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The Minnesota Supreme Court
1967-1968
The Minnesota Supreme Court Note comprehensively surveys
significant decisions of the 1967-1968 Term of the Minnesota
Supreme Court [hereinafter referred to as the Minnesota
Court or simply the Court]. The cases selected were thought
to represent new developments in Minnesota law and also to
present perplexing questions common to most jurisdictions; ac-
cordingly the decisions have been evaluated in terms of Minne-
sota law but the Minnesota Court's results have frequently been
compared with the law of other jurisdictions so that the analysis
is universally applicable. Also there are some 23 "Case Briefs"
of less significant decisions which may be of general interest
to the Minnesota Bar. While the cases are discussed separately
they are arranged according to the general legal issue involved.
In addition the Note presents statistics on recent operations of
the Court.
THE TABLES [:1964-1968]*
The data contained in the following Tables summarize the
four terms of the Minnesota Supreme Court from October,
1964, to October, 1968. So that the reader can evaluate these
Tables comprehensively, a statement of their purposes and bases
is presented here.
Tables I, II and III in each term concentrate primarily on
patterns of opinion-writing and voting among the individual jus-
tices. Table I tabulates the written opinions of each justice
according to the disposition represented and categorizes the num-
ber of votes cast by him, indicating abstentions as well as dis-
sents. Commencing with the 1967-1968 Term, the data for
opinions written and for absences reflect the operation of di-
visional sittings. Table II lists the total number of opinions
delivered during the respective terms and classifies them ac-
cording to whether the opinion was unanimous, per curiam or
with a dissent or concurrence. Table II for the 1967-1968 term
also indicates the number of opinions delivered under the di-
visional sitting system. Table III endeavors to determine the
alignment among the justices by measuring the extent of their
disagreements. It records the number of instances in which the
justices voted for opposite dispositions plus the number of in-
stances in which the justices voted for the same disposition but
* The text and Tables immediately following were prepared by Pro-
fessor Charles W. Wolfram or under his supervision in connection with
Notes From a Study of the Caseload of the Minnesota Supreme Court:
Some Statistics and Comments on Pressures and Responses, supra at
939.
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
did not join in an opinion. Table III includes per curiam dis-
positions as well as signed opinions.
Table IV categorizes by origin all of the opinions announced
by the Court during the respective terms. The primary purpose
is to show the approximate number of cases appealed from each
judicial district, commission, department or board and the number
of cases that originated in the Court itself. For this purpose, per
curiam decisions and cases dismissed without consideration of
the merits are counted as dispositions. The cases that originated
in the Supreme Court are subdivided depending upon whether
the Court was reviewing the action of a lower court or agency
or whether the case involved an entirely original proceeding in
the Supreme Court. Table IV also indicates the disposition or-
dered where the Court's decision required further consideration
by the originating court or agency.
Table V for each term indicates the general subject matter
of the action that gave rise to the opinion of the Court (not
necessarily the same as the principal issue decided by the Court).
The enumeration includes cases originating in the Court itself.
In areas of high interest or frequent occurrence, the subjects
are subdivided to indicate the subject matter more specifically.
Table V is also designed to indicate the relative success of de-
fendant and plaintiff appeals. Since success in the immediate
case is not always accurately measured by affirmance or re-
versal, the denomination of the result as "successful" or "un-
successful" has been employed.
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TABLE I
(1964-1965)
ACTION OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES
Opinions Written Votes
o 6 0
Knutson, C.J. 16 2 2 20 209 4 0
Gallager, T., J. 24 0 1 25 209 1 3
Nelson, J - 30 0 0 30 210 3 0
Murphy, J. 29 1 1 31 208 1 4
Otis, J. 29 1 2 32 210 2 1
Rogosheske, J. 27 2 2 31 208 2 3
Sheran, J. 26 3 1 30 209 1 3
Gallagher, F., Comm'r 25 0 0 25
Per Curiam 7 7
Totals 213 9 9 231 14 14
a Includes concurrences.
TABLE H
(1964-1965)
CLASSIFICATION OF WRITTEN OPINIONS
Number of Cases Percentage of Total
Unanimous 190 89.1
With Concurrence Only 8 3.8
With Dissent 8 3.8
Per Curiam 7 3.3
Totals 213 100.0
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
TABLE III*
(1964-1965)
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES
E4
Cd'
$-0 0
a'M Wf 1)U -40 -4 1; 1
__ __ __ C1 9 0 z 0
D 5 6 2 5 3 6
C 4 6 7 4 3 2KutsoT '9 12 9 9 6 8
N 210 '211 212 207 213 207
D 1 4 4 1 3
C 3 3 4 1 1Gallagher, T.- T 4 7 8 2 4
N 204 205 206 201 207
D 3 5 3 2
C .3 2 3 3Murphy T 6 7 6 5
N 210 '211 212 207
D 1 3 3'
C 4 5 6Nelson______ T 5 8 9
N 204 205 206
D 3 4
C 5 3Otis_ T 8 7
N 209 210
D 3
C 6Rogosheske_ _. T 9
N 208
* "D" represents decisions of the Court in which the justices voted
for opposite results. "C" represents decisions in which the justices voted
for the same result, but did not join together in an opinion. "'T" rep-
resents the total number of decisions in which the justices did not join
together in an opinion, i.e., the total number of decisions on which thejustices disagreed. '"N" represents the total number of decisions in
which both justices participated. The table includes per curiam opinions.
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TABLE IV
(1964-1965)
SOURCE AND DIsPosrrioN OFCASEs APPEALED
DispositionDisposition Ordered
Id 
..
2i2 2 r E
I AM
1st Judicial Dist. 19 6 2 1
2nd Judicial Dist. 35 23 10g 2 3 3
3rd Judicial Dist. -- ___20 10 9e Ii 1 4e 4a
4th Judicial Dist. ______59 34b 24 h b 3 5
5th Judicial Dist. 10 4 5 1d
6th Judicial Dist. 7 4 3 1 2
7th Judicial Dist. ____12 10 2 1
8th Judicial Dist. - - 4 3 1
9th Judicial Dist. 9 7 2 1 1
10th Judicial Dist. 15 7 7 e  1 3 2
Board of Tax Appeals 3 2 1
Industrial Comm'n 25 22 2 1 1
Dep't of Commerce 1 1
Comm'r of Banks 1 1
Dep't of Employment 2 2
212 134 70 7 1 16 18
Non- Re- Abso- Dis-
Supreme Court review view lute charged
Prohibition 5 1 4
Mandamus 2 2
Certiorari 1 1
Habeas Corpus 1 1
Certification 1
Cost Appeal 1 1 1
213 1 10 3 8
Includes one case that was reversed with directions to give judgment
to one defendant and a new trial to another.b Includes two cases each of which was affirmed in part and dismissed
in part.
c Includes one case that was not reversed but a new trial was granted
unless the plaintiff would consent to a remittitur.
d Includes one case in which a motion to dismiss the appeal was
denied without making further disposition.
e Includes two cases that were remanded for further proceedings
without reversal being ordered.
f Includes one case that was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
g Includes one case that was reversed and remanded for a partial new
trial.
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Disposition on Appeal
Appealed by Appealed by
Plaintiff Defendant
Cd )U
Subject Matter CJ
P U2
Contracts __ 16
Commercial Paper __
Construction -_
Personal Services
Sale-Realty
Sale-Other
Other-Business
Other-Nonbusiness -
Creditor Security -___ 3
Mechanics'
Lien Foreclosure -
Garnishment
Tax Lien
Foreclosure
Criminal Law 39
Appeal
Habeas Corpus
Domestic Relations - 12
Divorce
Adoption-Custody
Incompetency
Insurance 14
Motor Vehicle __
Life
Annuity
Workmen's
Compensation
Property Casualty
Labor Law 5
Public Employee
Intraunion
Wages
Other
1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1
2 2
2
1 1 3
2 3
1
3 1 2
1 1
h Includes one case that was reversed in part and remanded in part
for a new trial.
I Includes one case that was affirmed in part and reversed in part
for a new trial.
J Includes one case that was remanded for a partial new trial without
a reversal being ordered.
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
TABLE V
(1964-1965)
SUBJECT MATTER OF UNDERLYING DisPUTE
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Disposition on Appeal
Appealed by Appealed by
Plaintiff Defendant
Subject Matter 0 V Q
Property 17
Assessment 6 3 1 2
Eminent Domain __ 4 1 3
Title 5 1 4
Zoning 2 1 1
Regulatory Agency - 6
Banking 2 2
Agriculture 1 1
Insurance 1 1
Transportation .____ 2 1 1
State & Local
Government 12
Elections --- 
_- 2 1 1
Public Contracts 3 2 1
School Districts 1 1
City Annexation 1 1
Operations 3 2 1
Other 2 1 1
Taxation 4
Income 2 1 1
Sales ---- 1 1
Other 11Torts -- 49
Motor Vehicle
Negligence 25 3 11 5 6
Fraud 2 2
Intentional-Other 
__ 5 2 1 2
Product Liability - 2 2
Other 15 3 5 2 5
Trusts & Estates -___ 5
Decedents' Estates-
Administration - 1 1
Decedents' Estates-
Distribution 2 2
Wills 2 1 1
Welfare 4
Poor Relief 1 1
Unemployment
Compensation 3 1 2
Workmen's
Compensation - -----....25 25 1 12 1 11
Not Identified 2 2 2
Total 213 22 60 38 93
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
TABLE I
(1965-1966)
ACTION OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES
Opinions Written Votes
U~ ~ 2 0
00H 0 A A .________ Oo  :
Knutson, C.J. 14 1 2 17 208 1 4
Gallagher, T., J. 19 0 1 20 206 3 4
Nelson, J. 29 0 0 29 211 1 1
Murphy, J. 22 0 0 22 213 0 1
Otis, J. 30 3 5 38 205 6 2
Rogosheske, J. -- 24 4 1 29 211 2 0
Sheran, J. 29 2 1 32 209 2 2
Gallagher, F., Comm'r 26 26
Per Curiam 20 20
Totals 213 10 10 233 15 14
a Includes concurrences.
TABLE 11
(1965-1966)
CLASSIFICATION OF WRITTEN OPINIONS
Number of Cases Percentage of Total
Unanimous 174 81.6
With Concurrence Only 8 3.8
With Dissent 11 5.2
Per Curiam 20 9.4
Totals 213 100.0
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TABLE III*
(1965-1966)
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES
oH
19 P 00
0 -4- 0 as
____ __ 0 Z 0
D 4 2 7 2 1 3
Knutson- C 3 5 7 1 1 2T 7 7 14 3 2 5
N 208 210 209 209 210 206
- D 5 8 10 3 4
C 3 3 5 1 1Gallagher,T. T 8 6 15 4 5
N 207 209 208 208 209
D 3 3 5 1
C 2 4. 6 0NelsonT 5 7 11 1
N 211 213 212 212
D 2 2 7
C 2 4 6
Murphy T 4 6 13
N 210 212 211
D 7 7
C 6 7Otis- T 13 14
N 210 212
D 4
C 4Rogosheske T 8
N 211
* "D" represents decisions of the Court in which the justices voted for
opposite results. "C" represents decisions in which the justices voted
for the same result, but did not join together in an opinion. "T" rep-
resents the total number of decisions in which the justices did not join
together in an opinion, i.e., the total number of decisions on which the
justices disagreed. "N" represents the total number of decisions in
which both justices participated. The table includes per curiam opinions.
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TABLE IV
(1965-1966)
SOURCE AND DISPOSITION OF CASES APPEALED
DispositionDisposition Ordered
ta W>
1st Judicial Dist. 11 6 4a 1 3
2nd Judicial Dist. 23 10 13b e 1 8
3rd Judicial Dist. 14 10 3b e 1 3
4th Judicial Dist. 63 45 17a b obJ 1 6 5
5th Judicial Dist. 6 2di 4 2 1
6th Judicial Dist. 10 6 4e g 1 1
7th Judicial Dist. 7 6 1
8th Judicial Dist. 9 8 1
9th Judicial Dist. 21 17 4
10th Judicial Dist. 26 18 7 1 3 3
Board of Tax Appeals
(Tax Court) 3 2 1
Industrial Comm'n __ 14 12 23 1
Dep't of Employment - 1 1
208 143 61 4 - 17 21
Non- Re- Abso- Dis-
Supreme Court review view lute charged
Prohibition 7 4 3
Mandamus 2 2
Certification 4 lg 3
Discipline 3 3 3
Election 1 1 1
Stay 1 1 1
213 5 13 10 8
a Includes one case that was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
b Includes one case that was affirmed in part and reversed in part for
a new trial.
c Includes one case that was reversed for a partial new trial.
d Includes one case that was remanded for further proceedings with-
out a reversal being ordered.
e Includes one case that was not reversed but a new trial was ordered
unless the plaintiff would consent to a remittitur.
t Includes one case that was vacated and remanded for further pro-
ceedings.g Includes one case that, on certification by the trial court of an im-
portant and doubtful question, was remanded to the trial court after
answering the question in a manner inconsistent with the trial court's
tentative ruling.
1969] 1035
1036 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1026
TABLE V
(1965-1966)
SUBJECT MATTER OF UNDERLYiNG DISPUTE
Disposition on Appeal
Appealed by Appealed by
Plaintiff Defendant
04 W4 J
Subject Matter 0 W
Contracts 18
Commercial Paper 1 1
Lease 2 2
Construction 1 1
Personal Services 6 1 1 4
Sale-Realty 2 1 1
Sale-Other 2 1 1
Other-Business 4 1 1 2
Corporations & Securities 1 1 1
Creditor Security _ 5
Priority 3 3
Fraudulent
Conveyance 2 2
Criminal Law 64
Appeal 46 1 17 28
Habeas Corpus 18 3 15
Domestic Relations_ 9
Divorce 5 1 1 3
Adoption/Custody 4 1 3
Insurance 10
Motor Vehicle __ 7 4 1 2
Life 1 1
Other 2 1 1
Labor Law 5
Public Employee 4 3 1
Wages 1 1
Property 18
Assessment _ 4 2 1 1
Eminent Domain __ 8 1 3 4
Title 5 1 1 1 2
Zoning 1 1
Regulatory Agency 3
h Includes one case that was affirmed in part and in part remanded
for vacating of a second sentence.
I Includes one case that was affirmed in part and remanded for further
proceedings on a limited issue.
J Includes two cases each of which was remanded for further proceed-
ings without a reversal being ordered.
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Disposition on Appeal
Appealed by Appealed by
Plaintiff Defendant
Subject Matter 0 0
4- C) 2 w) 0o
Attorney Discipline __ 3 3
State & Local
Government 12
Elections - 4 1 2 1
School Districts _ 3 3
Other 5 2 2 1
Taxation _ 2
Income - 1 1
Other 1 1
Torts _ _ 49
Motor Vehicle
Negligence 22 3 7 1 11
Fraud 4 1 2 1
Intentional-Other __ 3 2 1
Civil Damage Act - 2 1 1
Product Liability 2 1 1
Other 16 1 7 8
Trusts & Estates _ - 2
Decedents' Estates - 1 1
Testamentary Trusts 1 1
Welfare 1
Unemployment
Compensation 1 1
Workmen's
Compensation 14 14 1 7 6
Total ---- 213 21 52 38 102
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
TABLE I
(1966-1967)
ACTION OF INDIIDUAL JUSTICES
Opinions Written Votes
0 .oo,~,
~U1 0FOo 0 k 42"
Knutson, C.J. 27 0 1 28 261 3 1
Gallagher, T., J.* __ 9 0 3 12 44 4 1
Nelson, J. 42 0 0 42 265 0 0
Murphy, J. 32 0 0 32 264 0 1
Otis, J. 22 0 10 32 251 10 4
Rogosheske, J. - 25 2 1 28 261 3 1
Sheran, J. - -- 35 0 0 35 258 1 6
Peterson, J.* - _ 19 0 2 21 211 2 3
Gallagher, F., J.** - 19 0 0 19 0 0
Per Curiam 35 35
Totals 265 2 1L7 284 23 17
* Mr. Justice T. Gallagher retired from the Court at the expiration
of his term of office in December, 1966; he did not seek re-election.
Forty-nine decisions were delivered prior to his retirement. Mr. Justice
Peterson was elected to fill the seat vacated and was sworn in on
January 3, 1967. After he was sworn in, 216 opinions were released, 49
of which were noted as having been argued and submitted before Mr.
Justice Peterson was a member of the Court.
** Mr. Justice F. Gallagher served the Court as a "commissioner"
prior to January 1967, at which time he was redesignated as a "tempor-
ary associate justice."
a Includes concurrences.
b Excludes cases where the justice was not a member of the Court at
the time of the argument and submission of the case.
TABLE II
(1966-1967)
CLASSIFICATION OF WRITTEN OPINIONS
Number of Cases Percentage of Total
Unanimous 211 79.6
With Concurrence Only - 4 1.5
With Dissent 15 5.7
Per Curiam 35 13.2
Totals 265 100.0
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TABLE III*
(1966-1967)
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES
5,
0
0u CU Ci)
9- 0 fit~
D 4 4 6 3 3 4 2
C 0 2 2 1 0 0 2Knutson_ T 4 6 8 4 3 4 4
N 258 263 260 263 264 47 164
D 2 2 2 2 2
C 1 2 3 1 1Petersonb---- T 3 4 5 3 3
N 158 163 159 164 164
D 4 4 8 4 4
C 0 0 0 0 0Gallagher, T _  T 4 4 8 4 4
N 46 48 46 48 48
D 1 3 10 0
C 0 3 1 1
Nelson 1 ' i 6 11 1
N 259 264 261 264
D 1 3 10
C 1 4 2Murphy. T 2 7 12
N 259 263 261
D 9 7C 1 3
Otis - T 1 10
N 255 260
D 4
C 3Rogosheske 
-_ T 7
N 258
* "D" represents decisions of the Court in which the justices voted for
opposite results. "C" represents decisions in which the justices voted for
the same result, but did not join together in an opinion. "T" represents
the total number of decisions in which the justices did not join together
in an opinion, i.e., the total number of decisions on which the justices dis-
agreed. "N" represents the total number of decisions in which both jus-
tices participated. The table includes per curiam opinions.
a Prior to his retirement on December 30, 1966, Mr. Justice T. Gal-
lagher was a member of the Court during the 1966-1967 term when 49
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TABLE IV
(1966-1967)
SOURCE AND DISPOSITION OF CASES APPEALED
Disposition
Disposition Ordered
3rd~~r rdica Dit 1 2
4. >
_ _ _ _ _1H a) W
1st Judicial Dist. 16 9 7 f 1 1
2nd Judicial Dist. 47 33 14e h 7 4
3rd Judicial Dist. 13 12 1 1
4th Judicial Dist. 70 49 18bd f 1 2 8 5
5th Judicial Dist. 16 9 6 1 1
6th Judicial Dist..~___ 12 8 4 1 1
7th Judicial Dist.. _ 12 8 3 1 1 1
8th Judicial Dist. ____ 5 2 2f 1 1
9th Judicial Dist. 15 10 41 1 2 2
10th Judicial Dist. 41 28 12c d k 1 10
Board of Tax Appeals
(Tax Court) 3 2 1 1
Industrial Comm'n 13 8 59 J 4
Commerce Comm'n .. 1 I
264 179 77 6 2 36 16
Non- Re- Abso- Dis-
Supreme Court review view lute charged
Prohibition 5 3 2
Mandamus 2 1 1
Certification 6 1 5
Discipline 1 11 1
265 1 13 5 9
decisions were announced.
b After Mr. Justice Peterson was sworn in on January 3, 1967, 216
decisions were announced, 49 of which included notations that Mr. Jus-
tice Peterson had not been a member of the court at the time of argu-
ment and submission and had taken no part in their consideration or
decision. Thus, following Mr. Justice Peterson's swearing in, 167 de-
cisions were announced in which he could have participated, except for
reasons causing him to recuse himself as occurred three times during the
term.
a Includes one case in which a new trial was granted on the issue of
damages only.b Includes one case that was affirmed in part and remanded in part for
clarification or correction of the order of the trial court.
c Includes one habeas corpus case that was remanded upon the pro se
petitioner's retention of counsel.
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TABLE V
(1966-1967)
SUBJECT MATTER OF UNDERLYING DISPUTE
1041
Disposition on Appeal
Appealed by Appealed by
Plaintiff Defendant
Subject Matter 'o
04. ,0.n U Wi
Contracts 16
Commercial Paper - 2. 1 1
Lease 1I1__
Construction 3 1 2
Personal Service - 2 1 1
Sale-Realty 4 1 1 1 1
Sale-Other 3 1 2
Other-Business 1 1
Corporations & Securities 4 2 1 1
Creditor Security 4
Priority 2 2Me~chanics' Lien
Foreclosure L 1 1
Homestead 1 1
Criminal Law _ __100
Appeal 66 1 12 53
Habeas Corpus 34; 2 8 24
Domestic Relations - 12
Divorce 5i 2 2- 1
Adoption/Custody - 6 1 5
Incompetency 1 1
d Includes one case that was affirmed in part and remanded in part
for further proceedings without a reversal being ordered.
0 Includes three cases that were remanded for further proceedings
without reversal being ordered.
f Includes one case that was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
9 Includes one case that was remanded for further proceedings with-
out a reversal being ordered.
h Includes one case that was affirmed in part and reversed in part
for a new trial unless the aefendant would consent to the entry of ajudgment against him in the amount of the jury..verdict in the first
trial.I Includes one case that was not reversed but a new trial was ordered
unless the plaintiff would consent to a remittitur.
I Includes one case that was affirmed in part and reversed and re-
manded in part for further proceedings.
L Includes one case that was affirmed and remanded to the sentencing
court for a hearing on the voluntariness of the defendant's confession
before granting the new trial ordered by the habeas corpus court.
I Includes one case in which the application for reinstatement by an
attorney suspended from practice was denied.
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Disposition on Appeal
Appealed by Appealed by
Plaintiff Defendant
Subject Matter U,5
o i
Insurance --- - 13
Motor Vehicle ___ 6 2 2 2
Annuity 1 1
Workmen's
Compensation 1
Other 5 1 3 1
Labor Law - - 6
Public Employee - 5 1 2 2
Other 1 1
Property 9
Assessment -1 1
Eminent Domain -- 4 3 1
Title - 1 1
Zoning 3 2 1
Regulatory Agency - 3
Attorney Discipline - 1 1
Banking 1 1
Barbering 1 1
State & Local
Government 12
School Districts 3 1 2
Public Contracts 1 1
City Annexation - 1 1
Elections 1 1
Other 6 1 3 2
Taxation 4
Inheritance 2 1 1
Other 2 1 1
Torts ----- 68
Motor Vehicle
Negligence 32 8 13 2 9
Fraud --- 6 1 5
Intentional-Other 3 2 1
Product Liability .6 1 2 1 2
Other .21 2 9 1 9
Trusts & Estates . 2
Decedents' Estates-
Administration - 1
Testamentary Trust - 1 1
Workmen's
Compensation - 12 12 1 2 4 5
Total -....  265 24 61 41 139
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
TABLE I
(1967-1968)
ACTION OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES
Opinions Written Votes
dJ 0
Knutson, C.J ___ 1 22 0 0 23 305 0 0 0Nelson, .- 16 23 0 0 39 265 1 40 0
Murphy,J. 10 18 0 0 28 259 1 46 0
Otis, J.. ___- 9 26 0 4 39 250 6 46 4
Rogosheske, J._ 16 19 0 3 38 257 3 45 1
Sheran, J. - 13 26 0 2 41 258 2 54 1
Peterson, J. 13 24 2 2 41 252 5 45 4
Gallagher, F., J. 14 20 0 0 34 0 45 2
Per Curiam - - 12 24 36
Totals 306 104 202 2 11 319 18 312 12
a Includes concurrences.
TABLE 11
(1967-1968)
CLASSIFICATION OF WRITTEN OPINIONS
Number of Cases Percentage of Total
0 0
Unanimous - 92 166 258 30.1 54.3 84.4
With Concurrence
Only 0 1 1 0.0 0.3 0.3
With Dissent 0 11 11 0.0 3.6 3.6
Per Curiam 12 24 36 3.9 7.8 11.7
Totals 104 202 306 34.0 66.0 100.0
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TABLE HI*
(1967-1968)
ALIGNIVMENT OF JUSTICES
a)
rn 0n00 0Cb-0
0)1 4 0 4 0z
D 4 2 3 4 11
KusnC 2 0 0 0 0 0
Knutson T 6 2 3 4 1 1
N 256 258 260 257 259 265
D 5 1 4 5 0
C 2 0 0 0 0
..... T 7 1 4 5 0
N 217 219 225 243 247
D 5 1 4 5
C 2 0 0 0Murphy T 7 1 4 5
N 225 213 234 227
D 4 6 5
C 2 0 0Otis T 6 6 5
N 211 227 215
D 7 3
C 1 1Rogosheske -. T 8 4
N 248 236
D 6
C 1
Sheran T 7
N 242
* "D" represents decisions of the Court in which the justices voted
for opposite rseults. "C" represents decisions in which the justices
voted for the same result, but did not join together in an opinion.
"T" represents the total number of decisions in which the justices did
not join together in an opinion, i.e., the total number of decisions on
which the justices disagreed. "'" represents the total number of de-
cisions in which both justices participated. The table includes per
curiam opinions.
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TABLE IV
(1967-1968)
SOURCE AND DISPOSITION OF CASES APPEALED
Disposition
Disposition Ordered
3rdr JuiilDs.1r d  Id 1o 3ohuiaD42 1 0 r. 0
7th4 >uica Dist E!7
1st Judicial Dist. 17 9 8a e 4 2a
2nd Judicial Dist. 53 40 121 1 2 1
3rd Judicial Dist. 16 8 7de 1 3 3
4th Judicial Dist. 92 64 24f g h 4 8 7
5th Judicial Dist. 14 10 4 1
6th Judicial Dist. __ 2 10 1 1 1
7th Judicial Dist. 11 7 4 1
8th Judicial Dist. 13 9 3 1
9th Judicial Dist. 17 11 6b 3 1
10th Judicial Dist. _____39 36 2b c 1 2 1
Tax Court rieiw ue ag2 2
Industrial Comm n 18 16 2b 1
Dep't of Employment 2 1 1
306 223 74 9 - 25 16
Non- Re- Abso- Dis-
Supreme Court review view lute charged
Prohibition 2 2
Mandamus 8 5 3
Certification 5 5
Certiorari 1 1
306 0 16 5 11
a Includes one case that was reversed and remanded for a partial new
trial.
b Includes one case that was remanded for further proceedings with-
out a reversal being ordered.
c Includes one case that, on the defendant's appeal, was remanded to
the sentencing court for further proceedings without a reversal being
ordered of the ruling of the habeas corpus court.
d Includes one case that was remanded for reconsideration of a lim-
ited issue without a reversal being ordered.
Includes one case that was remanded for clarification of the findings
of the trial court, without a reversal being ordered.
g Includes one case that was reversed in part.
h Includes two cases each of which was remanded for further proceed-
ings without reversal being ordered.
i Includes one case that was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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TABLE V(1967-1968)
SUBJECT MATTER OF UNDERLYING DISPUTE
I I I Disposition on Appeal
Subject Matter
Contracts 15
Commercial Paper -
Lease
Construction
Personal Service_
Sale-Realty
Sale-Other
Other-Business -Other-Nonbusiness 
_
Corporation & Securities 2
Creditor Security - 12
Priority
Mechanics' Lien
Foreclosure
Other
Criminal Law 127
Appeal
Habeas Corpus ___
Domestic Relations 19
DivorceAdoption/Custody 
_
Insurance 20
Motor Vehicle
Annuity
Workmen's
Compensation
Property Casualty
Accident & Disability
Other
Labor Law 8
Public Employee
Wages
Property 20
Assessment
Eminent Domain --
TitleZoning
Appealed by
Plaintiff
W4
C.U)
2 1
2 1
1
3 2
1 1
2 1
3 2
1 1
2 2
5 1 3
Appealed by
Defendant
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1 1
1 5 18
1
2 5 1
1 3
1 5 1
1
2
2
31 1
2
13
12 1
1 1
1
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MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
Disposition on Appeal
Appealed by Appealed by
Plaintiff Defendant
H~ t2 QI2
Subject Matter w 0 W "5
-4 E-4 a) C) H .0 c
cc; 0 0 0
State & Local
Government - 4
Public Contracts
Elections
School Districts
Operations
Taxation 2
Income
Torts 53
Motor Vehicle
Negligence
Product Liability
Intentional-Other
Civil Damage Act
Fraud
Other
Trusts & Estates -_ 2
Decedents' Estates-
Distribution .. _
Welfare 4
Unemployment
Compensation
Poor Relief
Workmen's
Compensation -_ 17
Not Identified I
Total _306
11
1
4 8
3 5
1 11 1
1
1 6
2 7
1
2 2
1
3 3
1 1
2
1 5 1 10
1
24 80 47 155
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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law: 1967 Sunday Closing
Law Ruled Void for Vagueness
Seeking to test the constitutionality of the Sunday closing
law enacted by the 1967 session of the Minnesota legislature,1 a
large discount store opened on a Sunday and sold wallpaper to
two policemen. A complaint was subsequently issued against
the store and its assistant manager charging violation of the clos-
ing statute. The Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed the com-
plaint, hoZding that the law's vagueness and uncertainty was a
denial of due process under the Minnesota and United States
Constitutions.2 The court also held that the 1967 statute had
not repealed the prior Minnesota Sunday law and that it re-
mained in effect. State v. Target Stores, Incorporated, 279 Minn.
447, 156 N.W.2d 908 (1968).
The vast majority of states with Sunday legislation have
general closing laws which require cessation of all commercial
activities except for works of charity and necessity. Laws of
this type are normally upheld on the ground that they are legiti-
mate exercises of state police power 3 -the power of the state
1. MINN. STAT. § 325.91(7) (1967). This statute adopted a commod-
ities approach and only prohibited the sale of the following commodi-
ties: -
cameras; musical instruments including pianos and organs; rec-
ords and other recordings; phonographs and tape recorders; ra-
dio receivers and television receivers; jewelry; clocks and
watches; furs; furniture and other home furnishings; home appli-
ances; footwear; wearing apparel of all kinds; luggage; lawn
mowers and other power driven or manually operated outdoor
machinery and equipment; hardware and tools; paints; varnishes
and wallpaper, and painting and wallpaper tools and supplies;
lumber and other building materials and supplies; floor cover-
ngs.
2. The Target court's conclusion that the 1967 enactment was un-
constitutionally vague is open to criticism. While it cannot be denied
that the statute's enumeration of commodities left many questions un-
answered, it is by no means clear that the uncertainties could not have
been solved by requesting the state Attorney General to promulgate
rulings or opinions on the areas of doubt. This approach has proved
satisfactory in the case of the Minnesota Sales Tax Act, which contains
virtually the same kind of enumeration as the 1967 closing statute.
MAmN. STAT. § 297A.01 (1967). The argument that such an approach is
time-consuming and otherwise cumbersome certainly does not outweigh
the arguable benefits of the statute to the extent that the enactment
should be declared unconstitutional.
3. Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164 (1900); State v. Ludwig, 21
Minn. 202 (1875). In accord with the widely held belief that the pro-
motion of religion was a responsibility of the government, the purpose
of the earliest Sunday laws was either directly or indirectly to compel
church attendance. During this early period of our history the courts
quite frankly recognized the religious nature of the Sunday laws and
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to place such restrictions upon private rights as are necessary
for the general welfare.4 Although this power has been greatly
expanded in recent years, its exercise is still limited by the due
process and equal protection clauses of most state constitutions
and the United States Constitution.5
In 1961 the United States Supreme Court reviewed four
cases involving Sunday closing laws. In one group of decisions,
the Court held that the laws in question violated neither the
equal protection nor the due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment nor the constitutional guarantees of freedom of re-
ligion and separation of church and state.6 All of the statutes
before the Court were general closing laws which provided
exemptions for items considered essential to either the health
and welfare of the people or to the recreational atmosphere
of the day.7 Such laws are of the type which is currently in
force in Minnesota.
The Sunday law enacted by the 1967 session of the Minne-
sota Legislature and rejected by the Target court was not a
general closing law but rather a commodities law which merely
prohibited the sale of specified items.8 At least two other states
have enacted such statutes, only to see them held unconstitu-
tional by their respective state supreme courts on the ground
that they violated the equal protection clause of both the state
and United States Constitutions. An ordinance enacted in Ne-
braska, prohibiting the Sunday sale of new or used clothing,
shoes, jewelry, ready-to-wear items, hardware, groceries, and
even went so far as to sustain them on that basis. Near the turn of
the century courts began to sustain Sunday legislation on the theory
that it is a legitimate exercise of the state's police power, in that it
promotes the health and welfare of the people by establishing a uni-
form day of rest. For an excellent history of Sunday legislation, see
L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (1953).
4. Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312, 24 N.W.2d
244 (1946).
5. State v. Ernst, 209 Minn. 586, 297 N.W. 24 (1941).
6. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 366 U.S. 617(1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys From Harri-
son-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).'
7. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961), the Court
enumerated exactly why a legislature might properly exempt the com-
modities which the Maryland legislature chose: a family which takes
a ride on Sunday will need gasoline and may enjoy a soft drink or fresh
fruit; those who go to the beach may desire ice cream or other items
normally sold there; some people will prefer alcoholic beverages to
add to their relaxation; and newspapers and drug products should al-
ways be made available to the public. Id. at 426.
8. See note 2 supra, and accompanying text.
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meat products, while not prohibiting Sunday labor or business
in general, was ruled unconstitutional because it was discrimin-
atory and unrelated to the health, safety, peace, or good order of
societyY A similar commodities law in Michigan was ruled un-
constitutional as the Michigan court said:
Since it appears that the sole and only objective of [the
Michigan Sunday closing law], is to eliminate, or at least reduce,
competition, since the general welfare is neither enhanced nor
promoted, and since no evil is eliminated by the act, it must be
concluded that it is not a valid and proper exercise by the legis-
lature of its police power.'0
The Target court held Minnesota's commodity statute void
on the ground of vagueness. The statute's classifications of re-
stricted commodities did not include all commodities sold in a
department store, nor did they contain a definitive test for de-
termining which of the thousands of items carried for sale in
such stores could not be sold on Sunday. The court stated that
the designation of restricted commodities did not afford clear
warning of the type of conduct which would violate the statute,"
and that this was violative of the due process clauses of the state
and United States Constitutions. In dictum, the court added
that the 1967 enactment was not a denial of equal protection to
retail merchants nor did it offend the first amendment guarantee
of freedom of religion. Finally, the Minnesota court concluded
that the prior general Sunday closing law was not repealed by
the 1967 enactment, thereby restoring the Sunday closing situ-
ation in Minnesota to the status it occupied prior to 1967-an
unenforced general proscription.
The court's resolution of the Target case unfortunately fails
to consider what was probably the most crucial legal issue em-
braced therein-the purpose and effects of the statute in the
context of equal protection. The 1967 enactment can be viewed
as a legislative attempt to arrest the economic decline of the in-
ner cities caused, in part, by the competition from the ever grow-
9. Skag-Way Dep't Stores, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 707,
140 N.W.2d 28 (1966).
10. Arlans' Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Kelley, 374 Mich. 70, 75, 130
N.W.2d 892, 894 (1964).
11. State v. Suess, 236 Minn. 174, 179, 52 N.W.2d 409 (1952). A
similar doctrine was formulated by the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). Another judge
once stated that a Sunday law must be definite and certain enough "so
that violation thereof becomes ascertainable in some manner other
than by extra-sensory perception, moon gazing, or resort to a crystal
ball." Arlans' Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Kelley, 374 Mich. 70, 81-82, 130
N.W.2d 892, 897 (1964) (O'Hara, J., concurring).
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ing suburbs. Conspicuously, the statute prohibited the sale of
virtually all commodities carried by large suburban discount
stores. The fact that many of these items might also be marketed
by the merchants downtown hardly mitigates this appraisal-
these merchants obviously do not desire to, nor do they currently
compete with suburban stores on Sunday. The stores in the city
can compete during the week in the presence of the great many
people working downtown; but on Sundays, the city fails to
attract the countless suburban shoppers. By resolving the case
on the tenuous ground of vagueness, the court effectively dodged
the equal protection issue and consequently has left little in the
way of guidelines for future legislative action in this area of eco-
nomic regulation.
What makes the court's failure to discuss the equal pro-
tection issue even more unfortunate is the court's dubious con-
clusion, justifying its reticence, that the 1967 enactment merely
supplemented the state's general Sunday closing law. Although
repeals by implication are not favored in Minnesota,12 and will
not be inferred unless clearly intended by the legislature,13 such
intent can be evidenced by the fact that the later statute fully
covers the subject of the prior statute and is inconsistent there-
with.14 Moreover, even if there is no conflict between an old
and a new statute, the former will be considered repealed if the
legislature clearly intended that the later statute proscribe a
general and exclusive rule.15
In reaching its conclusion that the new act did not repeal
the prior general law, the court relied on Two Guys from Harri-
son-Allentown, Incorporated v. McGinley,16 a case in which the
United States Supreme Court upheld a commodities approach
statute on the basis that it merely amended a general closing law.
12. State v. Northwest Linseed Co., 209 Minn. 422, 297 N.W. 635,
appeal dismissed, 313 U.S. 544 (1941).
13. The means of ascertaining the intention of the legislature are
enumerated in mNx. STAT. § 645.16 (1967).
14. MAxN. STAT. § 645.39 (1967) governs repeal by implication:
When a law purports to be a revision of all laws upon a par-
ticular subject, or sets up a general or exclusive system covering
the entire subject matter of a former law and is intended as a
substitute for such former law, such law shall be construed to
repeal all former laws upon the same subject. When a general
law purports to establish a uniform and mandatory system cov-
ering a class of subjects, such law shall be construed to repeal
preexisting local or special laws on the same class of subjects.
In all other cases, a later law shall not be construed to repeal
an earlier law unless the two laws are irreconcilable.
15. Nicol v. St. Paul, 80 Minn. 415, 83 N.W. 375 (1900).
16. 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
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However, it must be noted that in the Two Guys case the com-
modity restriction statute specifically stated that it was an act
"amending the act . . . entitled 'An Act to consolidate, amend
and revise the penal laws of the Commonwealth,' prohibiting cer-
tain business activities on Sunday."17 The preamble to the 1967
Minnesota enactment simply stated that it was an "act pro-
hibiting certain commercial activities on Sundays and certain
holidays.. .. '"18 The word "amending," which is generally used
when a statute is merely supplemental, is conspicuously absent.
Moreover, the 1967 enactment provides that "[n]o person ...
shall . . . sell a restricted item in such establishment ... on
Sunday.. ,"19 which implies that commodities not restricted
by this particular statute may be sold on Sunday, even if such
sale would be proscribed by the general law. In addition, the
1967 act appears to cover the entire subject matter of the older
law. It contains comprehensive definitions of terms, has its own
Sabbitarian exemption clause and is capable of operating as an
independent statute. Further evidence that the 1967 act was in-
tended to stand alone is found in the fact that the religious
exemption in the 1967 act differs substantially from the exemp-
tion in the older Sunday law. The latter provided an exemption
for anyone who "uniformly keeps another day of the week as
holy time .... "20 The 1967 act, on the other hand, only pro-
vided an exemption for those who regularly closed on Saturday.
Thus the 1967 statute did not make the choice of Saturday or
Sunday depend on religious habits, but rather left each person
free to choose either day at his own discretion. If the legis-
lature had merely intended to amend the prior law, it seems
unlikely that it would have undertaken a major revision of the
religious exemption for these few enumerated commodities. The
change indicates that the 1967 legislature was taking a fresh
approach to the subject of Sunday closing and intended to have
this particular statute cover the entire field. Finally, the pro-
hibitions of the 1967 act apply to six separate holidays as well
as to Sundays, whereas the prior law applied only to Sunday
sales. Although no one of these factors is conclusive, when
examined in the aggregate they indicate the intent of the legis-
lature to repeal the general closing law and replace it with new
comprehensive legislation.21
17. No. 212, [1959] Laws of Pa.
18. Ch. 165, [1967] Minn. Laws.
19. MINN. STAT. § 325.912 (1967) (eniphasis added).
20. MINN. STAT. § 624.03 (1967).
21. See note 14 supra. The 1967 Sunday law clearly appears to
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It seems surprising that the legislature did not make its
intent known, as it does in most statutes, by stating in the pre-
amble the purpose of the statute and its effect on prior laws
dealing with the same subject matter. Certainly many of the
legislators were aware of the landmark decisions by the United
States Supreme Court in 1961, particularly the Two Guys rule
that legislatures may enact commodities statutes if they supple-
ment general closing laws. Perhaps the legislature did not de-
sire to infect the 1967 act with the prior law, which was openly
defied and seldom enforced. Instead, it may have chosen to en-
act a new law with new penalties in order to impress upon the
public as well as the law enforcement agencies that Sunday
closing should be enforced in the future.
If the Minnesota court had concluded that the 1967 enactment
repealed the general closing law, it arguably would have been
obliged to hold the law violative of the equal protection clause
of the Minnesota and United States Constitutions.22 The equal
protection clause requires that statutory distinctions between
classes of persons or objects have some relevance to the purpose
of the enactment. Persons similarly situated must be treated
equally. Any classification must therefore be based on some
real difference between the classes.23 Discrimination cannot be
held reasonable if it offends plain standards of common sense.24
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held statutes unconstitu-
tional as class legislation when it was unable to justify the
distinctions which resulted in the inclusion of some classes and
the exclusion of others. A statute under consideration in State
v. Pehrson2 5 required transient merchants selling natural farm
products such as cattle, hogs, sheep, eggs and butter to obtain a
license. Exemptions from this statute were extended to persons
fall within the coverage of this statute as serving to repeal by implica-
tion the prior law.
22. In the Target case, the Minnesota court, even though conclud-
ing that the 1967 statute did not violate the equal protection clause, did
admit that the statute had potential incongruities and at least marginal
situations of inequality. The court noted that these inequalities would
have been especially evident if the statute had been the only one
regulating Sunday sales in Minnesota.
23. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38
(1928), quoted in State v. Pehrson, 205 Minn. 573, 578, 287 N.W. 313, 316(1939). The Coleman case went on to state that any "discriminations of
an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to deter-
mine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision [of the
equal protection clause]." 277 U.S. at 37-38.
24. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301
U.S. 459 (1937).
25. 205 Minn. 573, 287 N.W. 313 (1939).
19691 1053
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
selling milk, cream, fruit, vegetables, grain or straw. The Min-
nesota court did not defer to the legislative judgment as to the
reasonableness of the distinctions. It stated that,
[i]t cannot be said... that a man selling eggs is any more apt
to become a nuisance than one selling vegetables. No reason
appears why butter should be considered more dangerous to
the health of consumers than milk, cream or fruit.26
The same irrationality is perhaps evident in the 1967 Minnesota
Sunday enactment. However, it should be noted that if the Sun-
day law had been construed as an economic regulation, strong
deference to the legislature as to the reasonableness of the clas-
sifications likely would be warranted.27
Although the object of the 1967 law presumably was to pro-
mote a day of rest for most people in the state, it is difficult
to see how the classifications in the statute helped achieve this
end. The net effect of the enactment was to give a class of per-
sons a privilege not accorded others similarly situated. The
class which directly benefited from the 1967 law was composed
of downtown merchants who operate commercial businesses
which sell the restricted items and who find it economically
impractical to remain open on Sunday. The rationale behind
the 1967 Supreme Court decisions which upheld general Sun-
day closing laws was that such laws were necessary to secure
the uniform day of rest required to promote the general welfare
of the public.28 It is clear that the 1967 Minnesota enactment
did not attain this object. Each merchant was permitted to
choose between closing on Saturday or Sunday.29 Thus it was
possible that half of the merchants would elect to remain open
on Sunday while the others would choose Saturday.30 Moreover,
the 1967 statute failed to prevent an employee who worked on
Saturday for one merchant from working on Sunday for an-
other, thus working seven days a week. Although the ostensible
purpose of the 1967 Sunday law was permissable under the state's
police power, the means by which it sought to achieve its goal
26. Id. at 580, 287 N.W. at 317.
27. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See also
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934); Note, Sunday Blue Laws: An Analysis of Their Position in
Our Society, 12 RuTGERs L. R.v. 505 (1958).
28. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. '120 (1961).
29. MiNN. STAT. § 325.913(5) (1967).
30. This type of provision, which does not require any religious
basis for electing to close on Saturday rather than on Sunday, was not
present in any of the statutes which the United States Supreme Court
declared constitutional in the 1961 cases. See Arlan's Dep't Stores,
Inc. v. Kelley, 374 Mich. 70, 130 N.W.2d 892 (1964).
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were neither effective to this end nor reasonable in their nature.
Thus if the Minnesota court had concluded that the 1967 law
was the only law regulating Sunday business in Minnesota, it
would have been incumbent upon it to declare the statute in-
valid as an improper exercise of the state's police power.
The desirability of Sunday closing laws in the modern con-
text is not nearly as clear as it was many decades ago. Today's
labor force is no longer totally subordinate to the desires of man-
agement and those persons who choose to work on Sundays or
holidays generally receive substantially higher than weekday
pay. Federal legislation and the strong bargaining position of
labor unions have given most American workers a five day work
week. In addition, most states presently protect non-union work-
ers by regulating the number of hours a person can work each
week.3 1 In light of these factors, Sunday laws should continue
to be closely examined for their illegal purposes and effects, as
well as their vagueness.
Corporations: Director Indemnification
in Minnesota
Former directors sued defendant corporation to recover
indemnity for expenses they incurred in defending an action
brought by the SEC charging them with "gross abuse of trust
and gross misconduct" and with violations of section 17(d) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940.1 The trial court in the SEC
action acquitted the directors on the charge of "gross abuse and
gross misconduct" but held that they had violated section 17 (d)
by placing themselves in "continual danger of conflict of in-
terests." The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the lower
court's denial of indemnification as a matter of right, holding
that there is no common-law right to indemnification in third
party suits when the directors are not completely vindicated on
the merits. In addition, the court held that the indemnification
statute2 and the corporation's by-law3 merely permitted rather
31. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAu OF LABOR STANDARDS, GRowTH OF
LABOR LAw iN T=s UxcrsD STATES 73-84 (1962).
1. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1963). This provision of the Investment
Company Act makes it unlawful for any affiliated person of a registered
investment company to participate in any arrangement or joint enter-
prise with that company unless such participation has been approved
by the SEC.
2. MnnN. STAT. § 301.09(7) (1967), which provides that every
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than compelled indemnification. Tomash v. Midwest Technical
Development Corporation, - Minn. , 160 N.W.2d 273 (1968).
There has been substantial confusion in the common law
over the question of when a corporation has the power as opposed
to the duty to reimburse an executive for his litigation expenses.
Early corporate indemnification cases drew an analogy between
corporate executives and trustees.4 In the area of trusts, the
courts freely grant indemnification of legal expenses to trustees
who successfully resist charges against their integrity and man-
agement of trust affairs.5 This rule is based upon the principle
that the estate or trust should bear the expenses since it has
benefitted from the successful defense. When the fiduciary is
adjudged delinquent, however, the courts feel that there is no
justification for indemnification since the trust or estate has
been harmed.6 This principle of indemnifying only when such
expenses benefit the trust was extended to the corporate context
where it became known as the "corporate benefit theory."7 Al-
corporation shall have power:
To indemnify each director or officer or former director or
officer against all expenses, including attorney's fees, but ex-
cluding amounts paid pursuant to a judgment or settlement
agreement, reasonably incurred by him in connection with or
arising out of any action, suit or proceeding to which he is a
party, by reason of being or having been a director or officer
of the corporation, except with respect to matters as to which
he shall be finally adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding to
be liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of
his duties. Such indemnification shall not be exclusive of any
other rights to which he may be entitled under any by-law,
agreement, vote of stockholders or otherwise.
3. The Midwest by-law provided:
Each director . . . may be indemnified by the Corporation
against reasonable costs and expenses incurred by him in con-
nection with any action, suit or proceeding to which he may
be made a party by reason of his being or having been a di-
rector .... except in relation to any actions, suits, or proceed-
ings in which he has been adjudged liable because of willful
misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence or reckless disregard of
the duties involved in the conduct of his office....
Tomash v. Midwest Tech. Dev. Corp., - Minn. ._ 160 N.W.2d 273,
277 (1968) (emphasis added).
4. See New York Dock Co. v. McCollum, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.
2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222
(1931).
5. E.g., Van Gorden v. Lunt, 234 Iowa 832, 13 N.W.2d 341 (1944);
Linn v. Linn, 146 Neb. 666, 21 N.W.2d 283 (1946); In re Purcell's Estate,
125 N.J. Eq. 372, 6 A.2d 137 (1939); Application of Arms, 193 Misc. 427,
81 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1948).
6. See 6 A. ScoTT, TRusTs § 245 at 2155 (3d ed. 1967).
7. See New York Dock Co. v. McCollum, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.
2d 844 (Sup. Ct., 1939); Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222
(1931). These cases are discussed at length infra. The "corporate bene-
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though it is entirely reasonable to proscribe corporate indemnifi-
cation of directors who have breached their fiduciary duties, the
"corporate benefit theory" has caused problems in derivative
suits since courts have had difficulty seeing how a corporation
can benefit from the defeat of an action brought in its right and
on its behalf.8
The first major case in this area was Griesse v. Lang,9 where
directors of a corporation had successfully defended on the merits
against charges of dereliction of duty. The court held that cor-
porations do not have the power to pay their executive's legal
fees out of corporate funds when there has been no corporate
benefit. Following the rationale of Griesse,10 New York Dock
Company v. McCollum" held that absent a showing that a di-
rector "has conserved some substantial interest of the corporation
S.. or has brought some definite benefit to the corporation" by
successfully defending a derivative suit, the corporation is under
no legal obligation to indemnify him. Although McColum only
held that the directors were not entitled to indemnification as a
matter of right, the court intimated that a corporation may not
even have the power to indemnify when there is no corporate
benefit. The concern which McCollum caused among corporate
planners and management led to the enactment of statutes ex-
pressly stating that corporations have the power to indemnify
under such circumstances. The first of these "enabling acts"
was adopted by the New York Legislature in 1941.12 Delaware
followed suit in 1943.13
fit" principle also underlies the general rule that a stockholder, in
bringing an action on behalf of the corporation, can only be reimbursed
for his expenses when such action results in a pecuniary benefit to the
corporation. E.g., State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 244 Iowa 785, 56
N.W.2d 173 (1953); Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257
Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960); Grant v. Lookout Mountain Co., 93
Tenn. 691, 28 S.W. 90 (1894).
8. See note 7 supra.
9. 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222 (1931).
10. Id.
11. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
12. The original New York statutes were Laws of 1943, ch. 22,
§ 27 and Laws of 1943, ch. 22, § 61. The former enabled corporations
to provide for indemnification in their charter or by-laws and the latter
conferred on insiders a qualified right to indemnification. Both statutes
have been replaced by N.Y. GEN. Cor. LAW §§ 63-67 (McKinney Supp.
1968). See G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, INDENINIFTING THE CORPORATE
ExEcuTiVE 113 (1963).
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(10) (1953). For a collection of
state statutes dealing with indemnification see G. WASHINGTON & J.
BISHOP, supra note 12, Appendix A.
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The trend toward corporate indemnification of directors
which was initiated by these statutes was continued and ex-
tended by the non-statutory cases of Solimine v. Hollander4 and
In re E.C. Warner Company15 which rejected both the rationale
and results of McCollum'6 and Griesse.17 Solimine held that
directors who are successful on the merits in stockholder deriva-
tive suits are entitled to corporate indemnification of their rea-
sonable litigation expenses.' 8 The Solimine court emphasized
that directors, like executors and other trustees, should be en-
couraged to resist unjust charges by the knowledge that reim-
bursement is available upon the establishment of innocence.
The court also felt that its holding would discourage strike
suits and induce responsible businessmen to accept director-
ships. Similarly Warner,'9 a Minnesota case, held that a cor-
porate director who is vindicated on the merits in a derivative
suit is entitled to indemnification of his reasonable expenses.
The court stated that vindication of the integrity of manage-
ment was a corporate benefit in a general sense, but emphasized
that there was a right to be indemnified in such circumstances
"irrespective of any showing of direct or tangible benefit to the
corporation.'' 20  Reiterating the rationale of Solimine,21 the
court reasoned that absent such a rule the emoluments of a di-
rectorship would never be commensurate with the risk of incur-
ring legal expenses for defending against unjust charges.22
The common-law right to indemnification established in
Solimine and Warner had a liberalizing influence on the legis-
lative trend evidenced by the adoption in several states of stat-
utes establishing a right of indemnification for corporate execu-
tives who had successfully defended derivative suits on the mer-
its. 23 In Minnesota, however, the enactment in 1951 of an en-
abling statute of the old Delaware type seemed almost a step
14. 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941).
15. 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950).
16. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
17. 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222 (1931).
18. See also Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 109 N.W. 581 (1906).
19. 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950).
20. Id. at 215, 45 N.W.2d at 393 (emphasis added).
21. 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941).
22. In re E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 215, 45 N.W.2d 388, 393
(1950).
23. E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 271.375 (1946); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355
(1959); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-412 [now repealed by Montana
Business Corporation Act, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2204(0) (1968),
and modeled after the old Delaware act]; N.C. GE. STAT. §§ 55-19,
55-20, 55-21 (1955).
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in the opposite direction. 24 Although the adoption of this stat-
ute could be taken to infer legislative repudiation of the Warner
doctrine, it seems both more reasonable and more consistent with
the original Delaware statute2 5 to view it as manifesting a legis-
lative intent to allow management maximum discretion in
indemnifying itself. The major problem with statutes of this
type is their vagueness. They confer upon the corporation the
general power to indemnify directors and officers, 26 but forbid
indemnification where the director has been adjudged guilty of
negligence or misconduct.27 In addition, they usually provide
that such indemnification "shall not be deemed exclusive" of
any other rights to which such executives may be entitled under
by-law, agreement, vote of stockholders, or otherwise.28  Al-
though statutes of this kind answer the uncertainty raised by
Griesse29 and McCollum0 as to the power to indemnify directors
vindicated in derivative suits, the vagueness of the "non-exclu-
sive clause" leaves considerable doubt about the ability to indem-
nify after third party suits, administrative proceedings or crim-
inal investigations.31
24. The Minnesota indemnification statute is essentially modeled
after the old Delaware act, but it goes one step further and specifically
disallows indemnification of amounts "paid pursuant to a judgment or
settlement agreement." Mnwi. STAT. § 301.09(7) (1967).
25. G. WASINGTON & J. BIsHoP, supra note 12.
26. The basic intention of the early statutes was to respond to
Griesse and clear up the confusion created by McCollum.
27. See note 24 supra.
28. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(10) (1953). See also Mi.
STAT. § 301.09(7) (1967). For a reproduction of the Minnesota statute
see note 2 supra.
29. 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222 (1931).
30. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
31. Some of these doubts have been resolved in more compre-
hensive acts such as New York's, N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 63-67
(McKinney Supp. 1968), and California's, CAL. CORP. CODE § 830 (West
Supp. 1967). But the most complete consideration of the various
problems is found in the new Delaware Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145
(1968). For a general discussion of this statute see Arsht & Stapleton,
Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive Changes, 23
Bus. LAWYER 77-80 (1967). The act distinguishes between third party
actions and those brought by or on behalf of the corporation. The
section on third party actions provides for indemnification of legal ex-
penses, judgments, fines, and amounts paid in settlements under vary-
ing circumstances. The power to indemnify is not granted unless it
appears that the person seeking indemnification acted in good faith
and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the
best interests of the corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a).
Where indemnification is proper, it may be granted whether the suit or
proceeding was civil, criminal, administrative or investigative. Id.
§ 145(a). The statute grants an absolute right of indemnification to
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Corporations operating under statutes of this kind have at-
tempted to resolve some of these doubts by adopting by-laws
seeking to implement a literal reading of the clauses. Thus, in
those states which have retained the old Delaware-type act, it
has become increasingly important to determine the extent to
which courts will give effect to the broad by-laws adopted pur-
suant to the "non-exclusive clauses." The Tomash case provided
the Minnesota Supreme Court with its first opportunity 2 to
interpret the nonexclusive clause since enactment of the statute
over 17 years ago.
The trial court in Tomash had denied indemnification on the
ground that appellants' conduct had amounted to negligence and
misconduct in the performance of directorial duties. On appeal
appellants argued that Midwest's refusal to indemnify was an
unwarranted breach of discretion; that indemnification was
permissible under the statute because they were not negligent
and even if negligent they were not adjudged "liable" for negli-
gence; that they had a common-law right to indemnification
under Warner since they were "successful on the merits;" and
that irrespective of the language of the statute the nonexclusive
any director who is vindicated on the merits or otherwise irrespective
of the type of proceeding. Id. § 145 (c).
In addition, indemnification is permitted in derivative suits despite
a finding of negligence or misconduct when the court finds the director
equitably deserving. Id. § 145 (b). There was great debate over this pro-
vision during the committee's deliberations. While there was quick
agreement that the indemnification authorized in third party actions
should include indemnification against judgments, fines and amounts
paid in settlement, as well as litigation expenses, id. § 145 (a), there was
prolonged discussion as to the proper scope of indemnification in deriva-
tive actions. It was ultimately determined that the statute should only
authorize the indemnification of litigation expenses and not of amounts
paid in satisfaction of a judgment or in settlement of a claim. See
Arsht & Stapleton, supra. The statute also concludes with a non-
exclusive clause. DEL. CODE A'm . tit. 8, § 145(f). It has been sug-
gested that subsections (f) and (g) (permitting a corporation to pur-
chase insurance on behalf of its executives) throw everything back into
confusion. They suggest a legislative intent to permit indemnification,
directly or by means of company financed insurance in any and all
circumstances. One commentator has warned that without careful leg-
islative and judicial attention subsection g could destroy any limits
to indemnification. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77
'YALE L.J. 1078 (1968).
32. It had an opportunity to interpret the nonexclusive clause in
the sense that this was the first corporate indemnification case before
the court since enactment of the statute, but it was not necessary to
do so in order to decide the case. Thus, while to do so would be con-
sidered dicta or criticized as a declaratory judgment, many well rea-
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clause permits indemnification under either a by-law33 or the
common-law right established in Warner.3 4 Although these argu-
ments seemed to call for construction of the statute's nonex-
clusive clause, the court avoided reaching this issue by holding
that Warner35 could be distinguished since the original action had
not been brought in the right and for the benefit of the corpora-
tion and the plaintiffs had not been totally vindicated on the
merits. The court, however, was not satisfied with merely
distinguishing Warner; it went on to hold that "even if" Warner
were still controlling after passage of the Minnesota statute, it
would not compel indemnification under the facts of Tomash.36
In effect, the court held that even if a common-law right of
indemnification survived enactment of the statute it would not
require indemnification of a director not completely vindicated
on the merits in a third party suit.3 7
Having held that there was no common-law right to in-
demnification on these facts, the court felt that the only de-
cision necessary was whether indemnification could be compelled
under the corporation's by-law and the Minnesota statute.
Carefully avoiding any pronouncements on the issue whether
indemnification is permissible under the nonexclusive clause
despite a finding of negligence, the court held that, "even assum-
ing that the by-law of the corporation is consistent with the
statute, it is obvious that both speak in terms permissive rather
than mandatory."3 The court also refused to review the lower
court's finding of negligence since it considered that finding
soned opinions in unsettled areas of the law have gone as far or fur-
ther. See, e.g., Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800
(1957).
33. The Midwest by-law permitted indemnification for directors,
whether or not then in office, against reasonable expenses incurred in
any action, suit or proceeding to which such director is made a party by
reason of his being or having been a director except where he "has
been adjudged liable because of willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross
negligence or reckless disregard of [his] duties .. " Minn.
160 N.W.2d 273, 277 (1968) (emphasis added).
34. One question raised by the enactment of the statute is
whether the common law right of indemnification under the Warner
case survived its enactment under the words "or otherwise" of the non-
exclusive clause.
35. 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950).
36. - Minn. at , 160 N.W.2d at 278.
37. This holding, which leaves the present status of common-law
indemnification in considerable doubt, was unnecessarily cryptic. Since
appellants asserted that Warner established a common-law right of
indemnification, the court could properly have ruled on the question
whether that right survived the statute.
38. - Minn. at , 160 N.W.2d at 278.
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irrelevant to the question at bar.
The court's disposition of the case on the facts seems correct.
Warner39 was clearly distinguishable and both the by-law and
the statute were permissive rather than mandatory. The court
can be criticized, however, for so limiting its discussion to the
narrow question before it that more questions were raised than
answered. Prior to Tomash,40 it was generally considered that
the common-law right conferred by Warner was preserved by
the nonexclusive clauses.41  Thus, the court not only cast a
shadow on the validity of Warner but it refused to determine
whether, accepting the trial court's finding of negligence, there
could even be a power of indemnification under the nonexclu-
sive clause. If such a power did not exist, the court could have
decided the case on that ground, thereby clarifying one aspect
of the nonexclusive clause.
Although nonexclusive clauses are susceptible of innumer-
able interpretations, a few propositions are becoming clear.
Courts are unlikely to permit indemnification of "insiders" who
are equitably undeserving.42 Moreover, no case has been found
in which a court sanctioned the indemnity of a director or officer
for an amount which he paid to the corporation pursuant to an
adjudication or settlement of a derivative action. In addition,
the relatively few cases involving indemnification of defendants
in derivative suits who had not been wholly vindicated on the
merits43 strongly suggest that the courts are willing to set limits
no matter how generous the legislature may have been.44 The
39. 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950).
40. - Minn. ___, 160 N.W.2d 273 (1968).
41. See Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn.
362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960). See also G. WASHNGTON & J. BisHOP,
supra note 12.
42. Bishop, New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance Against Di-
rectors' and Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. LAWYER 92, 98 (1966).
43. Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963); SEC v. Conti-
nental Growth Fund, Inc., C.C.H. FED. SEC. L. RPTS. r 91,437 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 182 A.2d 647 (Del.
Ch. 1962); McConnell v. Combination Mining & Milling Co., 31 Mont.
563, 79 P. 248 (1905).
44. The most liberal handling of a nonexclusive clause is found in
Mooney v. Willis-Overland Motors, 204 F.2d 888 (3rd Cir. 1953), where
the Third Circuit interpreted the old Delaware statute. A more re-
stricted view of the power of corporations to indemnify outside and be-
yond the statute was taken in Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey
Corp., 182 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 1962). Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, interpreting the old Delaware statute, blatently ignored the non-
exclusive clause. Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963). See
also Bishop, supra note 42, at 99.
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most striking recent example of judicial reluctance to permit
indemnification of a director who has been guilty of negligence,
even when uncomplicated by self-dealing, is SEC v. Continental
Growth Fund, Incorporated.4 5 The nonexclusive clause of the
Maryland statute specifically mentioned "by-law, agreement,
vote of stockholders, or otherwise." 46 The appellant was guilty
of simple negligence and the corporation's charter entitled a
director to indemnification, except in cases of aggravated breach
of duty.47 The court disposed of the nonexclusive clause by
refusing to interpret "or otherwise" to include "charter pro-
visions."
In Tomash,48 the Minnesota court utterly failed to chart
the boundaries of permissible use of the nonexclusive clause.
This failure appears to have been a voluntary relinquishment
of the court's earlier role as a judicially progressive leader in the
area of director indemnification. The court refused to offer any
guidance as to whether the express prohibitions of the statute
could be overridden by adoption of a by-law pursuant to the
nonexclusive clause. In addition, in casting doubts on the va-
lidity of Warner,49 it failed to shed any light on whether the
nonexclusive clause will be given literal effect when the statute
is merely extended without in any way contravening its express
provisions. Foreign case law indicates that by-laws of the first
type will be ignored, but that those of the latter type may well
be given effect." Thus, the Tomash court could have provided
as an alternative reason for its holding that, without regard to
the permissive nature of the statute and by-law, the corporation
had no power to indemnify the plaintiffs since the statute's
specific prohibition of indemnification under such circumstances
cannot be overridden by a by-law under the nonexclusive
clause.5 1 Furthermore, there was no justification for the court
45. C.C.H. FED. SEC. L. RE. f 91,437 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
46. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 64 (1957) (emphasis added).
47. The charter excluded any right of indemnification where the
director was guilty of willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence,
or reckless disregard of duties. SEC v. Continental Growth Fund, Inc.,
C.C.H. FED. SEc. L. REP. f 91,437 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
48. - Minn. , 160 N.W.2d 273 (1968).
49. 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950).
50. See notes 42-47 supra, and accompanying text.
51. Of course, such holding would require a finding of negligence
or misconduct on the part of the directors. While the court said it did
not consider the finding of negligence by the trial court, it did hold
that appellants had not been vindicated of all misconduct when it dis-
tinguished Warner. Thus the court could have addressed itself to the
issue of whether the by-law was consistent with the statute even on
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to spend over one-third of its opinion distinguishing Warner and
then conclude by casting doubt on whether the case retains any
validity after enactment of the indemnification statute.
Aside from the confusion caused by Tomash, the Minnesota
statute itself and others of the old Delaware type breed un-
certainty by their failure to distinguish between third party suits
and those brought by or in the right of the corporation.52 Such
inconsistencies and ambiguities recently inspired the enactment
of a comprehensive new act by the Delaware legislature. 58 Very
few states54 have followed the new Delaware provision; most,
including Minnesota, have indemnification statutes of the old
Delaware type and must still depend on judicial construction
and interpretation to clear up these uncertainties. Unfortu-
nately, if Tomash is any indication, very little enlightenment
will be forthcoming from the Minnesota court with respect to
the nonexclusive clause. Thus, members of the Minnesota bar
are unable to offer solid advice to their clients in this area except
to suggest comprehensive insurance coverage. The time has
clearly arrived to enact a new indemnification statute again
following Delaware's lead.55 Unless this is done, no corporation
will know where it stands without needless litigation. Like-
wise, unnecessary sums of money will be expended each year
on all-pervasive insurance policies in order to protect corporate
executives from burdensome litigation expenses. While some
degree of flexibility is certainly desirable, it cannot be achieved
by retention of the nonexclusive clause. Past experience demon-
strates that such clauses cause uncertainty and fruitless litiga-
tion rather than flexibility. The new Delaware act, although
unfortunately retaining a nonexclusive clause, achieves the de-
sired flexibility by placing a certain amount of discretion in trial
courts to depart from the provision's general rules when the
executive is deemed equitably deserving of indemnification.5
the findings that it did consider. At any rate, the court could cer-
tainly have reached the issue by accepting the trial court's finding of
negligence and misconduct.
52. These statutes, enacted after McCollum and Griesse, were ap-
parently designed only to deal with indemnification in the derivative
suit context. The confusion is probably the result of attempts to mold
inappropriate statutory schemes to fit uncontemplated contexts.
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1968).
54. S.B. No. 500, Kansas Regular Session (effective on publication);
PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 15, § 410 (Supp. 1967); VA. CODE § 13.1-3 (1968);
see 25 THE CoaRoRATioN JoURNAL 267 n.2-4 (1968).
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Criminal Law: Knowledge of Victim's Age
in Statutory Indecent Assault
Defendant was prosecuted for taking indecent liberties1
with a girl under the age of consent.2 At the trial, defendant
failed to offer evidence on the issue of whether he was misled or
mistaken as to the girl's age. After both sides had rested, de-
fendant's motion for dismissal on the ground that the state had
not established his knowledge of the girl's age was denied, and
he was found guilty. On appeal he contended, inter alia, that it
would be unconstitutional to deny him a charge to the jury that
knowledge of age is a necessary element of "statutory" indecent
assault and that the state has the burden of proving such knowl-
edge. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed, holding that
Minnesota Statutes section 609.02 (9) (6) (1964) 3 is constitutional
despite its failure to require proof of the defendant's knowledge
of his victim's age. State v. Morse, - Minn. -, 161 N.W.2d
699 (1968).
Rape, statutory rape, and indecent assault are currently the
most frequently committed crimes subsumed in the category of
sex offenses.4 Rape originated at common law,5 but is now
defined by statute.( Statutory rape also originated at common
law and differs from rape in that liability is imposed despite the
victim's consent when the victim is below an established age.7
The age of consent for statutory rape is presently governed by
1. In the offense of taking indecent liberties with a girl below the
age of consent, the italicized phrase means "such liberties as the com-
mon sense of society would regard as indecent and improper." BLAcK's
LAw DIcTIoNARY 909 (4th ed. 1951).
2. MINN. STAT. § 617.08 (1964) [repealed 1967; now MANN. STAT.
§ 609.296 (1967)] provided:
... [E]very person who shall take such indecent liberties with
or on the person of any female under the age of 16 years
without regard to whether he or she shall consent to the
same or not... shall be guilty of a felony.
3. MINN. STAT. § 609.02(9) (6) (1964) provides that "[c]riminal
intent does not require proof of knowledge of the age of a minor even
though age is a material element in the crime in question."
4. For the incidence of these felonies, see generally An=. DEPT.
OF CORRECTIONS, THE SEx OFFENDER nT MINNESoTA (1964).
5. "The unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman by a man for-
cibly and against her will." BLAcK's LAw DICTIoNARY 1427 (4th ed. 1951).
6. See generally CONN. Gr. STAT. ANN. § 53-238 (1958); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 794.01 (1965); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 265, § 22 (1958); Mi=.
STAT. § 609.292 (1967); Wis. STAT. § 944.01 (1961).
7. The first English statutes in the area made 12 the age of con-
sent. Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edward I, ch. 13. Later, the age was
lowered to 10. Statute of Elizabeth, 18 Elizabeth I, ch. 7, § 4.
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statute,8 and the crime of indecent assault or indecent liberties9
also contains a statutory age of consent provision.10 As to the
issue of age, therefore, statutory rape and "statutory" indecent
assault will be analyzed concurrently.
The distinctive feature of "statutory" sex offenses is the
element of age. The consent of an underage girl to sexual con-
tact is without legal effect. 1 This conclusive presumption of
non-consent is rationalized on both individual and societal
grounds. It is believed that underage females are incapable, be-
cause of psychological immaturity, of appreciating and under-
standing the nature, consequences, and implications of consent-
ing to sexual contacts or intercourse. 2 Thus, the law seeks to
protect them from the physical and psychological harm which is
thought to result from immature sexual activity. Furthermore,
it is argued that society's interest in protecting its mores re-
quires it to shield young girls from sexual contact whether con-
sensual or not.'
3
In order to deter statutory sex offenses, the law presumes
that the man had knowledge of the age of his partner or victim.
Thus a man must act at his own risk and assume all respon-
sibility for his sexual behavior.' 4 In terms of judicial approach,
this presumption is effectuated by the court's refusal to recog-
nize mens rea or intent as elements of statutory sex crimes. 5
8. In Minnesota the age is 18 [MAluN. STAT. § 609.295 (1967)] and
ranges from 7 to 21 in other states [A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207(4),
Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) 1.
9. See note 1 supra. In Minnesota. the offense involves an as-
sault or attempt at sexual intercourse. State v. Glaum, 153 Minn.
219, 190 N.W. 71 (1922); State v. Kunz, 90 Minn. 526, 97 N.W. 131 (1903);
State v. West, 39 Minn. 321, 40 N.W. 245 (1888).
10. The age of consent for indecent assault in Minnesota is 16.
MINN. STAT. § 609.296 (1967).
11. Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the
Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 75
(1952) (citing cases) [hereinafter cited as Forcible and Statutory Rape].
12. Myers, Reasonable Mistake of Age: A Needed Defense to
Statutory Rape, 64 MCH. L. REV. 105, 119 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Myers].
13. The law's concern with ... [an underage female's] capac-
ity or lack thereof to so understand [sexual intercourse or other
sexual contact] is explained in part by a popular conception of
the social, moral and personal values which are preserved by
the abstinence from sexual indulgence on the part of a young
woman. An unwise disposition of her sexual favor is deemed to
do harm both to herself and the social mores by which the
community's conduct patterns are established.
People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 531, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 362, 393 P.2d
673, 674 (1964).
14. Id. at 534, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 364, 393 P.2d at 676; Myers at 119.
15. Myers at 106.
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Consistent with the above approach, it has traditionally been
held that mistake of age is not a defense to a charge of statutory
rape or "statutory" indecent assault.16 It is reasoned that rec-
ognition of the defense would thwart both the purposes and
deterrent effect of the statutes.17 While this view is still gen-
erally followed, a growing number of commentators, courts, and
legislatures have concluded that the mistake of age defense is
necessary to a just administration of the law.'8
In Minnesota, the availability of the mistake of age defense
is not expressly settled by statute and had not, prior to Morse,
been considered by the court. Section 609.02(9) (6), which is
the only provision relevant to the state of mind of defendants
accused of "statutory" indecent assault or statutory rape, pro-
vides: "Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of
the age of a minor even though age is a material element in the
crime in question."
In Morse, the court began its opinion by stating that "[t]he
only issue is whether defendant was entitled to a charge that
one of the elements of the offense, as to which the state had
the burden of proof, was defendant's knowledge that the girl
was under 16 years of age."' 9 The court resolved this question
in the negative, arriving at this conclusion by relying on prior
Minnesota cases which had held that the legislature has the
power to dispense with proof of some elements of a crime.20
The court also found support for its position in three United
States Supreme Court decisions which had ruled that intent is
16. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 16 Ala. App. 534, 79 So. 314 (1918);
Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310 (1910); People v. Marks, 146
App. Div. 11, 130 N.Y.S. 524 (1911); Robertson v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R.
493, 102 S.W. 1130 (1907); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:42(3) (1950); Wis. STAT.
§ 939.43(2) (1961).
17. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 16 Ala. App. 534, 79 So. 314 (1918).
18. Two jurisdictions have enacted statutes providing that mistake
of age is a defense. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-4(b) (1) (Smith-Hurd
1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40 A-9-3 (1964). One jurisdiction has allowed
the defense judicially. People v. Moseley, 240 Cal. App. 2d 859, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 67, 331 P.2d 65 (1966); People v. Nigri, 232 Cal. App. 2d 348, 42
Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966); People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 39 Cal. Rptr.
361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964). A number of commentators have argued
that mistake of age should be a defense. See A.L.I. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.6(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND ME
LAW (1951); Myers, supra note 12; Forcible and Statutory Rape, supra
note 11; Comment, 50 MANN. L. REV. 170 (1965).
19. - Minn. at ..- , 161 N.W.2d at 700-701 (emphasis added).
20. The court cites State v. Anderson, 270 Minn. 411, 134 N.W.2d
12 (1965), and State v. Bates, 156 Minn. 104, 194 N.W. 107 (1923), as
standing for the proposition that the legislature may do away with
intent in criminal offenses.
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not a prerequisite to guilt in all cases.21
Having concluded its discussion of the "only issue" in the
case, the Morse court turned its attention to the question whether
the defense of mistake of age is available under section 609.02
(9) (6). In postulating that the defense cannot be raised, the
court relied on two statutes which it said were similar to the
Minnesota provision,22 and an early case which it read as inti-
mating the unavailability of the defense.2 3
In conclusion, the court declared that although section
609.02 (9) (6) might lead to unjust results in some cases, this was
not one of them. The court suggested that the good judgment
of prosecutors and jurors would prevent injustices from occur-
ring.2
4
It seems clear that the Minnesota court mistakenly infused a
separate and distinct issue into its discussion of the single ques-
tion actually before it. 25 Although it correctly read section
609.02(9) (6) as dispensing with the requirement of proving the
defendant's knowledge of his victim's age, the court apparently
felt that as a consequence of dispensing with such proof, the
intent statute also repudiated the defense of mistake of age.26
21. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (criminal intent
held an essential element of the crime of converting government prop-
erty); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (defendant was con-
victed of selling narcotics under a statute which provided that no
knowledge of the type of drug which a person sells is not a defense
for violation of a statute proscribing such behavior); Shevlin-Carpen-
ter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910) (the Shevlin-Carpenter Co. was
originally prosecuted under a statute which made it a crime to will-
fully or innocently remove timber from Minnesota forests).
22. LA. REV. STAT. § 14.42(3) (1950) provides: "(3) Where [a
female's age shall not be a defense." WIs. STAT. § 939.43 (2) (1961) pro-
female's age shall not be a defense." WIS. STAT. § 939.43 (2) (1958) pro-
vides: "A mistake as to the age of a minor ... is not a defense."
23. See also State v. Dombroski, 145 Minn. 278, 279, 176 N.W. 986
(1920) (rape case which denied the defense of mistake as to whether a
woman was mentally retarded).
24. - Minn. at --, 161 N.W.2d at 703.
25. See note 19 supra.
26. An issue which deserves ... extended consideration is
whether Minn. St. 609.02, subd. 9 (6), is constitutionally vulner-
able insofar as it dispenses with the necessity for proving intent,
mens rea, or scienter. In other words, defendant complains of
being denied an opportunity to present to the jury as a defense
the fact that he was reasonably mistaken as to the victim's
age.
-Minn. at . 161 N.W.2d at 700.
The dichotomy which the Morse court failed to see is exemplified
by a statement of the High Court of Australia in a case in which one
party was being sued for allowing someone to drive his car without
a valid license:
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Not only was this issue not presented by the case but the court's
resolution of it seems highly doubtful at best.
The court began by pointing out that the defense is barred
in Wisconsin and Louisiana, whose statutes it considered com-
parable to section 609.02(9) (6). The difficulty with this com-
parison is that both the Wisconsin and Lousiana statutes spe-
cifically declare that mistake of age is not a defense.27 No-
where can such an express provision be found in the Minnesota
statutes.
The Minnesota court also failed to note that section 609.02
(9) was taken verbatim from a different provision of Wisconsin's
statutes than the one mentioned above.28  Looking to the law
surrounding that provision, a number of important considera-
tions become apparent.
The Wisconsin intent statute from which section 609.02(9)
was copied forged an exception to earlier Wisconsin case law
which had required the state to plead and prove any "special
intent beyond the natural consequences of the thing done."29
Under that general judicial doctrine, it seems clear that in prose-
cutions for statutory indecent assault the state would have to
show knowledge of the victim's age and the defendant would be
able to set up mistake of age as a defense. The Wisconsin stat-
ute which Minnesota subsequently adopted was designed to nar-
row the reach of the courts' doctrine by eliminating the need to
prove knowledge of age. There is no evidence indicating that
that provision was also intended to eliminate the defense of mis-
take of age. Indeed, the fact that Wisconsin enacted a separate
It is one thing to deny that a necessary ingredient of the offense
is positive knowledge of the fact that the driver holds no sub-
sisting license. It is another to say that an honest belief
founded on reasonable grounds that he is licensed cannot ex-
culpate a person who permits him to drive.
Proudman v. Dayman, 67 Commw. L.R. 536, 540 (Austl. 1941).
27. See note 22 supra.
28. "Subd. 9 ... The definitions are taken verbatim from Wiscon-
sin St. § 939.23. Uniformity of definitions and interpretations of the
terms will thus result." MlmN. STAT. AxN. § 609.02(9) (6) Advisory
Committee Comment (1964).
29. State v. Bloedow, 45 Wis. 279, 280 (1878). The defendant in
BZoedow was charged with mayhem. The applicable statute required
the prosecution to prove intent to maim or disfigure. In State v. Al-
fonsi, 33 Wis. 2d 469, 147 N.W.2d 550 (1967), the defendant was appealing
a conviction for bribery. The bribery statute required an "understand-
ing" by defendant that he violated his lawful duty as a public official
in giving or accepting "personal advantages." 33 Wis. 2d at 76, 147
N.W.2d at 555. The court pointed out that the question whether "un-
derstand" must be proved was governed by Wis. STAT. § 939.23 (1961).
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provision dealing with the mistake of age defense3 ° is strong,
if not conclusive, evidence that the Wisconsin legislature did not
regard the section which Minnesota copied as having any bear-
ing on the availability of the defense.
Considering this Wisconsin law and the Minnesota Advisory
Committee Comment to the Minnesota intent statute, it seems
highly significant that Minnesota failed to adopt a provision
similar to the Wisconsin mistake of age statute.31 Thus, it ap-
pears that the Morse court was incorrect in declaring that sec-
tion 609.02(9) (6) precludes the defense of mistake of age.32
The legislature has either left the question open to the courts
or indicated its desire to allow the defense.
It also appears that the court in Morse misapplied two of the
three United States Supreme Court decisions on which it relied.
The Minnesota court cited United States v. Balint33 and Moris-
sette v. United States34 for the proposition that the legislature
may constitutionally dispense with intent in some criminal of-
fenses. In Morissette the Supreme Court held that unless a
clear legislative directive to the contrary were shown, proof of
criminal intent could not be dispensed with in prosecutions for
conversion of Government property. The Court distinguished
Balint on the ground that it involved public welfare regulations.
The Court explained that public welfare regulations are the re-
sult of the increasing complexity of our society and represent
attempts to regulate conduct which had not previously been con-
sidered harmful. For that reason, the Court considered that in-
tent, which must be proved in most common law crimes, need
not be an element of public welfare offenses. The Court con-
cluded that while the crime in Balint was a public welfare of-
fense,3 5 the conversion in Morissette was a common law crime
"such as those against the state, the person, property, or public
30. WIs. STAT. § 939.43(2) (1961).
31. See note 28 supra.
32. It should be noted that the defendant in Morse relied on People
v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964),
where it was held that mistake of age is a defense to statutory
rape. The Morse court answered by stating: "Significantly, the court
in [Hernandez] held that the lack of criminal intent was a defense
to a charge of statutory rape 'in the absence of a legislative direction
otherwise.' (Italics supplied)." 161 N.W.2d 699, 703 (1968). As is
apparent from the textual discussion above, the court was mistaken
in thinking there is a "legislative direction otherwise" in Minnesota.
33. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
34. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
35. Id. at 255.
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morals"3 6 and therefore required proof of intent unless a legis-
lative purpose to the contrary could clearly be shown. The Min-
nesota court, relying on this distinction, viewed Morse as fitting
within the Morissette Court's characterization of Balint. That
this view is erroneous is shown by Morissette's description of
public welfare offenses as new crimes which, absent statutes,
would not be punishable, as carrying relatively light penalties,
and as resulting in no grave damage to the offender's reputa-
tion.37 Clearly this description is entirely inappropriate to the
crime of statutory indecent assault: Age of consent offenses
originated at common law and were therefore punishable with-
out statutes; the penalty is up to seven years in jail;38 and a con-
viction would certainly damage a defendant's reputation by
branding him as a felon and a sexual pervert.
While the Minnesota court may have correctly decided that
the state could constitutionally dispense with proof of the de-
fendant's knowledge of his victim's age, it is clear that the court
went beyond the actual issue presented. In so doing it unneces-
sarily and probably incorrectly interpreted the Minnesota stat-
ute to preclude the defense of mistake of age. Finally, the court's
heavy reliance on the defendant's moral turpitude, and on juries
and prosecutors to prevent injustices, seems an abdication of the
judicial function.
Criminal Law: Multiple Murder on Same Occasion
Not Single Crime for Sentencing Purposes
Defendant, while on leave from a Minnesota mental institu-
tion, killed his wife and two children. lie pleaded guilty to
indictments charging him with the murders and was sentenced
to life imprisonment on one indictment for murder in the first
degree and 40 years on each of two indictments for murder in
the second degree. The sentences were to run concurrently.
Defendant later petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming
that the imposition of concurrent terms violated Minnesota Stat-
utes section 609.035 (1967), which permits punishment for only
one crime when the defendant's behavior constitutes more than
36. Id.
37. See generally Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L.
REv. 55 (1933).
38. MnwN. STAT. § 609.296 (2) (1967).
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one offense under the laws of Minnesota.' The Minnesota Su-
preme Court, ruling on this issue for the first time, denied the
writ, holding that section 609.035 does not apply since defendant's
conduct constituted three separate crimes against separate indi-
viduals.2 State ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash, - Minn. _, 161 N.W.
2d 667 (1968).
Section 609.035, like the common law3 and constitutional 4
double jeopardy doctrines, encompasses two distinct prohibitions:
one against double punishment for statutory violations arising
out of a single act, and one against serialized prosecutions. Tra-
ditionally, the policy justifications for each of these proscriptions
have been different. Double punishment is prohibited on the
ground that the defendant's punishment must be commensurate
with, but not greater than, his criminal culpability.5 Serialized
prosecutions, on the other hand, are proscribed on procedural
grounds: to protect both the defendant and the public from the
expense of prolonged and unnecessary litigation, to safeguard
the defendant from the harassment and stigma of multiple
prosecutions, and to allow the defendant to plan ahead without
the continual threat of possible reprosecution and punishment
for a previously tried offense.6
1. MN. STAT. § 609.035 (1967) provides as follows:
Except as provided in section 609.585, if a person's conduct
constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this statehe may be punished for only one of such offenses and a convic-
tion or acquittal of any one of them is a bar to prosecution for
any other of them. All such offenses be included in one prose-
cution which shall be stated in separate counts.
2. This Comment will not deal with the court's second holding:
that a defendant, who is charged with perpetrating a crime at
a time when he is under commitment to a state mental hospital,is [not] obliged to stand trial on the question of whether he was
at the time of the offense responsible for his actions ... if when
he pleads guilty he is adequately represented by counsel and
there is no other evidence before the sentencing court to support
a defense of insanity.
161 N.W.2d at 668.
3. For a discussion of the history of common law double jeo-
pardy, see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150-55 (1959) (Black, J., dis-
senting); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: "... . nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ..
See also Mmiq. CoNsT. art. 1, § 7.
5. Note, Statutory Multiple Punishment and Multiple Prosecution
Protection: An Analysis of Minnesota Statute Section 609.035, 50 MINN.
L. REv. 1102, 1104 (1966); Note, The Protection from Multiple Trials,
11 STAw. L. REV. 735, 736-37 (1959).
6. Note, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses:
New Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YAiE L.J. 339,
340-41 (1956).
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Although it has been argued that the distinct policy bases
should lead to consideration of different factors in determining
which of the two proscriptions applies in a particular case,7 the
trend has generally been to ignore these policy distinctions and
to apply identical tests for each prohibition.8 As a result, the
case law in this area is extremely confusing and has contributed
to the widespread complaint that the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy has proved to be largely illusory.9
In determining what constitutes the "same offense" courts
have generally resorted to one of two opposing tests: the
"same evidence" test or the "same transaction" test. The "same
evidence" test was first stated in King v. Vandercomb,'0 and was
adopted with modification by the United States Supreme Court
in Blockburger v. United States."- Since that time, it has been
accepted by a majority of American jurisdictions.12  The Block-
burger Court stated the test as follows:
The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses
or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a
fact which the other does not.13
In general this test has provided inadequate protection
against double jeopardy. With current expansion of the number
of statutory offenses which can be charged on the basis of a
single unit of conduct, the test often allows the prosecutor to
expose a defendant to several prosecutions for a single act and
to obtain a separate sentence for each.14
This inadequacy has led a minority of state courts to adopt
the "same transaction" approach.15 In addition, several states
which had traditionally been committed to the "same evidence"
test by their constitutions or common law have subsequently en-
acted statutes intended to broaden double jeopardy protection.16
7. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE 66 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956); Kirch-
heimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YArz L.J. 513
(1949); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YAiE L.J. 262, 267 (1965).
8. Note, Statutory Multiple Punishment, supra note 5, at 1104.
9. Comley, Former Jeopardy, 35 YALE L.J. 674, 675 (1926); Note,
Criminal Law-Double Jeopardy, 24 AD=. L. REv. 522 (1940).
10. 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (1796).
11. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
12. Note, Double Jeopardy and the Multiple-County Indictment,
57 YALE L.J. 132, 134 (1947).
13. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
14. Note, Statutory Multiple Punishment, supra note 5, at 1105-06.
15. Note, The Protection from Multiple Trials, supra note 5, at 743.
16. See statutes cited in ALI, ADMniSTRATION OF THE CPmsuAL
LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY 128-29 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1932).
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According to the Minnesota legislative advisory committee, sec-
tion 609.035 was drafted with this purpose in mind.17 The "same
transaction" test focuses on behavior rather than on possible
statutory offenses or the evidence involved. The defendant's
behavior is held to constitute a single unit of conduct when it
involves a single act, transaction, or intent and objective. 8
Although this approach provides adequate protection against
serialized prosecutions by requiring compulsory joinder of crim-
inal charges whenever the court finds a single act, transaction,
or intent and objective,19 it has been criticized as inappropriate
for the determination of multiple punishment issues. The objec-
tion in this regard is that most courts define "transaction" so
broadly that the defendant's sentence does not correspond to his
criminal culpability, thereby sacrificing the state's interest in
adequate punishment.20 Furthermore, the vagueness of the
"same transaction" standard has led to inconsistent application of
the test in those jurisdictions following it.21
In Stangvik, the narrow issue was whether section 609.035
applied to criminal conduct involving multiple victims. The
court treated this issue in a somewhat summary fashion. After
reviewing previous Minnesota cases construing the section,22 and
several California2 3 and New York24 decisions dealing with
double jeopardy statutes,25 the court upheld the three concurrent
sentences stating that "these were three separate murders in-
tentionally inflicted on three separate victims. From a legal
point of view they were totally unrelated. '2  In reaching this
17. 40 MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.035, at 57-58 (1964) (Advisory
Committee Comment, Prof. Maynard E. Pirsig, Sec.).
18. Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 7, at 270.
19. Note, The Protection from Multiple Trials, supra note 5, at 744.
20. Id. at 745.
21. Note, Statutory Multiple Punishment, supra note 5, at 1107;
Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 7, at 276-77; 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965).
22. State v. Gaulke, Minn. , 161 N.W.2d 662 (1968); State v.
Murphy, 277 Minn. 355, 152 N.W.2d 507 (1967); State v. Gladden, 274
Minn. 533, 144 N.W.2d 779 (1966); State v. Reiland, 274 Minn. 121, 142
N.W.2d 635 (1966); State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 141 N.W.2d 517
(1966); City of Bloomington v. Kossow, 269 Minn. 467, 131 N.W.2d 206
(1964).
23. In re Ford, 66 Cal. 2d 183, 57 Cal. Rptr. 129, 424 P.2d 681 (1967);
People v. Ridley, 63 Cal. 2d 671, 47 Cal. Rptr. 796, 408 P.2d 124 (1965);
Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839 (1960).
24. People v. La Vallee, 15 App. Div. 2d 611, 222 N.Y.S.2d 462
(1961).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1955); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1938
(McKinney 1967).
26. State ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash, - Minn.._, 161 N.W.2d 667,
673 (1968).
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conclusion the court ruled that "[t]he fact that the crimes
occurred at substantially the same time and place as part of a
single behavioral incident [did] not in itself require the appli-
cation of the statute.127 This holding seems to be based largely
upon a consideration of the policy behind the statute, namely to
protect against exaggerating the criminality of a person's conduct
and to make both punishment and prosecution commensurate
with culpability. In the present case the court felt that "the
imposition of three sentences [did] not offend its sense of
justice."-28
The Stangvik court's final disposition of this case is open to
criticism on the ground that its narrow construction of section
609.035 contravenes the legislature's intent in passing the statute.
This intent has been expressed by Professor Maynard E. Pirsig,
secretary of the legislative advisory committee which drafted sec-
tion 609.035:
Ordinarily, a criminal prosecution for a given crime involves
but a single violation of law resulting from a single criminal
act. But sometimes, a single incident of criminal behavior in-
volves a multiplicity of violations permitting a series of prosecu-
tions and of sentences which exaggerate the criminality of
the behavior involved and, in a sense, defeat the policy under-
lying the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
The intent of the section is to meet these objections by limiting
the sentence to the maximum permitted for the most serious
crime committed.29
According to the legislative advisory committee, the legisla-
ture tried once before to achieve this objective through the pass-
age of section 610.2130 which was superseded by section 609.035.
The advisory committee states that the purpose of section 610.21
was to limit punishment to one sentence whenever a single
behavioral incident resulted in the commission of more than
one statutory crime.31 The committee notes, however, that ex-
cept for a few early decisions, 32 the Minnesota Supreme Court
defeated this purpose by identifying a separate punishable act
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Advisory Committee Comment, supra note 21, at 58-59.
30. Any act or omission declared criminal and punishable in
different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished
under only one of such provisions, and a conviction or acquittal
under any one shall bar a prosecution for the same act or
omission under any other provision.
M m . REV. LAws § 4765 (1905).
31. Advisory Committee Comment, supra note 21, at 57.
32. State v. Klugherz, 91 Minn. 406, 98 N.W. 99 (1904); State v.
Moore, 86 Minn. 422, 90 N.W. 787 (1902).
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for each statutory violation, even though the violations were the
product of a single behavioral incident.33
As an example of a case which frustrated the purpose of sec-
tion 610.21, the advisory committee cites State v. Thompson,34
where the court said that section 610.21 "implements the constitu-
tional provision against double jeopardy.., but adds nothing to
the scope of the prohibition therein contained;"35 and further,
that "in using the words act and omission, the legislature was
using them in the restricted and consequential sense of a single
and separate offense. '3 6  In addition, the court adopted what
was basically the "same evidence" test to determine whether
610.21 applied to a given case:
Whether a defendant has been placed in double jeopardy turns,
therefore, upon whether the offense with which he is charged
in the second action is identical with the offense involved in
the first action. The offenses are not identical unless they
are the same in both law and fact.37
That the legislature was clearly dissatisfied with the re-
strictive course the court had taken in construing section 610.21
is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the Thompson decision,
and the other cases decided under 610.21 in conformity with the
"same evidence" approach, are expressly disapproved in the
comments of the legislative committee which drafted the new
statute.3 8  Those comments specifically state that the new stat-
ute was drafted to effectuate the original purpose of Minnesota
Statutes section 610.21,39 that being to broaden double jeopardy
protection by limiting punishment to one sentence whenever
more than one statutory crime is committed during a single be-
havioral incident. The Stangvik decision not only contravenes
these general expressions of legislative intent but also completely
ignores the tests suggested by the drafters for determining what
constitutes a single behavioral incident within the meaning of
the statute. While recognizing that "[w]hat is a person's single
unit of conduct which constututes more than one offense is not
capable of. . . precise definition,"40 the advisory committee sug-
33. State v. Thompson, 241 Minn. 59, 62 N.W.2d 512 (1954); State v.
Winger, 204 Minn. 164, 282 N.W. 819 (1938); State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn.
44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937).
34. 241 Minn. 59, 62 N.W.2d 512 (1954).
35. Id. at 66, 62 N.W.2d at 518.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 62, 62 N.W.2d at 516 (emphasis in original).
38. Advisory Committee Comment, supra note 21, at 57-58.
39. Id. at 58.
40. Id.
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gests that the Minnesota courts adopt the following test de-
veloped by the New York court in People v. Savarese:41
Although our statute ... speaks of 'an act' we know that few
if any crimes are committed by a single act. A crime unless it
is a crime of omission results from a series of acts or a trans-
action motivated by a criminal intent. The true factual test
is 'Were all of the acts performed necessary to or incidental to
the commission of a single crime and motivated by an intent
to commit that crime'? Then even if another separate crime
be committed or another statute also violated, the defendant
may not be doubly punished. He may be punished only for
the highest offense committed. But if any of the acts were
not necessary to or incidental to the commission of the crime
intended, and those acts result in the commission of a separate
crime, then the defendant may be doubly punished for each
crime.42
This test takes a transactional approach with the scope of
the particular transaction to be defined by the intent and objec-
tive of the defendant. Other factors which Professor Pirsig
suggests should be considered in this determination are the single-
ness of purpose of the defendant and the unity of time and
place of the behavior.43 These various factors and tests should
always be considered in light of the underlying policy behind
the statute prohibiting multiple punishment-that the punish-
ment given to a defendant should always be commensurate with
the culpability of his conduct.44
It is submitted that the facts of this case satisfy the require-
ments of the Savarese test. All three murders were motivated
by and incidental to the single intent and objective of eliminating
by homicide a specific, well defined, and limited group of people
-defendant's immediate family. It could be argued, of course,
that such a broad application of the Savarese test would allow
the court to define any course of conduct as a single act or trans-
action. In view of the added requirements that the crimes occur
at substantially the same time and place as a part of a single
behavioral incident, however, such fear seems unjustified. These
added requirements are clearly satisfied in Stangvik. It could
also be argued that a liberal reading of the Savarese test would
militate against one of the basic objectives of the criminal law,
namely deterrence. As one commentator points out, however,
the threat of additional punishment for victimizing more than
one individual is not likely to deter the criminal who has
41. 1 Misc. 2d 305, 114 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1952).
42. Id. at 326, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 816 (emphasis in original).
43. Advisory Committee Comment, supra note 21, at 59.
44. See Note, Statutory Multiple Punishment, supra note 5, at 1104.
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already assumed the risk of punishment for victimizing a single
individual.45 This observation has special significance in the case
of multiple murders, since a single murder in Minnesota requires
the maximum punishment of life imprisonment.
40
Finally, it could be argued that three concurrent sentences
do not constitute multiple punishment for the purposes of this
statute since, as a practical matter, the defendant would only be
serving one sentence. However, both the language of the
statute and the comments of the advisory committee clearly pro-
scribe more than one sentence in any form if the defendant's
crimes are the results of a single behavioral incident. Further,
as appellant pointed out in his brief, concurrent sentencing
effectively results in cumulative punishment because it increases
the penalty by decreasing the defendant's chances for parole.47
Admittedly the court faced a difficult problem in attempting
to construe section 609.035. It is virtually impossible to devise a
test which could anticipate all of the different fact situations
which would require application of the statute. The court, how-
ever, refused to recognize as controlling the tests recommended
by the legislative advisory committee. This refusal is particularly
confusing in light of the fact that the court used those tests in
several prior decisions construing section 609.035.48 The aban-
donment of these tests, in favor of a purely subjective weighing
of the defendant's punishment against the court's estimation of
his culpability, will effectively preclude use of section 609.035 in
future multiple victim cases, and will return the law to its status
under former section 610.21.
Damage Contribution Test: Relative
Culpability of the Tortfeasors
Plaintiff brought suit for the injuries suffered when she
stepped into a drain depression in the floor of defendant's food
market. The defendant food market, claiming indemnity, joined
as third-party defendants the store's designer-builder, the sub-
contractor who installed the drain, and the company responsible
for placing the equipment. Although the defendant had been
45. Id. at 1121.
46. Mnm. STAT. § 609.185 (1967).
47. Brief for Appellant at 26.
48. State v. Reiland, 274 Minn. 121, 142 N.W.2d 635 (1966); State v.
Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 141 N.W.2d 517 (1966); City of Bloomington v.
Kossow, 269 Minn. 467, 131 N.W.2d 206 (1964).
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aware of the depression for five years, nothing had been done to
eliminate the hazard it constituted. The trial court directed
verdicts in favor of all third-party defendants and the jury re-
turned a general verdict for the plaintiffs. The market's post-
trial motion for a new trial against the third-party defendants
was denied. On appeal,' the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed,
holding as a matter of law that a storeowner who has known
of a dangerous condition on his property for five years and
acquiesced in its continuance cannot gain indemnification from
those who created the hazard. Jack v. Applebaun's Food Mar-
kets, Incorporated, 280 Minn. 247, 158 N.W.2d 857 (1968).
Where multiple parties are responsible for a tort to a third
party, the courts face the difficult task of justly distributing
damages. Early courts were reluctant to permit damage appor-
tionment among the parties, reasoning that a party should not be
permitted to found a cause of action on his own wrong.2 Such a
rule produced what most considered an unjust result by causing
one of the wrongful parties to assume all the liability on the
fortuity that he was the plaintiff's chosen defendant.3  In re-
sponse to such unfairness, two equitable principles-contribution
and indemnity 4 -developed to permit the distribution of dam-
ages between wrongdoers. 5 Contribution distributes the loss
among tortfeasors by requiring each to pay his proportionate
share," while indemnity shifts the entire loss from one tort-
1. The claim against the plumbing subcontractor was withdrawn
on appeal.
2. See Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 196 U.S.
217 (1905); F. HARPER & F. JAb-s, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.2, at 715
(1956); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 48 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER]; Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366, 1373 (1958). The rule against
apportionment of damages supposedly arose from the English case,
Merryweather v. Nixon, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). Al-
though this case denied distribution of damages as between intentional
tortfeasors, the common law in the United States did not recognize this
distinction and initially denied proportional damages in all non-con-
tractual cases whether intentional or negligent conduct was involved.
3. This unfairness seems particularly blatant in cases where the
damages resulted from negligent, as opposed to intentional conduct.
4. For a general discussion of contribution and indemnity, see
RESTATEMENT OF REsTITuTIoN §§ 76-102 (1937).
5. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Great Northern Ry., 109 F. Supp. 552
(D. Minn. 1952), affd sub nom., Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great
Northern Ry., 201 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1953).
6. In Minnesota, contribution results in equal division of the
damages among the negligent parties. See, e.g., Gugisberg v. Eckert,
101 Minn. 116, 111 N.W. 945 (1907); Note, Contribution and Indemnity
Among Tortfeasors in Minnesota, 37 MINN. L. REv. 470, 474 (1953). Some
jurisdictions distribute the damages in proportion to the comparative
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feasor to the other.7
At the present time contribution is available in most juris-
dictions,8 while indemnity is now permitted in all states.9 The
most common basis of indemnity is a contract which provides
for it.1 While courts have granted indemnity in a wide variety
of non-contractual situations,1 the grounds advanced are often
inconsistent and confusing. 2 Some basic principles do emerge,
however, on close examination of the cases in which indemnity
was at issue:' 3
(1) Substantial difference in fault. Probably most indemnity
cases reflect a wide disparity in the fault of the wrongdoers.
However, most courts find that this standard is so uncer-
tain in its application that it is unworkable.14
(2) Duties between the tortfeasors. Many decisions turn on an
analysis of indemnity in terms of a breach of duty owed
by one co-tortfeasor to the other. The tortfeasor who has
breached his duty to his co-tortfeasor becomes liable for
indemnification.15 This reasoning is strained in many in-
stances where there is no apparent duty owed between
co-tortfeasors other than the general duty not to cause in-
jury which will result in liability to another.l0
fault of the defendants. PRossER, § 47; see notes 49-53 infra, and ac-
companying text.
7. PROSSER, § 48; 27 Am. Jun. 2D Indemnity § 3 (1940); see Davis,
Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37
IOWA L. REv. 517 (1952); Note, supra note 6.
8. See Davis, supra note 7, at 517-18. Contribution is recognized
in nine states by judicial decision and in varying degrees in 23 states
by statute. PROSSEa, § 47.
9. Davis, supra note 7, at 518.
10. 41 A. Jun. 2D Indemnity §§ 6-18 (1968).
11. Attempts have been made to define those situations in which
indemnity is awarded. Larson v. Minneapolis, 262 Minn. 142, 148,
114 N.W.2d 68, 72-73 (1962); Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light
Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960); Jacobs v. General Acci-
dent, Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 14 Wis. 2d 1, 109 N.W.2d 462 (1961).
12. The courts frequently rely on word combinations or word
formulas to resolve a case without delineating the reasoning which
supports their conclusion. The indiscriminate use of these formulas has
further clouded the indemnity area. Davis, supra note 7, at 542-44.
13. PROSSER, § 48.
14. But see United States v. Savage Truck Lines, 209 F.2d 442, 447
(4th Cir. 1953); Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1951).
15. Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortleasors, 26
TEx. L. REv. 150, 162 (1947); see, e.g., Gray v. Boston Gas Light, 114
Mass. 149 (1873); Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Wheeler, 31 Minn. 121, 16
N.W. 698 (1883); Humble Oil & Refining v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222
S.W.2d 995 (1949); Annot., 140 A.L.R. 1306 (1942); RESTATEMENT OF RES-
TITUTION § 93, comment c at 412; Id. § 94, comment a at 414 (1937).
16. See Davis, supra note 7, at 546. Some commentators have
criticized this duty test as too difficult to apply and not clearly relevant.
The question whether one tortfeasor could have recovered from another
if he had suffered injury seems immaterial to the question of whether
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(3) Duties owed by the tortfeasors to the injured person. It
has been suggested that most cases indicate that indemnity
is granted to that co-tortfeasor who is charged with a more
exacting duty to the injured party.17 Although applicable
in some instances as an adequate standard, in many cases
where indemnity has been awarded differences in the re-
spective duties demanded of each tortfeasor do not seem
determinative.' 8
(4) General theories of equity. Perhaps the most appropriate
explanation of all indemnity decisions is that the courts are
aware of the equitable foundations of indemnity, and in
cases where justice demands that one co-tortfeasor assume
the total liability, a right to indemnity will be found. 19
Minnesota law, which has long recognized indemnity among
negligent co-tortfeasors, 20 is illustrative of the diversity of
grounds upon which indemnity has been awarded. Earlier cases
sometimes employed word formulas21 to express the basis of their
decision. Where the negligence of one tortfeasor was "passive"
while that of the other was "active,122 the former was entitled
to indemnity. A similar distinction was drawn between "pri-
mary" and "secondary" negligence.23 Several decisions have
found a breach of duty by one tortfeasor to the other, thus
justifying indemnity in favor of the party to whom the duty was
owed.24 In other cases indemnity was denied on the grounds that
the two were equally negligent in injuring a third person. Keeton,
Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 27 INSURANcE COUWSEL
J. 630, 632 (1960).
17. Davis, supra note 7, at 547.
18. The comparison of degrees of duty owed to an injured party is
difficult to make. Because the duties seem of roughly equivalent
weight in most indemnity problems, the courts have failed to adopt this
test, although it appears as a factor which is considered in the reasoning
of some decisions. The courts apparently reason that indemnity rests
upon a broader base than this approach would allow.
19. PRossER, § 48; see Larson v. Minneapolis, 262 Minn. 142, 148,
114 N.W.2d 68, 73 (1962).
20. Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Wheeler, 31 Minn. 121, 16 N.W. 698
(1883). But Minnesota recognizes indemnity only in cases of negligence.
See Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887).
21. See Davis, supra note 7, at 542-44; Note, supra note 6, at 476.
22. E.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., 214 Minn.
436, 440, 8 N.W.2d 471, 473 (1943). In a recent case the use of the
active-passive formula was approved. Daly v. Bergstedt, 267 Minn.
244, 253, 126 N.W.2d 242, 248 (1964).
23. E.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 140
Minn. 229, 231, 167 N.W. 800, 801 (1918); accord, Larson v. Minneapolis,
262 Minn. 142, 148, 114 N.W.2d 68, 73 (1962).
24. Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Wheeler, 31 Minn. 121, 16 N.W. 698
(1883); accord, Larson v. Minneapolis, 262 Minn. 142, 114 N.W.2d 68
(1962); Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn.
368, 377, 104 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1960); Olson v. Schultz, 67 Minn. 494, 70
N.W. 779 (1897).
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the wrongdoers were "in pari delicto." 25
In a recent case, Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light
Company,26 the Minnesota court attempted to clarify the law of
indemnity by isolating five general situations in which indemnity
should be awarded.27 While recognizing the equitable founda-
tions of indemnity, the court expressed the opinion that it should
be restrictively applied, reasoning that contribution is often a
more appropriate remedy.28 However, subsequent decisions
have strayed from Hendrickson's restrictive guidelines.29 The
most recent Minnesota decision prior to the instant case stated
that, "whether indemnity or contribution possibly lies in this case
depends on the conduct of the two wrongdoers and relative
culpability of their actions. ' 30 This language seems to indicate
the essentially equitable nature of indemnity, which precludes the
25. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 140 Minn.
229, 231, 167 N.W. 800, 801 (1918); accord, Daly v. Bergstedt, 267 Minn.
244, 252-53, 126 N.W.2d 242, 248 (1964), and cases cited therein. In
pari delicto means "in equal fault." Thus it is only when two parties
are responsible for an injury, one party being guilty of more culpable
conduct than the other, that a right to indemnity may exist against him.
BrAcK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 898 (4th ed. 1951).
26. 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960). Only two states, Minne-
sota and Wisconsin, have attempted a systematic analysis of indemnity.
Larson v. Minneapolis, 262 Minn. 142, 114 N.W.2d 68 (1962); Jacobs
v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 14 Wis. 2d 1, 109 N.W.2d
462 (1961).
27. (1) Where the one seeking indemnity has only a derivative or
vicarious liability for damage caused by another party.
(2) Where the party seeking indemnity has incurred liability
at the direction of or in the interest of another party.
(3) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability
because of a breach of duty owed him by the other party.
(4) Where the indemnitee has failed to discover the negligence
of another.
(5) Where there is an express contract between the parties
which explicitly provides for indemnification.
E.g., Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 372-73,
104 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1960), and cases cited therein.
28. Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368,
370-71, 104 N.W.2d 843, 847 (1960). But contribution has not precluded
indemnity because there are instances where the courts find the assump-
tion of the whole liability by one co-tortfeasor more equitable than
division of liability. Lawrence v. Great Northern Ry., 109 F. Supp. 552,
555 (D. Minn. 1952), aff'd sub nom., Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great
Northern Ry., 201 F.2d 408, 416 (8th Cir. 1953).
29. White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 137 N.W.2d 674 (1965); Daly v.
Bergstedt, 267 Minn. 244, 126 N.W.2d 242 (1964); Larson v. Minne-
apolis, 262 Minn. 142, 114 N.W.2d 68 (1962); American Automobile Ins.
Co. v. Minneapolis, 159 Minn. 294, 107 N.W.2d 320 (1961). But see
Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 272 Minn. 217, 136 N.W.2d 667 (1965).
30. White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 368, 137 N.W.2d 674, 677 (1965).
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use of strict standards and which requires courts to examine
carefully both parties' conduct in light of general notions of jus-
tice.31
Since privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant is
no longer necessary, an architect-builder, as in the instant case,
remains liable to third parties injured by the hazardous con-
ditions he creates.3 2 On the other hand, store owners are under
a continuing,3 3 non-delegable 34 duty to inspect the premises in
order to protect business invitees from harm.35 Thus, the issue
presented in the instant case was whether the market owner's
culpability was of sufficient weight to preclude indemnity from
the negligent architect as a matter of law. 8
In resolving this issue the court recognized a general rule of
indemnification that provides a possessor of land with indemnity
from one who creates a hazard on the land which leads to the
possessor's liability.37 However, the court said that if a party
"seeking indemnity is equally, if not more, negligent, indemnity
will not lie."38 On the facts presented here the court concluded
31. PROSSE, § 48.
32. The Minnesota courts have seen no logical basis to support
distinguishing between the laws governing chattels and real struc-
tures. A builder, therefore, has an implied obligation of reasonable
workmanship, not foolproof construction, and will be held liable for
harm caused by neglect of this duty. See Murphy v. Barlow Realty
Co., 206 Minn. 527, 289 N.W. 563 (1939). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 394-98, 403, 404 (1965) (rules that apply in Minnesota).
33. E.g., McGenty v. Stephenson & Co., 218 Minn. 311, 15 N.W.2d
874 (1944).
34. E.g., Daly v. Bergstedt, 267 Minn. 244, 253, 126 N.W.2d 242,
248-49 (1964); Corrigan v. Elsinger, 82 Minn. 42, 83 N.W. 492 (1900).
35. A store owner is liable for defects of which he knows or
which have existed for a time sufficient to provide, with the exercise
of reasonable care, an opportunity to discover and remedy the hazard.
See, e.g., Behrendt v. Ahstrand, 264 Minn. 10, 118 N.W.2d 27 (1962);
Hastings v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 189 Minn. 523, 250 N.W. 362 (1933); Ober
v. The Golden Rule, 146 Minn. 347, 178 N.W. 586 (1920). See generally
Annot., 100 A.L.R. 711 (1936).
36. The majority rule is that a contractor's negligence is super-
seded by a failure of an intermediate party to correct a defect which is
discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Howard v. Redden, 93 Conn.
604, 107 A. 509 (1919); cf. Lamb v. South Unit Jehovah's Witnesses, 232
Minn. 259, 45 N.W.2d 403 (1950). If it is a latent defect, the contractor
remains liable to an injured third party. Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co.,
78 Ill. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966); accord, O'Brien v. American
Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W. 1012 (1910); Price v. Johnston Cotton
Co. of Wendell, 226 N.C. 758, 40 S.E.2d 344 (1964).
37. Jack v. Applebaum's Food Markets, Inc., 280 Minn. 247, 249,
158 N.W.2d 857, 859 (1968); see note 32 supra.
38. Id. at 859; see White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 137 N.W.2d 674
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that the market owner's degree of negligence was so substantial
that it was at least equal to the negligence of the architect-
builder.
Although not clearly articulated, five factors appear to be
weighed in the court's determination that the market owner was
at least equally negligent with the designers.
(1) Awareness of the defect. The store owner knew of the con-
dition for five years, 39 and the jury found that he knew or
should have realized that the condition was a "hazard involv-
ing an unreasonable risk of harm to a business visitor.' 40
(2) Possession of the store. Unlike the designers, the store
owner had possession of the premises during the five years
after construction,41 and this control both minimized the de-
signer's chance to find and rectify the defect, and facilitated
the ease with which the store could have corrected it.
(3) Time. The existence of the condition was known for five
years, during which time no steps were taken to correct the
defect.42 The court noted that M=. STAT. section 541.051
(1967), passed four years after the trial, terminates indemni-
fication rights unless an action is brought within two years
after the hazard is discovered.43 The statute, although not
binding in this instance,44 represented legislative policy and
weighed heavily, if not presumptively, against indemnifica-
tion here.
(4) A continuing duty to inspect. Substantial weight is placed
on the fact that the store owner must inspect and maintain
his premises to prevent injury.45
(5) Probability of harm. An "open and obvious" 46 hazard exist-
ing on the floor in a heavily traveled area of a busy super-
market for an extended length of time constituted a substan-
(1965); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 272 Minn. 217, 136 N.W.2d 677
(1965).
39. The store manager testified that he had known of the drain's
existence for five years. 280 Minn. at 248, 158 N.W.2d at 859.
40. Id.
41. This line of reasoning formerly supported those decisions
which held that builders were not liable for negligent defects after
acceptance by the owner. See Note, Torts-Independent Contractor-
Liability After Completion and Acceptance of Work, 37 TEx. L. REv.
354, 356-57 (1959).
42. Several cases have noted the importance of time in determin-
ing the degree of negligence involved when a party fails to discover or
rectify a defect. E.g., Larson v. Minneapolis, 262 Minn. 142, 147,
114 N.W.2d 68, 72 (1962); Murphy v. Barlow Realty Co., 206 Minn. 527,
535, 289 N.W. 563, 567 (1939); Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn.
228, 196 N.W. 171 (1923).
43. Jack v. Applebaun's Food Markets, Inc., 280 Minn. 250 n.1, 158
N.W.2d 857, 859 n.1 (1968).
44. This statute of limitations was passed in 1965, four years after
the injury in the present case.
45. See cases cited notes 32-34 supra.
46. Jack v. Applebaum's Food Markets, Inc., 280 Minn. 247, 249,
158 N.W.2d 857, 859 (1968).
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tial risk.47
From these five considerations, the court concluded that the store
owner's knowledge of the condition and his acquiesence in its
continuance for a considerable length of time in spite of his
duty to correct hazardous defects, were sufficient grounds to
deny indemnification. 48
In addition, these same five considerations were evidently
used to substantiate a further conclusion that the market owner's
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. However, it
is not clear from the opinion what relationship the denial of
indemnity has to the issue of intervening causation.
Analysis of the decision calls attention to the proposition
that the most just method of distributing liability among co-
tortfeasors would be some apportionment on the basis of com-
parative negligence.49 There is no insurmountable barrier pre-
venting the courts from initiating a comparative negligence sys-
tem other than their own reluctance to undertake such an alter-
ation without legislative action.r0 The arguments supporting
such a step are strong,5 1 and it is a logical extension of the
quantification of negligence principles now relied upon in
indemnity cases. -52 However, in lieu of a legislative or judicial
47. A store should be aware that a customer is particularly sus-
ceptible to defects in the walking surfaces because of the attention being
given the display cases. Harris v. Campbell Cereal Co., 243 Minn. 308,
67 N.W.2d 824 (1954).
48. Courts have held that a property owner's inaction in the face
of duty to repair a known condition subjects him to liability for
injuries caused thereby. Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 237,
196 N.W. 171, 174-75 (1923). See also RESTATEMENT or RESTITUTION
§ 95 (1937).
49. General apportionment statutes have been adopted in five
states, and a number of federal statutes also provide for a legislative
scheme of apportionment of damages in certain areas (e.g., Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act or Merchant Marine Act). PROSSER, § 66.
50. Several factors probably inhibit judicial creation of a system of
apportioned damages. The courts distrust a jury's ability to apportion
damages fairly. Many courts evidently believe there are no definite
guidelines on which they themselves could divide liability with accu-
racy. Heil v. Glanding, 42 Pa. 493, 499 (1862). However, the most
substantial factor causing inaction is the general inertia of the court
system because of excessive reliance on tradition. PRossER, § 66.
51. It seems apparent that contributory negligence does not pro-
vide an equitable solution to a great many tort cases. Contribution and
indemnity are also very rough forms of justice, although admittedly
they are much closer than contributory negligence to an equitable allo-
cation of liability. However it would seem any approximate division
of liability would be better than placing 100 per cent of the liability
upon one party, and none upon the other, when, as in the present case,
both have some culpability in the matter.
52. The court in recent cases, including the present case, has rec-
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scheme of allocations based on comparative negligence, the court
in recent cases 53 has awarded indemnification when the facts
indicate that full liability should be placed upon one tortfeasor.
Under the facts of the instant case, denial of indemnity seems
consistent with both the principles underlying the doctrine
and prior Minnesota case law. The store owner's conduct in
light of his knowledge of the hazard removes him from that
class of persons who are "legally liable but morally innocent. '54
Certainly under the Hendrickson standards, indemnity was prop-
erly denied.55 However, in keeping with the spirit of their
recent indemnity decisions, the court chose to employ a more
flexible doctrine by weighing relative culpability. In so doing,
the court drew on a decision involving proximate causation 0 in
considering the passage of time from the potential indemnitor's
wrongful conduct until the injury to the plaintiff. Insofar as
such passage of time is used for measuring the defendant's culpa-
bility, it represents an appropriate analogy; but, as the ensuing
discussion will indicate, the courts may be allowing the passage
of time overly to influence their decisions.
In addition to finding the store owner not entitled to indem-
nity, the Applebaum court concluded that the store owner's con-
duct had become the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
It is unclear from the opinion the precise relationship the court
saw between indemnification and proximate cause. Concep-
tually, the determination that the market's negligence was the
sole proximate cause is superfluous since the court had already
decided that indemnification was unavailable to the defendant.
However, from the standpoint of policy considerations, indem-
nity and proximate causation are closely related. Both, in a
sense, measure the relative culpability of the parties, particularly
with respect to the passage of time. Perhaps in the instant
ognized indemnity as an equitable doctrine which requires balancing the
culpability of each party to determine the issue of indemnification. See
notes 27-30 supra and note 53 infra, and accompanying text.
53. See notes 28-29 supra.
54. Larson v. Minneapolis, 262 Minn. 142, 148, 114 N.W.2d 68, 73
(1962).
55. See note 26 supra.
56. Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 196 N.W. 171 (1923).
In Goar the village became an intervening cause in 14 months by
neglecting to perform any maintenance on the electric plant installed
by the electric company. The defect developed over time by the action
of the elements; the lines were not initially dangerous. The court found
that ordinary maintenance could have repaired the defect, and the injury
was a direct result of the neglect of this duty. The danger was created
because of the neglect of the village's duty.
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case the court's discussion of proximate causation represents no
more than a recognition of this relationship, and its use to sup-
port the court's denial of indemnity. An alternative explanation
could well have been the court's desire to preclude the store
owner from recovering contribution. Although the court por-
trays the issue of the case as solely one of indemnity, contri-
bution was argued in the store owner's brief.57 By finding that
the store owner's conduct constituted an intervening cause, the
third party defendants would be absolved of all liability, in-
cluding contribution.5 8
Regardless of the wisdom of interjecting intervening cau-
sation into an indemnity case, the court's finding appears to
expand the rule enunciated in Goar v. Village of Stephen.59 The
general rule that passage of time cannot cause passive negligence
to become an intervening cause 0 was rejected there apparently
on the grounds that there must be some point in time when a
party is no longer liable for his misconduct. 6 1 However, in Goar
the third-party defendant's product was not inherently dangerous
at the time of delivery and became so only because of the de-
fendant's failure to maintain the product.62 In the instant case
the drain depression constituted a danger when delivered. Thus,
Applebaum seems to extend the Goar principle to cases where
the defect is initially inherent in the structure. Such an exten-
sion of the reasoning of the controversial Goar case is question-
able. This holding would preclude the store owner from recover-
57. Brief for Appellant at 12, Jack v. Applebaum's Food Markets,
Inc., 280 Minn. 247, 158 N.W.2d 857 (1968).
58. Because the court found that the market's action was the prox-
imate cause, no other party could have been a proximate cause. The
courts have held that a party must be a proximate cause in order to be
liable for damages. The market, being the sole proximate cause,
could sue no one. See Erickson v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687
(1963); Tandeski v. Barnard, 265 Minn. 339, 121 N.W.2d 708 (1963).
59. 157 Minn. 228, 196 N.W. 171 (1923).
60. See, e.g., Honer v. Nicholson, 198 Minn. 55, 59, 268 N.W. 852,
854 (1936).
61. Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 236, 196 N.W. 171,
174 (1923). See also Roberts v. Donaldson, 276 Minn. 72, 149 N.W.2d 401
(1967) (intervening causation in six weeks because of a failure to in-
spect); Murphy v. Barlow Realty Co., 206 Minn. 527, 535, 289 N.W. 563,
567 (1939). It seems that the courts are far less reluctant to find
intervening causation because of passage of time if the injured party will
still have an action to recover his damages against the other co-tort-
feasor.
62. In Goar, the court emphasized at several points that the trans-
former pole became dangerous only because of the "utter neglect by
the village of the very important duty which rested upon it." 157
Minn. at 241, 196 N.W. at 176.
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ing contribution 63 and seems to conflict with both past decisions
on intervening causation64 and a sense of just distribution of
damages.65
In conclusion, the Applebaum decision represents further
evidence that the Minnesota court will continue to approach the
question of indemnity by weighing the relative culpability of the
co-tortfeasors. In so doing, one factor which will weigh heavily
against the party seeking indemnity is his own acquiescence in
the continued existence of the original negligence over an ex-
tended period of time. The decision may also be read as a re-
affirmation of the court's belief that the passage of time is an
important element of intervening causation. However, while on
the facts the instant denial of indemnification seems proper, the
court unnecessarily and unwisely confused the law concerning
distribution of damages among co-tortfeasors by interjecting a
discussion of proximate causation.
63. If an employee of the market had been injured by the defect,
there seems little doubt that recovery from the designer-builder
would be denied because of contributory negligence. The omissions of
the market in failing to correct the defect do seem sufficient to have
contributed proximately to the result, which meets the test for con-
tributory negligence. Zuber v. Northern Pacific Ry., 246 Minn. 157, 74
N.W.2d 641 (1956). The objectives of contributory negligence differ
from those of indemnity and contribution, however, and accordingly in
many instances contribution, and perhaps even indemnity, might be
awarded although contributory negligence would have barred the
party seeking relief had he suffered the injury. The purpose of con-
tributory negligence is to prevent plaintiffs who are at fault from re-
covering for any portion of the injury. Indemnity and contribution,
however, distribute the loss as equitably as possible among those who
are admittedly proximate causes and at fault in the matter.
64. An essential element of intervening causation is that it func-
tions actively to cause a result not otherwise following from the origi-
nal negligence. Kroeger v. Lee, 270 Minn. 75, 78, 132 N.W.2d 727, 729(1965). The injury in the present case would have resulted from the
original negligence; moreover the case seems to fall within the rule
that if a party initiates forces which would not have resulted in harm to
another but for the failure of a third person to perform a duty which the
law imposes upon him, the failure of the third person does not break the
causal connection between the conduct and the injury. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoNI) OFTORTS§ 452, comment b at 486 (1965).
65. Although the store knew of the condition, it was believed to be
without defect because it was under the toe space. Record at 33, Jack
v. Applebaum's Food Markets, Inc., 280 Minn. 247, 158 N.W.2d 857 (1968).
The only disparity of fault between the negligence of the designers
and the owner is the amount of time during which correction could
have been made. This does not seem on its face to be negligence of
such a magnitude that the culpability of the designer is de minimus
in comparison.
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Joint Tortfeasors: Contribution-No Intentional
Wrongdoing Inference from Strict
Liability Statute
Plaintiffs, a widow and her five children, sued liquor vend-
ors-Andrews Hotel and Brady's Bar-for loss of support, basing
their action on the Minnesota Civil Damage Act.' The two de-
fendants had unintentionally made illegal liquor sales to a minor
and immediately thereafter the minor shot plaintiffs' deceased.
Brady's Bar paid the plaintiffs $20,000 to covenant not to sue
and was dismissed. Andrews Hotel, however, impleaded Brady's
as a third-party defendant, 2 claiming a right of contribution.
The trial court granted Brady's motion for summary judgment
on the ground that intentional wrongdoers are barred from con-
tribution rights; since the Act did not require any proof of an
intentional or negligent sale, the vendor was presumed to have
intentionally violated the statute. The Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the violation of a strict liability
statute does not raise a reasonable inference of intentional wrong-
doing and that conscious willfulness to violate a statute or
commit a wrongful act must be shown before contribution is
barred. Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Company, - Minn. -, 161 N.W.
2d 657 (1968).
Contribution is an action which provides for sharing a com-
mon liability3-usually equally, but sometimes apportioned 4- -
which otherwise would be shouldered entirely by one tortfeasor.5
1. AT=x. STAT. § 340.95 (1967) [hereinafter cited as the Act] pro-
vides:
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other
person who is injured in person or property, or means of sup-
port, by any intoxicated person, or by the intoxication of any
person, has a right of action, in his own name, against any per-
son who, by illegally selling, bartering or giving intoxicating
liquor, caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages
sustained; ... and all suits for damages under this section
shall be by civil action ....
2. Mbx. R. Civ. P. 14.01 allows a defendant to implead a per-
son not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim.
3. See American Auto Ins. Co. v. Moiling, 239 Minn. 74, 78-81,
57 N.W.2d 847, 850-53 (1953). Gregory, Contribution Among Tort-
feasors: A Uniform Practice, 1938 Wis. L. REv. 365, 369: "[Contribution]
is an equitable device to redistribute the common burden ratably and
in a fashion different from that employed by the person to whom each
one of the group is usually answerable severally for the entire
amount."
4. 68 YALEL.. 964,981 App. I (1959).
5. While plaintiff could make this selection according to "whim,
spite, or collusion," W. PRossme, LAw or ToRTs 275 (3d ed. 1964)
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Required for contribution are the existence of the parties' com-
mon liability6 and the payment of a disproportionate share of
this liability by one party.
7
Merryweather v. Nixon8 in 1779 established the rule that
there can be no contribution among joint tortfeasors because the
law will not aid wrongdoers. 9 Although the early American cases
allowed contribution when the wrong was committed by mere
negligent or mistaken acts,10 complete disallowance of contrib-
ution has again become the rule at common law.1" Statutes in
[hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER], he usually will pick according to "in-
telligent self interest." James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors:
A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1167 (1941).
6. American Auto Ins. Co. v. Molling, 239 Minn. 74, 57 N.W.2d 847
(1953) announced the rule that no common liability exists if a defense-
here interspousal immunity-is available to the potential third party
defendant at the time the cause of action accrued. Employers Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn. 304, 50 N.W.2d 689
(1051) without explanation ruled a covenant not to sue to be a defense
acquired after the cause of action accrued with common liability there-
fore present. See generally Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among
Tortfeasors in Minnesota, 37 M Nw. L. Rmr. 470 (1953).
7. Merrimac Mining Co. v. Gross, 216 Minn. 244, 12 N.W.2d 506
(1943); Duluth, Missabe & N. Ry. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N.W.
766 (1931); see Gustafson v. Johnson, 235 Minn. 358, 364-72, 51 N.W.2d
108, 112-16 (1952), explaining the impact of Rule 14.01, supra note 2, on
the "payment" requirement for a right to contribution. Fox v. Western
N.Y. Motor Lines, 232 App. Div. 308, 249 N.Y.S. 623 (1931), pointed out
the circular problem possible before such a rule as 14.01.
8. 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1779).
9. Andromidas v. Theisen Bros., 94 F. Supp. 150, 153 (D. Neb.
1950); Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negli-
gence-Merryweather v. Nixon, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176 (1898). Merry-
weather not only involved an intentional tort but was decided at a
time when all torts were intentional, negligence not yet being classified
a tort. Thus, as the concept of tort was expanded to include negli-
gence, it was very easy for courts to distinguish Merryweather.
10. Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455 (1859); Nickerson v. Wheeler,
118 Mass. 295 (1875); see W. PROSSEa at 274 n.44; Reath, supra note 9,
at 178.
11. Various explanations have been given. Dean Prosser feels that
the availability of joinder influenced courts to take a less sympathetic
view to contribution. He criticizes this result for losing sight of the
reasons for allowing contribution in the first place: to aid the person
seeking contribution and not the aggrieved plaintiff. W. PROSSER at 274.
A closely related explanation points out how the category of "joint
tort" expanded to include defendants whose acts were so unrelated
that contribution was no longer deemed necessary. Comment, supra
note 4, at 964 n.1.
Tennessee shows a possibility other than this return to complete
exclusion. After early allowing contribution in the absence of inten-
tional wrongdoing, Rhea v. White, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 121 (1859), its
courts retreated to concepts of active and passive negligence with a cor-
responding denial or allowance of contribution. Davis v. Broad St.
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23 states1 2 have modified the common law rule to allow contri-
bution under certain circumstances, 3 but Minnesota continues to
allow contribution at common law.' 4 In Minnesota, contribution
is allowed only when the wrong results from certain uninten-
tional acts.'5 The category of such wrongs has expanded, how-
ever, and includes a presumption of intent whenever a statute is
violated. In Fidelity & Casualty Company v. Christenson,16 a
truck owner violated a traffic statute by leaving his truck
parked at night without a lighted tail light, thereby causing in-
jury to a passenger in a negligently driven auto. The court
barred contribution, reasoning that since defendant had actual
knowledge that the tail light was out, he "intended" to violate
the statute whether he actually knew of the statute or not.'7
Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950). See also Jones, Contri-
bution Among Tortfeasors, 11 U. FL-A. L. REv. 175, 192 n.47 (1958).
12. W. PRossER at 275; Hewes, The Evolution of Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors in Maine, 44 B.U.L. REV. 79, 83 (1964). Uniform
acts have been adopted in 1939 and 1955 without much direct impact.
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 9 U.L.A. 125-26 (Supp.
1967).
13. C.J.S. Contribution § 11(5), (6); Annot., 141 A.L.R. 1207 (1942);
Annot., 122 A.L.R. 520 (1939); Annot., 85 A.L.R. 1091 (1933).
14. Underwriters v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13 (1926); An-
keny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887); see Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d
1366, 1377-79 (1959). Iowa is the latest state so to rule, doing so in 1956.
Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956).
While Minnesota has a contribution statute, it is merely procedural,
not changing any common law rule. Kemerer v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 201 Minn. 239, 276 N.W. 228 (1937), aff'd, 211 Mini,. 249, 300
N.W. 793 (1941). Mm. STAT. § 548.19 (1967) provides for a ten day
filing of notice after payment given.
15. Underwriters v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13 (1926),
quoting Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048(1918) and Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887). The
Ellis rule allowed a right of contribution if no moral turpitude or will-
ful or conscious wrong was involved. Ankeny would disallow contri-
bution if the person knew or was presumed to know he was committing
an illegal act.
16. 183 Minn. 182, 236 N.W. 618 (1931). See also Kemerer v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 211 Minn. 249, 300 N.W. 793 (1941). Christenson
and Kemerer are cited as probable authority for barring contribution
to a defendant who has violated the Act. See Cochrance, The Dram
Shop Act, 23 BENCH & BAR 29, 33 (No. 1, 1966); Note, Liability Under
the Minnesota Civil Damage Act, 46 MViNN. L. REv. 169, 182 (1961). But
see Note, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Liable in Tort, 35 GEo.
L.J. 382 (1947) (presumption of intentional wrong is categorized as more
deserving of contribution than mere negligence).
17. 183 Minn. 182, 187-88, 236 N.W. 618, 620: "There is rarely in
these cases an intent to injure any particular person. Such intention is
not necessary." This reasoning is based on the premise that a statute
intended to protect a class of persons was intentionally violated-a
premise which is hardly viable considering the intentional violation was
presumptive rather than actual.
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Although Christenson has been criticized,18 its doctrine of pre-
sumed intentional violations of statutes has never been over-
turned.19
The Minnesota Civil Damage Act creates a cause of action
for persons, or their dependents, who are injured by any person
intoxicated through an illegal sale of liquor.20 At common law,
supplying liquor could seldom be found proximately to cause
the alleged injury.21  Courts reasoned that because the Act
created a new action it was penal and to be strictly con-
strued.22 But the Minnesota court has explicitly rejected a penal
interpretation, 23 and the Eighth Circuit, reviewing the Act, con-
cluded that "although penal in nature, [it is] also remedial in
character and, according to the prevailing view, [is] to be lib-
erally construed so as to suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy."24
The Act allows the plaintiff to recover "one full satis-
18. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Village of Hewitt, 274 Minn. 246, 143
N.W.2d 230 (1966).
19. In Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Danberry, 234 Minn. 391, 48
N.W.2d 567 (1951), the additional actions "after the peril was obvious"
were, as in Farmers Ins., enough to eliminate the jump previously seen
in Christenson between a presumed intentional statutory violation and
an intentional causing of the resulting injuries.
20. See note 1 supra.
21. Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955), citing 10
DuNNx L DIG. § 4918 (3d ed.); 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquor § 430 (1947).
But see Sharp, Dram Shop Laws and Problems, 28 ALA. LAw. 409 (1967);
12 BAYLOR L. REV. 388 (1960).
22. Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955); Mayes v.
Byers, 214 Minn. 54, 7 N.W.2d 403 (1943). This change from derogation
of the common law to penal is hard to see although strict rules of
construction have been justified using either classification. But see
Lund v. Village of Watson, 260 Minn. 273, 281 n.7, 109 N.W.2d 564, 568
n.7 (1961).
23. Adamson v. Dougherty, 248 Minn. 535, 81 N.W.2d 110 (1957).
The court stated that the desire to eliminate certain defenses such as
contributory negligence from the original case prompted the courts
who adopted the penal language. See 42 MImm L. REV. 145, 146-47
(1957).
But it would seem plausible that the outlook of society towards the
function of law in the civil liability area has simply changed. See
Ogilvie, History and Appraisal of the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958 U.
ILL. L. FOR. 175, 182. But cf. 42 MINN. L. REV. 298, 300 (1957), where it
was suggested that a moral reprehension over the sale of liquor still
exists, requiring some penal elements. Village of Brooten v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1961), while seeming to agree that
times have changed, still felt that any confusion in interpretation is due
to different fact situations and collateral issues.
24. Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284 (8th
Cir. 1961).
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faction."25 If a covenant not to sue26 or an unsatisfied judg-
ment27 is not full satisfaction, plaintiff is not barred from pur-
suing other defendants concurrently liable. A plaintiff may sue
one28 or any combination 29 of the vendors commonly liable-this
choice being limited only by the "one full satisfaction" rule.
In the instant case, the court held that contribution will not
be denied solely because the seeker has violated the Act. Such a
violation was said not to fall within the intentional or willful
category for purposes of barring contribution. Rather, each stat-
utory violation will be examined for its intentional nature, just
as carefully as common law torts, to determine whether a right
to contribution will be barred.30
Examining the Act generally, the court found that if any
presumption exists, it would have to be that violations occur in
spite of reasonable precaution by the vendor.31 Furthermore,
the policy objectives of the Act itself were found to be best
effectuated by a grant of contribution. The "remedy" is "ad-
vanced" by distributing the burden of economic loss across the
whole liquor selling industry as a cost of doing business. The
"mischief" is "suppressed" by the strict liability remedy, which
provides almost certain recovery if a vendor violates the statute.
Deterrence is heightened by eliminating the possibility that
many will fortuitously escape liability if they are not the chosen
defendants. 32
The decision in Skaja represents a marked improvement in
dealing with the question of contribution in statutory liability
25. Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954); 48
C.3.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 478 (1947); see Adamson v. Dougherty, 248
Minn. 535, 81 N.W.2d 110 (1957) (comparing the Act's recovery with the
limited recovery allowed under MiNr. STAT. § 573.02 (1967) for wrong-
ful death awards).
26. W. PRossER at 46; Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403, 420-22 (1960).
27. Lund v. Village of Watson, 260 Minn. 273, 109 N.W.2d 564
(1961); Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954).
28. Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954); War-
ren v. Westrup, 44 Minn. 237, 46 N.W. 347 (1890).
29. No separation right because of prejudicial joinder will be
allowed. Hartwig v. Loyal Order of Moose, 253 Minn. 347, 91 N.W.2d
794 (1958); Doyle v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 134 Minn. 461, 159 N.W.
1081 (1916).
30. Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., - Minn..., ., 161 N.W.2d 657,
660 (1968).
31. Id.; see Respondent's Brief at 2. The actual facts of Skala
show how small a proximate cause was required to be shown. See
Note, supra note 16 (an exhaustive treatment of proximate cause).
32. Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., - Minn. .. , ., 161 N.W.2d 657,
661 (1968).
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cases. If there is some salutary reason for disallowing contri-
bution when the seeker's liability results from an intentional
act, the presumption of intent without inquiry into the nature
of the act is obviously undesirable. Indeed, liability under many
strict liability statutes may attach even in the absence of negli-
gent conduct. To hold the fortuitous defendant incapable of
contribution by labeling his liability resultant from pre-
sumptively intentional conduct is often to foist the entire lia-
bility on one guilty of negligent conduct at most, and frequently
on one guilty of no culpable conduct whatsoever. The court's
approach in examining the nature of the act on a case-by-case
basis, for the purposes of deciding contribution, seems to remedy
the unfortunate results accompanying blanket presumptions of
intentional conduct.
With respect to justifying the allowance of contribution on
the ground that the deterrent quality of the Act will be im-
proved, however, it is certainly arguable that liquor vendors sell
or refuse to sell irrespective of their speculation that the cus-
tomer has or will frequent the establishment of other vendors.
Indeed, with respect to vendors concerned about sales to minors,
it is unlikely they would assume that minors have or will be
served elsewhere, as they are likely to continue drinking in the
immediate establishment which has consented to serve them
rather than risk refusal elsewhere.
Even if vendors do speculate that their customers have or
will frequent other establishments, the court's assumption that
deterrence will be heightened by the law's allowance of contri-
bution is doubtful. The fact that a vendor can always acquire
contribution arguably reduces his fear of liability under the Act,
as opposed to the possibility that he might incur the entire lia-
bility by himself should he fortuitously be named the defendant.
Furthermore, the prevalence of liability insurance to indemnify
the vendor for his liability under the Act tends to mitigate any
deterrence argument on the question.
After Skaja, the theory behind the formalistic Christenson
doctrine no longer has support in Minnesota. In addition, the
Act's penal characteristics are de-emphasized or ignored. If the
court's deterrence rationale is not viable and the strong emphasis
on compensatory theory is continued, future developments may
occur in the contribution area. Specifically, as the court seems to
invite,33 contribution may eventually be granted even to actual
33. Id. at _, 161 N.W.2d at 660.
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intentional tortfeasors. But this development must be left to
future argumentation. Skaja itself was clearly needed to bring
Minnesota contribution law back into the realm of realistic legal
theory.
Libel: Application of Times Standard to Public Officials
Defendant published an article on the front page of its news-
paper stating that a prominant Catholic priest was seeking to
have plaintiff, a police-detective captain, reprimanded. Accord-
ing to the article, the priest was upset because the plaintiff had
"refused" to arrest a father who had molested his six year old
daughter, and because plaintiff had treated the complaining
mother with extreme discourtesy. The article further stated that
the Chief of Police commented that the matter was merely a
"misunderstanding or error of judgment," and that plaintiff
could not be reached for comment. In an action for libel the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict for plaintiff,
and held that under the standard enunciated in New York Times
Company v. Sullivan,' the evidence was sufficient to justify a
finding of "actual malice." Mahnke v. Northwest Publications,
Incorporated, 280 Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d 1 (1968).
Libel is the written form of defamation.2 Broadly speaking,
a statement is defamatory if it "tends to hold the plaintiff up to
hatred, contempt, or ridicule .... -3 To recover, the plaintiff
must show: (1) that the statement was defamatory; (2) that it
was made of and concerning the plaintiff;4 and (3) that the state-
ment was communicated to a third party.5 Liability for de-
famation is strict; no fault by defendant need be proven.6 The
truth of the defamatory statement is a complete defense, regard-
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 769-80 (3d ed. 1964). The other form
of defamation, slander, may be roughly identified as oral defamation.
Although this distinction is not always clear, as in the case of defama-
tion by radio, television, or movies, it will suffice for the purposes of
the instant discussion. The distinction is largely historical, but, like
much of the law of defamation, it remains to the present day without
any apparent reasonable justification for its existence. See Donnelly,
History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 99.
3. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 756.
4. Northrop v. Tibbles, 215 F. 99 (7th Cir. 1914); Helmicks v.
Stevlingson, 212 Wis. 614, 250 N.W. 402 (1933).
5. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 785-90.
6. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [1909] 2 K.B. 444, aff'd, [1910] A.C. 20.
See also Smith, Jones v. Hulton: Three Conflicting Views as to Defama-
tion, 60 U. PA. L. REV. 365 (1912).
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less of the defendant's motives, 7 but where the defendant has
merely repeated the words of another, as in the instant case, he
must prove the truth of the original statement, not merely that
it was accurately repeated.8 When the defendant is not able
to prove truth, he may still avail himself of one of several privi-
leges.9
Although suits for defamation restrain free speech,10 it has
always been presumed that the first amendment does not protect
defamatory statements," and until 1964 there was no federal
constitutional limit to the state defamation laws. While the
majority of states recognized no special privilege for factually
erroneous comments on the conduct of public officials, 2 some
states, including Minnesota,13 did recognize a qualified privilege
for such statements.14 In 1964, the *United States Supreme Court
elevated the minority rule to constitutional status in New York
Times Company v. Sullivan15 The Court viewed the problem:
... against the background of a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehe-
ment, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials.' 6
In its now famous decision, the Court held that the first amend-
ment requires:
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official con-
duct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual
7. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 823-26.
8. Watkin v. Hall, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 396.
9. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 795-823. Some of these privileges
are absolute, such as the privilege accorded a public official for state-
ments made in the course of his official duties. Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S.
564 (1959). Others are qualified and can be defeated upon a showing
of abuse.
10. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-72 (1964).
11. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
12. Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair
Comment II, 42 CoLUm. L. REv. 1282, 1288 (1942). It should be noted,
however, that the common law did allow a privilege for statements of
opinion about matters of public concern, and this included statements
about public officials. This privilege was lost if the statement contained
errors of fact. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 812-16.
13. Friedell v. Blakely Printing, 163 Minn. 226, 203 N.W. 974 (1925).
14. Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921);
Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908); Palmer v. Con-
cord, 48 N.H. 211 (1868). Only in Coleman, however, was the privilege
based on constitutional grounds.
15. 376 U.S. at 254.
16. Id. at 270.
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malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not.17
Moreover, the Court held that actual malice must be proven
with "convincing clarity."' The Court concluded that a less
stringent standard would deprive speech of the "breathing
space" it needs to survive. 9 In other words, legitimate criticism
of public officials would be inhibited either by fear of libel
judgments or by the expense of defending libel actions.20
Several subsequent Supreme Court decisions have attempted
to clarify the Sullivan standard and its requirement of actual
malice. Garrison v. Louisiana2' was a criminal prosecution for
libel against a district attorney for his statements alleging that
state court judges were sympathetic to criminal elements in the
state. The Court said that, under Sullivan, actual malice is not
present unless the statements are made with a "high degree of
awareness of their probable falsity .... "22 In St. Amant V.
Thompson,23 defendant, a candidate for a public office, appeared
on television and charged that plaintiff was guilty of corruption
in office. The Court reaffirmed its statement in Garrison24
and restated the requirement:
... [R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasona-
bly prudent man would have published, or would have investi-
gated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to
permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.25
Thus, the constitutional standard delineated in these cases
requires proof of "convincing clarity"26 that defendant "in fact"27
had a "high degree of awareness" that the defamatory statement
was probably false 28 before a libel award to a public official can
be upheld. The common law definition of malice which equated
the term with ill-will or bad motives29 does not apply to the
constitutional standard.30 Nor is it sufficient to show that the
defendant should have known that the statements were prob-
17. Id. at 279-80.
18. Id. at 285-86.
19. Id. at 271-72.
20. Id. at 282.
21. 379 U.S. 64 (1965).
22. Id. at 74.
23. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
24. Id. at 731.
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
27. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (emphasis added).
28. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1965).
29. Hammersten v. Reiling, 262 Minn. 200, 115 N.W.2d 259 (1962).
30. Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965).
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ably false; negligence, or even gross negligence will not support
recovery. 1 The plaintiff must show that defendant did have
such an awareness.
In the instant case, both parties agreed that plaintiff was a
public official and that the Sullivan standard applied. It was con-
ceded on appeal that the article in question was false and de-
famatory. It was also agreed that defendant did not have actual
knowledge that the article quoted the priest accurately. Thus,
the only question was whether the facts were constitutionally
sufficient to support the verdict.
The court stated at the outset that there was ample evidence
to justify a finding that defendant's action in publishing the
article was hasty and negligent.32 Although it might be argued
that the record does not support such a strong statement, this
is unnecessary since false and defamatory statements about pub-
lic officials made with negligent disregard of their truth or
falsity are clearly protected by the Sullivan rule.3 3 It is not
clear why the court mentioned that a finding of negligence was
warranted when it expressly recognized that negligence is not
sufficient to justify recovery. 4
The court next discussed the question whether the record
supported a finding of reckless disregard of truth or falsity, as
required by Sullivan. The court's affirmative answer to this
question was based on a consideration of essentially the same
factors as it weighed in concluding that the publication was
negligent. 5 First, the court stated that the material in the article
could have been checked and the errors eliminated in a follow-
up story in the next edition. Second, the court pointed out that
since the incident on which the story was based was six days old,
its publication on the front page without verification must have
been strictly to attract reader attention. Third, the controversial
view was given to the story in spite of the statement by the
31. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968); Baldine v.
Sharon Herald Co., 280 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Pa. 1966); Theckston v. Tri-
angle Publications, 100 N.J. Super. 452, 242 A.2d 629 (1968); Pauling v.
National Review, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
see Bertelsman, The First Amendment and Protection of Reputation
and Privacy- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and How It Grew, 56
Ky. L. REv. 718, 752 (1968).
32. Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 343, 160
N.W.2d 1, 10-11 (1968).
33. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287-88 (1964).
See also Hammersten v. Reiling, 262 Minn. 200, 115 N.W.2d 259 (1962).
34. Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 343, 160
N.W. 2d 1, 11 (1968).
35. Id.
1098 [Vol. 53:1026
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
Chief of Police that the affair was merely a "misunderstanding
or error of judgment." Fourth, the court stated that if the de-
fendant had been concerned with the truth of the article, it
would have gone to greater lengths to verify the statements.
Fifth, the court viewed the extent of the falsity as evidence of
recklessness. Finally, the court reasoned that the priest's ab-
sence from the scene of the incident should have prompted
further investigation, and that the failure to do so was evidence
of recklessness.35
These factors, which the court viewed as constitutionally suf-
ficient to support a finding of actual malice, must be evaluated
in light of the requirement that defamatory statements be
made with actual awareness that they are probably false in
order to justify recovery. It is submitted that as a matter of
constitutional law, they are not sufficient to support a finding of
actual malice. The court suggested that the facts could have
been checked with the plaintiff and his comments carried in a
follow-up story. It is perhaps sufficient to state that this is
exactly what the defendant did,37 but it should also be noted
that the failure of the newspaper to print a follow-up story can-
not support an inference that it knew the content of the original
article was probably false. A failure to print the follow-up could,
at the most, be taken to indicate that the defendant was not
acting in accordance with the standards of a reasonable pub-
lisher.
The court also suggested that the story was six days old and
36. The court also stated that the failure to retract the article on
the request of the plaintiff should have been considered by the jury
as evidence of actual malice, although the trial court excluded it. This
factor will not be considered here because it appears that this is not
the basis for the decision, since the jury had no opportunity to consider
the matter. Record at 44, Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280
Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Record]. It should
be noted, however, that at least one federal court of appeals has held that
failure to retract may never be evidence of actual malice. New York
Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567, 575 (5th Cir. 1966). The court in the
instant case draws its support from dicta in Pratt v. Pioneer-Press Co., 35
Minn. 251, 28 N.W. 708 (1886), which stated that failure to retract was
evidence of malice. That case, however, was decided under the com-
mon law privilege, which required only ill will, bad motives, or wanton
behavior to constitute malice. Hammersten v. Reilng, 262 Minn. 200,
115 N.W.2d 259 (1962). "Malice" under Sullivan is, as a matter of
constitutional law, entirely different.
37. Record at 8. Moreover, the follow-up story was printed in
the morning paper which has about 20 times the circulation of the
Sunset Final edition which carried the article in question. Record
at 250-51.
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was placed on the front page strictly to attract reader interest.
Perhaps the court overlooked the possibility that the story was
based, not on the incident involving the plaintiff, but on the
priest's reaction to that incident.38 That reaction was not even
one day old when the story went to press.30 Moreover, the mere
fact that a story is based on an incident which occurred some
days before the story appears does not necessarily mean that the
newspaper can postpone publication as the court suggested.
It seems obvious that the crucial date is not the date on which
an incident occurs, but rather the date on which it becomes pub-
lic knowledge. As to the court's belief that the story was placed
on the front page strictly to attract reader attention, the un-
contradicted testimony at trial disclosed that the reason for this
placement was that the front page is the only page which is
changed for the particular edition of the paper in which the ar-
ticle appeared.40
The next factor considered by the court as evidence of actual
malice was the police chief's statement that the matter was
merely a "misunderstanding." In many instances this would be
a relevant consideration since the fact that the publisher received
information indicating that this previous information was wrong
would tend to show that he knew the material was probably
false. In the instant case, however, it seems doubtful that the
evidence of the police chief's statement can justify such an in-
ference. It is hard to imagine what else a police chief with an
investigation of misconduct underway in his department could
say. Comparing the chief's relatively self-serving statement
with that supplied by a well-known and respected priest, it seems
somewhat unlikely that the statement by the chief would raise
"serious doubts"41 in the mind of defendant's reporter about the
truth of the priest's information. However, it is true that the
circumstances might reasonably have indicated a need for further
investigation.
The court placed heavy emphasis on defendant's failure to
38. The headline and first paragraph of the article, which normally
reveal the subject matter of any news story, read:
COP REBUKE IN TOT MOLESTING URGED
A Minneapolis Catholic priest today demanded an official
reprimand for one of that city's detective captains because he
said the police official had refused to arrest a man involved in
a serious child-molesting case.
Record at 3.
39. Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 367, 160
N.W.2d 1, 25 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
40. Record at 227-28.
41. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
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investigate adequately the facts of the story, but the suggestion
that failure to investigate indicates reckless disregard for truth
or falsity is open to serious question. In the case of a responsi-
ble publisher, failure to investigate may indicate faith in the
truth of the story rather than "serious doubts" about its truth.
The United States Supreme Court has held that failure to investi-
gate by itself cannot constitute actual malice in cases involving
public officials. In Sullivan itself, the defendant failed to in-
vestigate its own files.42 Similarly, in Beckley Newspapers Cor-
poration v. Hanks,43 the defendant did not conduct any investi-
gation.44  In St. Amant v. Thompson,45 the Court found that
defendant's inadequate investigation did not constitute actual
malice: ". . . reckless conduct is not measured by whether a
reasonably prudent man ... would have investigated before
publishing."46 Therefore, it is not constitutionally permissible
to consider failure to investigate adequately as evidence of actual
malice.
The court also reasoned that the extent of the falsity was
evidence of actual malice. The notion that the words of an
article can ever be evidence of actual malice seems questionable4 7
and should only be applied to occasions when the article is un-
believable on its face.48  The words themselves cannot show a
"high degree of awareness of probable falsity" unless they are
so outrageous that the publisher himself disbelieves them with-
out any investigation. It is clear that the article in the instant
case contains no such statements. In fact, the United States Su-
preme Court has made no finding of actual malice from words
alone in cases where the statements were seemingly far more
outrageous and improbable.49
42. 376 U.S. at 287.
43. 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
44. Id. at 84.
45. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
46. Id. at 731. See also Bertelsman, supra note 31, at 753.
47. See Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir 1966).
48. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968); see Bertels-
man, supra note 31, at 753; cf. Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th
Cir. 1965).
49. E.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (defendant
charged plaintiff with corruption); Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks,
389 U.S. 81 (1967) (defendant stated that plaintiff had threatened
another public official in order to gain her support); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (defendant claimed that state judges were
sympathetic to criminals). See also Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365
F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (defendant charged plaintiff with taking bribes
and other nefarious activities); Suchomel v. Suburban Life Newspapers,
Inc., 84 Ill. App. 2d 239, 28 N.E.2d 172 (1967) (defendant accused plaintiff-
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Finally, the court pointed out that the source of the story,
the priest, was not present when the controversial incident
occurred, and that the defendant did not check the story with
any of the participants. The court suggested that if the defend-
ant had verified the story with any of the participants, it would
not have been printed. Arguably, the basis for the story was
the reaction of a well-known Catholic priest, rather than the inci-
dent in question. 50 If that view is correct, it is difficult
to imagine a better source than the priest himself. Moreover,
it seems doubtful that contact with an actual participant would
have precluded publication of the story.5 1 On the contrary, the
inclusion of comment by a participant might have increased in-
terest in the story by creating open conflict between well-known
persons. The fact that the story was one-sided is immaterial."
The constitutional protection does not depend on telling both
sides of the story; it depends on defendant's belief in the truth
of the side he tells.53 The court seems to suggest that if the
source of a defamatory article is not present at the described
incidents, failure to check the story with a participant will consti-
tute actual malice. Such a conclusion would be novel since in
both United States Supreme Court cases involving a newspaper's
libel of a public official, the source for the story was not a
participant in the described incidents.54 It may be desirable to
check a story with a participant, and at times it may be negligent
not to do so, but negligence is not sufficient in this case.
The same doubtful application of the Sullivan standard is
apparent in the court's choice of supporting authority. The court
relied on Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts55 for the standard
policeman of drinking on duty, firing his weapon for no reason, picking
up women in his squad car, burglary, and other improper and criminal
acts).
50. See note 38 supra, and accompanying text.
51. The same story was run again after one of the participants
(plaintiff) had been contacted. Record at 8.
52. New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir.
1966): "The protection of the first amendment is not limited to state-
ments . . . which reflect an objective picture of the reported events."
Cf. Suchomel v. Suburban Life Newspapers, 84 M1. App. 2d 239, 28 N.E.2d
172 (1967) (suggests that telling both sides tends to rebut evidence of
actual malice).
53. See Theckston v. Triangle Publications, 100 N.J. Super. 452,
242 A.2d 629 (1968). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (material in question was far from objective in its de-
scription of the disputed incidents).
54. Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
55. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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of press responsibility stated by Justice Harlan, which allows re-
covery when a newspaper publisher ignores "elementary" pre-
cautions. 0 The court suggested that the defendant ignored
such precautions in the instant case.57 Even assuming the cor-
rectness of that statement, the court seems to have overlooked
the fact that the standard espoused by Justice Harlan did not
command a majority of the Supreme Court.58 Moreover, even
Justice Harlan himself would not apply it to cases involving the
libel of public officials. 59
56. Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 345, 160
N.W.2d 1, 12 (1968).
57. Id.
58. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), involved the
libel of a well-known person who was not a public official. The issue
was whether the first amendment required the extension of a privilege
to comments about public figures who are not public officials. No
definition of a public figure was undertaken, but Justice Harlan con-
cluded that plaintiff football coach was such a figure, pointing out that
he
... commanded sufficient continuing public interest and had
sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able
"to expose through discussion the falsehoods and fallacies" of the
defamatory statements.
Id. at 155. All nine justices concluded that some privilege is re-
quired, but confusion was raised at to what the standard should be.
In the main opinion announcing the decision of the Court, Justice Har-
lan, speaking for himself and three other justices, concluded that a
public figure should be able to recover from a newspaper if he proves
that the libel was published in an extreme departure from ordinary
publishing standards and found that the evidence was sufficient to
justify recovery.
This standard allows recovery less readily than the common law
but more readily than the Sullivan standard. Chief Justice Warren
concurred with Justice Harlan, thus forming the majority, but the
Chief Justice contended that the Sullivan standard should be applied
to the libel of public figures. He concluded that the evidence was
sufficient to justify recovery even under that standard. Justices Bren-
nan and White also argued that the Sullivan standard should be applied,
but they found the instructions inadequate, and therefore did not reach
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence. Justices Black and
Douglas stated, as they did in Sullivan, that freedom of the press is
absolute and the press should be immune from libel judgments under
all conditions. Thus, since the Black and Douglas standard will always
deny recovery, and the Sullivan standard (Warren, Brennan, and White)
will allow recovery less often than the Harlan standard, five members
of the Court advocate a standard at least as protective as Sullivan's.
It must be concluded that any public figure must meet the Sullivan
standard in order to recover. W. LOcKHART, Y. KAMVsAR, & J. CHOPER,
CoNsTirUTioNAL LAW 51 (2d ed., Supp. 1967); Bertelsman, supra note 31,
at 735-36; Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment:
Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267, 307.
59. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 386 U.S. 130, 155 (1967): "Noth-
ing in this opinion is meant to affect the holdings in New York Times
and its progeny ......
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The court also referred to Goldwater v. Ginzberg60 for the
proposition that if defendant admits he did not consider whether
the material was true or false, reckless disregard is present.
Although the court in the instant case said the defendant's
conduct falls within the purview of Ginzberg, that statement
finds little support in the record. In addition, the court seem-
ingly failed to notice the Ginzberg court's intimation that the
same criteria would not be applied had the ruling not been made
on a motion for summary judgment."1 Finally, the court in the
instant case approved the instruction of the trial court, although
its propriety was not argued on appeal 6 2 This approval illus-
trates the court's possible misconceptions regarding the Sullivan
standard. The instructions included the following statement: "A
reckless disregard means a conduct which is heedless and shows
a wanton indifference to consequences. It is a conduct which is
far more than negligent."63 This instruction supports a standard
of reckless disregard which is only quantitatively different from
negligence. This is the common law meaning usually attached
to the term.64 The Sullivan standard, however, brought a dis-
tinctive meaning to the term "recklessness" when applied to the
libel of public officials. In that context, "recklessness" is quali-
tatively different from negligence. It requires proof of actual
awareness of probable falsity. 5
Mahnke is of more significance than a technical analysis
readily indicates. The significance of the opinion stems from two
basic considerations. First, the factors which the court took into
account in drawing its conclusions may have substantial impact
since the United States Supreme Court has not yet delineated
with any degree of precision the kinds of factual considerations
60. 261 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
61. The Ginzberg court pointed out that when the issue is the sub-jective intent of one of the parties, such as the presence or absence of
malice, summary judgment is particularly inappropriate, because the
party trying to establish the state of mind should have an opportunity
for cross-examination. Id. at 787-88.
62. Brief for Appellant at 36-37, Mahnke v. Northwest Publica-
tions, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d 1 (1968).
63. Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 350, 160
N.W.2d 1, 15 (1968) (emphasis in original).
64. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 189 (3d ed. 1964):
[T]here is often no clear distinction at all between such
conduct and "gross" negligence, and the two have tended to
merge and take on the same meaning, of an aggravated form of
negligence ....
65. See note 29 supra, and accompanying text. See also Bertels-
man, supra note 31, at 751.
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that are relevant under the Sullivan standard.6 Since defeas-
ance of the Sullivan privilege depends on the defendant's con-
scious awareness of probable falsity, the only circumstances
worthy of consideration are those which tend to show the de-
fendant's state of mind at the time of the publication. In the
course of the present discussions, it has been suggested that the
court was misguided in directing its attention at several factors.
As a matter of constitutional law, defendant's failure to investi-
gate, to tell both sides of the story, and to publish a follow-up
story should not have been considered as evidence of actual mal-
ice, and should not be so considered in future cases. The other
factors considered by the court, namely interest in sensational-
ism, reliability of the source, and pre-publication notice, are
worthy of consideration on the issue of actual malice, although
their application in the instant case is open to question.
A more disturbing aspect of Mahnke is the court's apparent
unwillingness to comply fully with the dictates of Sullivan. The
court relied heavily on Justice Harlan's opinion in Curtis Pub-
lishing Company v. Butts, 7 which prescribes a gross negligence
test.0 8 Not only is this opinion inapplicable to public officials,
but, in all probability, it is not authoritative as to public figures
either."9 Moreover, in its discussion of the Sullivan standard,
the court referred to an article which opposes that standard in
its entirety. 70 Furthermore, the court approved trial court in-
structions which were phrased in terms of gross negligence.71
Finally, the court relied on old Minnesota cases which espoused
a common law privilege and a standard of malice which depends
on bad motives rather than conscious awareness of probable
falsity.72 It did so without any mention of St. Amant v. Thomp-
son, 7 3 the most recent United States Supreme Court case which
applied the Sullivan doctrine. This is particularly puzzling in
view of the fact that the lower court in St. Amant rested its
findings of liability on the defendant's failure to investigate
66. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1968).
67. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
68. Kalven, supra note 58, at 298.
69. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153-54 (1967).
70. 280 Minn. at 346 n.3, 160 N.W.2d at 12 n.3.
71. Id. at 351, 160 N.W.2d at 18.
72. The court relied on MacInnis v. National Herald Printing Co.,
140 Minn. 171, 167 N.W. 550 (1918), for the proposition that a reckless
failure to ascertain true facts may constitute malice sufficient to support
an award of punitive damages. 280 Minn. at 337, 160 N.W.2d at 7. The
court apparently failed to recognize that common law definitions of
recklessness and malice are insufficient under the Sullivan standard.
73. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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and contact an actual participant in the described incident.74
These factors seem to indicate an inclination to protect the
reputation of individual public officials by forcing newspapers
to "pay the freight" as do other needed enterprises. 7 Whatever
the merits of this position in debating the wisdom of the privi-
lege, that debate has been foreclosed. The essence of the Sul-
livan doctrine is that a newspaper cannot be required to "pay
the freight." The first amendment requires that speech and
press be given an extraordinary degree of protection. To those
who question the need for such protection, perhaps the best
answer was offered by Professor Kalven:
[T]he answer is not that we think communication will be inhib-
ited more than the other activity, but simply that we are less
willing to have it inhibited .... In a profound sense the com-
mitment to free speech is quixotic and gallant; it is not a matter
for prudence .... I suspect that, properly viewed, there is in
the world of the First Amendment no place for the 'reasonable
prudent man.' 76
Reluctance or inadvertent neglect to apply the full scope
of the Sullivan doctrine is not an unusual phenomenon. This
is apparent from the large number of cases dealing with the
doctrine which have reached the Supreme Court in the past few
years, and the sizable number of appellate court reversals for
misapplication of the doctrine.77 This is perhaps most distress-
ing for those who wish to preserve some measure of protection
for the reputations of individual public officials since the unwill-
ingness of lower courts to respect the mandate of the Supreme
Court may require an absolute standard prohibiting all recovery
by public officials. 78 An absolute standard should not be neces-
sary. The concept of conscious awareness of probable falsity is
not too difficult for courts to understand and apply if they
will forget the common law formulation of recklessness and
recognize that the Constitution requires a different type of
recklessness-one that does not depend on ill will or bad motives
and has "no place for 'the reasonable prudent man.' -79
74. 250 La. 405, 196 So. 2d 255 (1967).
75. Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 345, 160
N.W.2d 1, 12 (1968).
76. Kalven, supra note 58, at 301, 303.
77. E.g., New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966);
Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Suchomel v.
Suburban Life Newspapers, 84 Ill. App. 2d 239, 228 N.E.2d 172 (1967);
Theckston v. Triangle Publications, 100 N.J. Super. 452, 242 A.2d 629
(1968).
78. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294-95
(1964) (Black, J., concurring).
79. Kalven, supra note 58, at 303.
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Torts: Abrogation of Parental Immunity
A minor riding in an automobile driven by his mother suf-
fered personal injuries when the automobile collided with an-
other. The mother was covered by liability insurance. The
boy's father, as natural guardian, brought an action for damages
allegedly resulting from the mother's negligence. The defend-
ant mother moved to dismiss the action, claiming immunity as
the boy's parent. The motion was granted by the trial court.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed1 and held the child-
parent immunity rule abrogated except "(1) where the alleged
negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental author-
ity over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act in-
volves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect
to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental
services, and other care. ' 2 Silesky v. Kelman, - Minn.
161 N.W.2d 631 (1968).
At common law, an action in negligence lies against a party
who creates an unreasonable risk of harm resulting in injury,
except in the few instances where courts have thought some
public policy sufficiently strong to justify a party's status im-
munizing him from suit.3 No English decision has answered
the question of whether a minor child should be allowed to sue
his parent for acts which outside the family relationship would
create an unreasonable risk of harm.4 In 1891, when confronted
with an action between parent and child involving an intentional
or willful tort, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Hewlett v.
Georges enunciated the doctrine of parent-child immunity.
Minnesota followed in 1908 with its decision in Taubert v. Tau-
1. The court did not consider another action brought individually
by the father to recover medical expenses. Since the defendant mother
had made a single motion to dismiss the actions on grounds that she
was immune as mother of plaintiff son and as wife of plaintiff father,
the court's resolution of the parental immunity question unfavorably
to the mother was sufficient to dismiss the motion as a whole.
2. The court also declared that the change was prospective only,
except as applied to the instant case. Silesky v. Kelman, __ MAinn. __
161 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1968).
3. Parties most commonly immune include governmental units,
public officers, and charities. See W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 996
(3d ed. 1964).
4. English courts have also been silent in the area of child-parent
intentional torts, but at common law a minor child could always main-
tain an action against his parent to enforce contract and property rights.
See, e.g., King v. Sells, 193 Wash. 294, 75 P.2d 130 (1938).
5. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) (minor confined for 11 days in
an insane asylum sued her mother for false imprisonment).
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bert,6 and the doctrine was soon accepted by a majority of
United States courts3
Courts have set forth many justifications for parental im-
munity,8 the most common of which are: (1) to preserve do-
mestic tranquillity; (2) to promote parental control and author-
ity; (3) to discourage fraud and collusion; and (4) to avoid de-
priving other family members of their share of family resources)
While claiming adherence to the doctrine, courts have limited
the rule's impact by carving numerous exceptions.' 0 The most
commonly recognized exception allows actions for intentional and
willful acts by a parent." Even within the confines of negligent
misconduct, courts have increasingly departed from the doctrine
in two major instances. When the special parent-child relation-
ship has been terminated by emancipation 12 or death of either
the parent or the child,' 3 the justifications for the rule are
obviously inapplicable. Second, when the parent is acting in an
occupational capacity at the time of his misconduct, the parent-
child relationship is said to be merely incidental.14
6. 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908) (action for negligence). Lat-
er, in Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 377, 199 N.W. 97 (1924) (action
for intentional and willful misconduct), the Minnesota Supreme Court
adopted language verbatim from the Hewlett case and lived with it
for over 40 years:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and
a sound public policy . . . forbid to the minor child a right to
appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.
7. Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423 (1951).
8. "Parental immunity" limits the discussion to actions brought
by a minor child against his parent. "Parent-child immunity" also in-
cludes the reverse situation where the parent brings the action.
9. See generally McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VMi.
L. REv. 521, 528-29 (1960). Analogy to intraspousal immunity is of
limited significance because of the latter's different policy basis-the
common law view that husband and wife were one-and its legislative
changes in the United States. W. PRossm, supra note 3, at 885-86.
10. See 1967 U. ILL. L. FoR. 805 for a comprehensive discussion.
11. Despite immunity having originated to protect such conduct, the
usual explanation is that when the culpability involved is greater than
ordinary negligence, domestic tranquility has already been disrupted and
parental authority does not extend to such behavior. See, e.g., Emery
v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7
Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
12. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Lancaster, 213 Miss. 536, 57 So. 2d 302
(1952). While minority is a significant factor and often used in place of
"unemancipated," the real test appears to be whether the parent has
surrendered his parental rights and duties. See Thompson v. Thompson,
264 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1954).
13. See, e.g., Davis v. Smith, 253 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1953); Bren-
necke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960).
14. See, e.g., Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952);
[Vol. 53:10261108
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
While the exceptions have greatly diminished the effective-
ness of the parental immunity doctrine as originally formulated,
the most significant diminution came in 1963 in Gofler v.
White.1r Instead of making another exception, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court wholly abrogated the immunity rule in negli-
gence actions. The court announced a rule that allows suits by
a child against his parent except where the parent's act involves
an exercise of either parental authority or ordinary parental
discretion in providing the child with necessities.16 When faced
with actions involving a parent's negligent driving, New Hamp-
shire17 and Alaska 8 recently abolished parental immunity. In
contrast to Wisconsin, however, these courts did not explicitly
set down a new rule, but rather rejected immunity as applied
to the facts of each case. Minnesota is the only other jurisdiction
to be significantly persuaded by the minority view. 9
In rejecting 20 the immunity doctrine, the instant court rea-
soned that since most litigation by a child against his parent
results from operation of the family automobile, most possible
disruption of family harmony and discipline is negated by the
Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). Some courts
have attempted to make an exception to the immunity rule by distin-
guishing between a natural parent and one standing in loco parentis,
but they have not been generally followed. See Gillett v. Gillett, 168
Cal. App. 2d 102, 335 P.2d 736 (1959).
15. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). In this case, not only
was the parent a foster father standing in loco parentis but his liability
insurance, by an exclusion provision, was held not to cover his plaintiff
son. The court relied heavily on analogy to the intraspousal immunity
abrogation 35 years earlier, noting that it apparently did not promote
family discord. See 1964 Wis. L. REv. 714.
16. The exact wording of the Goller exceptions is identical to that
of the instant case except for the inclusion in the latter of the word
"reasonable" in the first exception relating to the exercise of parental
authority. See text accompanying note 2, supra.
17. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); see 13
N.Y.U.L. FoR. 182 (1967).
18. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967); see 16 KAN. L. REv.
562 (1968).
19. In Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966) (action for
child negligently driving automobile), Minnesota abolished immunity
in the reverse situation where the parent brings an action against his
child. See 71 Dicm. L. REV. 145 (1966); 12 S.D.L. REv. 364 (1967). Both
Wisconsin and New Hampshire have also abolished immunity where a
parent sues his minor child for negligence. See Gaudreau v. Gaudreau,
106 N.H. 551, 215 A.2d 695 (1965); Ertl v. Ertl, 30 Wis. 2d 372, 141 N.W.2d
208 (1966).
20. At the outset, the court unhesitantly established its power to
overrule precedent by noting that since the immunity doctrine has ajudicial origin, the court, not the legislature, should determine its pres-
ent applicability. - Minn. at , 161 N.W.2d at 632.
19691 1109
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1026
prevalence of automobile liability insurance.21 As to suits re-
sulting from other activities,22 the court suggested the unlikeli-
ness of any family harmony being disturbed.23 The court further
noted that actions have been allowed between minors in the same
household, and between parent and child where property and
contract rights are involved or exceptions to immunity exist,24
notwithstanding the possibility of disrupting family harmony.
The court also relied on Balts v. Baits,25 which denied immunity
to a child being sued by his parent, reasoning that there was no
difference in principle or policy between that situation and the
reverse one at bar, the family-discord argument being the basis
for immunity in each.26
With much less explanation, the court disposed of the
analogy to intraspousal immunity,2 7 and the depletion of family
resources28 and collusion 29 arguments. Concluding that the doc-
trine's traditional explanations are outweighed by the necessity
of affording a remedy to the injured child, the court merely
stated that "this factor of negligent wrong is and must be of
paramount significance." 30  While the court dealt almost ex-
clusively with abolishing the doctrine without regard to ex-
ceptions, it did state that the child should be afforded a remedy,
"subject to certain exceptions in accordance with the holding"
21. Id. at , 161 N.W.2d at 634-36.
22. The most typical non-driving activities would probably be in-
cluded in the court's exception classifications of disciplining the child
and providing necessities for the child. See text accompanying note
2 supra.
23. - Minn. at , 161 N.W.2d at 635-36. The court cited HARPER
AND JAVES for the propositions that actions should be allowed where "it
is reasonably clear that the domestic peace has already been disturbed
beyond repair or where by reason of the circumstances it is not imperiled,
and where the reasonableness of family discipline is not involved" and
family harmony is not disturbed where there is liability insurance cover-
age. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAM-ES, LAW OF TORTS § 8.11, at 650 (1956).
24. - Minn. at ___, 161 N.W.2d at 634-35. The court specifically
mentioned the exceptions where the parent is deceased, where the par-
ent's act constitutes willful misconduct, and where the parent was acting
in his occupational capacity at the time of the act. Id.
25. 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); see note 20 supra.
26. - Minn. at , 161 N.W.2d at 635-36. The court analogized
the question before it to the converse situation in Ertl v. Ertl, 30 Wis. 2d
372, 141 N.W.2d 208 (1966), since at the time of that case, the immunity
of a parent had already been abolished in Goller.
27. - Minn. at , 161 N.W.2d at 636. See note 9 supra.
28. Id. at , 161 N.W.2d at 636-37; see reason (4) in text accom-
panying note 9 supra.
29. Id. at , 161 N.W.2d at 637; see reason (3) in text accom-
panying note 9 supra.
30. Id. The court cited the Hebel case for this same conclusion.
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in Goller.31 However, the instant court deviated from the Gofler
court by qualifying the parental authority exception with the
word "reasonable."
32
While there are valid and persuasive reasons for abolishing
the long-standing parental immunity rule, the court's reasoning
appears to have left some problems. The court relied greatly
on the prospect of very few actions arising where liability insur-
ance is not present, but made exceptions to the rule for some
parental functions without mentioning that homeowner's lia-
bility insurance would seem to indemnify a parent for such
acts. Furthermore, the currently low number of actions without
liability insurance present is of very limited relevance when con-
sidering the future incentive to sue resulting from the instant
case.83 Also, it is possible that insurance companies or private
parties will demand the exclusion of intrafamily indemnity to
avoid an increase in premium rates or the inequities of
collusion.3 4 If this resulted, the Silesky rule would stand absent
the most important reason for abolishing immunity, namely the
prevalence of liability insurance.35
The court relied further on other intrafamily actions that
are allowed without noting that their underlying policy bases
may be different. Allowing suits between minors in the same
household, and between parent and child involving property
and contract rights and where exceptions to immunity exist are
not likely to threaten the maintenance of parental authority
and control to the same degree as some non-excepted negligence
actions since in the former, either the parent is not a party to
the suit or the parent's authority is not at issue.36 Similarly,
the court found no difference in policy between a suit by a child
against his parent and the reverse suit in Bats,37 despite the
Baits court having said that the two types of suits "may well
31. Id.
32. Id. at , 161 N.W.2d at 638. See note 16 supra, and accom-
panying text.
33. It must be realized that parental immunity was in effect at the
time of this observation.
34. See reason (4) in text accompanying note 9 supra.
35. For more considerations, see Justice Sheran's dissenting opinion
in Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 439, 142 N.W.2d 66, 80 (1966). Justice
Sheran also dissented in the instant case. - Minn. at , 161 N.W.2d
at 639.
36. Even the situation where the parent's act is willful can be dis-
tinguished on this basis by the argument that parental authority does
not extend to such behaviour. See note 11 supra.
37. See note 26 supra, and accompanying text. In Silesky, Justice
Peterson concurred, giving this as the only reason for his decision.
161 N.W.2d at 638.
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involve different and distinguishable policy considerations."3
Arguably, allowing a child to sue his parent is more likely to
result in diminished parental authority and control than allow-
ing a parent to sue his child since the latter may at most result
in some degree of disrespect for the parent.3 9 Furthermore, prop-
erty and contract actions present little danger of collusion
since there is usually no indemnifier present.
After rejecting the parental immunity doctrine, the Silesky
court articulated a rule that in scope appears to go beyond that
of any other state in allowing a child to sue his parent for negli-
gent acts. 40 In so doing, however, the court's opinion seems to
present a contradiction. Early in the opinion, the court sug-
gested that suits should be allowed only "where the reasonable-
ness of family discipline is not involved."41 Yet the court's rule
explicitly subjects family disciplinary acts to the test of "reason-
ableness" in allowing a child to sue his parent.42 The Silesky
court claims adherence to the Goller reasoning, but this appears
to be the precise determination that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
avoided by its carefully drawn rule.43 In Lemmen v. Servais,44
decided only four months prior to the instant case, the Wisconsin
court interpreted the Goller rule as not subjecting a parent
to suit "for each failure to exercise care and judgment commen-
surate with the risk" while performing "parental functions."' Ir
The court concluded that within the parental functions of author-
38. 273 Minn. 419, 433, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (1966).
39. Where a parent sues his child, courts have generally applied
parental immunity in reverse but have necessarily relied on the domes-
tic tranquility argument. In Silesky, Justice Rogosheske wrote a per-
suasive dissent mainly focusing on the differences between the two ac-
tions. - Minn. at , 161 N.W.2d at 638.
40. See text accompanying note 32 supra. The word "reasonable"
has a limiting effect on the exception, which thereby broadens the
scope of the rule.
41. See note 23 supra.
42. See text accompanying note 2 supra. Disciplinary acts are as-
sumed to be properly included as exercises of parental authority and
control. See In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 604, 237 N.W. 589, 590 (1931),
where the court states "discipline" has "various meanings" and "no tech-
nical legal meaning," but generally signifies "instruction, comprehend-
ing the communication of knowledge and training, to observe and act in
accordance with certain rules or practice, and may include correction."
43. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
44. 30 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968) (disallowed action for
parent's failure to instruct child to cross highway safely).
45. Id. at 79, 158 N.W.2d at 344. The court cited a Michigan case
that favorably identified the Goller rule as the "parental functions im-
munity rule." See Rodebaugh v. Grand Truck Western Ry., 4 Mich.
App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401 (1966).
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ity and discretion as to necessities, parents should be afforded
absolute immunity.46
The social value of the duties society exacts of a parent and
the necessarily close and continuous relationship of parent and
child have always been important exculpatory circumstances
considered in determining whether a parent's disciplinary acts
create an unreasonable risk of harm to the child.47 A negligent
tort exists only if the means used by a parent to discipline his
child are unreasonable for the ends to be accomplished. 48 But
if parental immunity exists as to a parent's disciplinary acts, an
action may not be maintained even though a tort exists, thereby
making the tort determination wholly academic. 49 Today, this
appears to be the case in states where the immunity doctrine is in
force; in New Hampshire and Alaska, where immunity has been
abolished only for negligent driving; and in Wisconsin, where
parents by the Goller exceptions have retained immunity as
to disciplinary acts. Minnesota, however, is now the first state
to allow actions for a parent's unreasonable disciplinary acts and
so has implicitly given some significance to the existence or non-
existence of a tort.50 Therefore, it appears that a parent's exer-
cise of unreasonable authority or control over his child, such as
punishing51 or instructing a child to do a dangerous act, would
46. The distinction drawn by the Lemmen court between parental
functions arising from the special parent-child relationship and non-
parental functions where the relationship is only incidental was recog-
nized by several courts while the immunity doctrine was in full force.
See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930) (referred to later
as a landmark decision); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445
(1950). This distinction also appears to be the underlying basis for the
"occupational capacity" exception to the immunity rule. See Borst v.
Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
47. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 139-40. The same considerations
used to determine whether conduct is reasonable under the circumstances
in the area of negligence are used to determine whether it is "privileged"
to avoid intentional torts. Id. at 99.
48. Id. at 99-100, 140.
49. Id. at 140.
50. The lasting significance given the existence or non-existence
of a tort will actually depend upon the future interpretation given "rea-
sonable parental authority and control." If it is interpreted the same as
the "reasonable man in circumstances of parenthood" standard, an action
will always be allowed when a tort results from a disciplinary act. If
it is interpreted more broadly, immunity will still protect some tortious
conduct from suit. But if it is interpreted more narrowly, immunity will
even be abolished for some non-tortious conduct. In this event, the
"reasonable under the circumstances" test will not only determine
whether a tort exists, but also whether an action is allowed.
51. The punishment must, of course, be in the form of a negligent
act since Silesky applies only to negligence, and actions for non-privi-
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result in liability only in the state of Minnesota.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Silesky commendably re-
jected the outdated parental immunity doctrine but the court's
failure to focus on some important considerations can only create
speculation as to the desirability of the rule set forth. The court
should have noted the real possibility of actions being allowed
where no liability insurance is present. Similarly, it should
have recognized that other intrafamily suits rest to a great
extent on different policy bases. Finally, the court overlooked
the present authority for retaining absolute immunity for the
negligent exercise of all parental functions.52 In view of the
above, the dissent's statement that the majority used a "hatchet
instead of a scalpel" seems well-founded. 53
Extreme judicial restraint is a necessity when consideration
is given to allowing a new cause of action within the family
unit. It is far from clear that the traditional justifications for
parental immunity are outweighed by other considerations when
the misconduct occurs in the performance of essentially parental
functions the existence of which is primarily attributable to
the special parent-child relationship. 54 However, the majority's
lack of restraint in establishing the new Minnesota rule will sub-
ject the exercise of parental authority and control to the test of
"reasonableness," and for the first time allow a child to litigate
his parent's misconduct in the performance of parental func-
tions.
Zoning: Aesthetic Motivation Will Not Invalidate
Billboard Ordinance; Amortization of Existing
Billboards Constitutional
Defendant village, seeking to develop a wholly residential
district as part of a comprehensive municipal plan, enacted a
zoning ordinance' which prohibited the erection of billboards
leged intentional torts are allowed by exception to the immunity doc-
trine. The most typical case of negligent punishment would probably
be an instruction to do some act.
52. Lemmen v. Servais, 30 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968); Goller
v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
53. - MVinn. at , 161 N.W.2d at 639 (dissenting opinion).
54. See note 46 supra.
1. Ordinance No. 50, entitled "Signs and Billboards," was en-
acted on May 8, 1961. It permitted the maintenance of certain types of
signs, such as professional or institutional name plate signs, but classi-
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within the residential area and which required that pre-existing
billboards be removed after a three year "amortization period."'
Aesthetic considerations were significant in motivating the
ordinance's adoption.3  After the expiration of the three year
period, plaintiff commenced a declaratory judgment action
challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance and request-
ing an injunction against its enforcement. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court held that if a municipal zoning ordinance is other-
wise constitutional as reasonably promoting a traditional police
power objective, the fact that aesthetic considerations motivated
its adoption will not invalidate it. The court also held that the
amortization device does not violate the constitutional pro-
scription against the taking of property without just compen-
sation and that the provision was not invalid on its face or as
applied. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Company v. Village of
Minnetonka, - Minn. -, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
The police power of a state or municipality may be exercised
in the interests of public health, safety, morals, and general wel-
fare.4 In furtherance of these objectives, the police power has
been utilized to attack a broad range of infirmities in a city's
physical environment, 5 most often through zoning restrictions.
The Minnesota legislature first authorized certain cities to
create residential districts through zoning in 1913.6 A Minne-
apolis ordinance enacted thereafter prohibited the subsequent
initiation of a business enterprise within an area designated
residential.7 The restriction was held unconstitutional in State
ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton,s the court declaring that a munic-
ipality is without power to exclude ordinary store buildings from
fled those unspecified as nonconforming and required their removal
within three years from the effective date of the ordinance.
2. Three months prior to the expiration date, plaintiff received
letters from the chief building inspector of defendant village stating
that 14 of its billboards, and eight billboards owned by General Out-
door Advertising Company, whose assets were recently purchased by
plaintiff, were nonconforming and would have to be removed.
3. The court considered the issue on the basis of its statement that
"aesthetics admittedly were a significant factor in the council's deci-
sion .... ." Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka,
- Minn. _, 162 N.W.2d 206, 213 (1968). See also note 19 infra.
4. See, e.g., Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 290 U.S. 398,
437 (1934); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872); Com-
monwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 85 (Mass. 1851).
5. See notes 11 & 13 infra, and accompanying text.
6. Ch. 98, § 1; ch. 420, §§ 1-4, [1913] Minn. Laws 102, 618.
7. Minneapolis, Minn., Aug. 20, 1915.
8. 134 Minn. 226, 158 N.W. 1017 (1916).
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residential districts." Frustrated by this narrow interpretation
of the police power, municipalities sought the development of
exclusively residential areas through the power of eminent do-
main.10 The approach was successful but proved unnecessary
after the court, in State ex tel. Beery v. Houghton," overruled
Lachtman and held that the city could exclude less objectionable
structures, such as four-family flats, from the residential dis-
trict.12
Subsequent courts consistently upheld the municipality's
power to exclude both offensive and inoffensive uses in develop-
ing residential districts.13 Although the opinions frequently
failed to explain the basis for invoking the police power,14 it
9. The court restrictively interpreted the police power by stat-
ing that "[o]nly such use of property as may produce injurious conse-
quences, or infringe the lawful rights of others, can be prohibited
without violating the constitutional provisions that the owner shall not
be deprived of his property without due process of law nor without
compensation. . . ." Id. at 237, 158 N.W. at 1021-22.
Although this limited reading of a municipality's zoning power was
representative of the early courts, Vorlander v. Hokenson, 145 Minn.
484, 175 N.W. 995 (1920); Meyers v. Houghton, 137 Minn. 481, 163 N.W.
754 (1917), the judicial decisions did not completely incapacitate local
zoning authority. State v. Dirnberger, 152 Minn. 44, 187 N.W. 972
(1922) (laundry); St. Paul v. Kessler, 146 Minn. 124, 178 N.W. 171
(1920) (funeral home); State ex tel. Banner Grain Co. v. Houghton,
142 Minn. 28, 170 N.W. 853 (1919) (cereal mill).
10. In State ex tel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144
Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159 (1919), the court held that the power of eminent
domain could be used so that the effect of the condemnation resulted
only in restricting the property's use and not in taking property from
the owner. The property owner was, of course, entitled to compensa-
tion for the condemnation.
11. 164 Minn. 146, 204 N.W. 569 (1925), aff'd mem., 272 U.S. 671
(1927).
12. The Beery court, id. at 150, 204 N.W. at 570, said that the police
power is "responsive" to such changing conditions as increasingly com-
plex social relationships and growing population density, and noted that
a restriction upon the use of private property which was formerly
thought to be unconstitutional is "accepted now without a thought
that it invades a private right."
13. Connor v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d
789 (1957) (prohibition of lawn mower and general repair shop in farm-
ing residental district); State v. Miller, 206 Minn. 345, 288 N.W. 713
(1939) (prohibition of bag cleaning industry in light industrial zone);
State ex tel. Madsen v. Houghton, 182 Minn. 77, 233 N.W. 831 (1930)
(prohibition of apartment houses in residential district); State ex Tel.
McKusick v. Houghton, 171 Minn. 231, 213 N.W. 907 (1927) (building
protrusion limited by set-back provision).
14. The Beery court justified the ordinance because it "bettered"
living conditions. Other cases, such as Madsen v. Houghton and State v.
Miller, have simply cited the Beery case. The court in Connor v. Town-
ship of Chanhassen, provided a relatively detailed explanation by stating
1116 [Vol. 53:1026
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
appears that sightliness had not attained explicit judicial
cognizance as a valid police power objective. In Oscar P. Gustaf-
son Company v. Minneapolis,1 5 however, the latent issue of
aesthetics finally surfaced when the court upheld an ordinance
requiring the removal of overhanging signs in downtown Min-
neapolis. Although the court assumed that aesthetic consid-
erations were a motivating factor behind the ordinance, it ac-
cepted the city's contention that the restriction was justified
because of the signs' danger to passers-by, obstruction of light
and view, and detrimental effect on real estate values. While the
court did not discount the propriety of aesthetics as an additional
basis of validity,16 it avoided a holding on that ground. Al-
though the validity of basing property use restrictions on
aesthetic considerations has been expressly denied in some
recent cases,17 the statements have been dicta.'8 Thus, prior to
the instant case, many offensive and inoffensive uses had been
validly restricted in residential districts, but the validity of
restrictions motivated by aesthetic considerations had never been
specifically adjudicated.
The court in the instant case held that a municipal zoning
that "uses of land which might depreciate the value of surrounding
property and impair its livability" could be prohibited. 249 linn. at
211, 81 N.W.2d at 595. Furthermore, only the court in State ex rel.
McKusick v. Houghton, 172 Minn. 231, 213 N.W. 907 (1927), opined
which objective was invoked. It was found that the police power was
exercised for the general welfare.
15. 231 linn. 271, 42 N.W.2d 809 (1950).
16. The court cited several cases which explicitly accepted the
factor of aesthetic considerations. Among them was Perlmutter v.
Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 332, 182 N.E. 5, 6 (1932), which said: "Beauty
may not be queen, but she is not an outcast beyond the pale of protec-
tion or respect. She may at least shelter herself under the wing of
safety, morality, or decency."
17. Ostrand v. Village of N. St. Paul, 275 Minn. 440, 447, 147 N.W.
2d 571, 575 (1966); Alexander v. Minneapolis, 267 Mlinn. 155, 160, 125
N.W.2d 583, 587 (1963); Golden v. St. Louis Park, 266 Mlinn. 46, 56,
122 N.W.2d 570, 577 (1963); Olsen v. Mfinneapolis, 263 Minn. 1, 11,
115 N.W.2d 734, 741 (1962); Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minnn. 553,
569, 118 N.W.2d 659, 670 (1962).
18. For example, the issue in Golden v. City of St. Louis Park, 266
Minn. 46, 122 N.W.2d 570 (1963), was the validity of a municipal planning
commission's refusal to issue a permit for the operation of an "automo-
bile reduction yard" in an industrial district. Although the court said
that police action cannot destroy valuable property rights solely upon a
desire for aesthetics as determined by the commission, a rule excluding
aesthetics as a proper objective of the police power cannot be obtained
from the decision. The statement that municipal action cannot be arbi-
trary or discriminatory was dispositive of the issue, since the court had
found that the use in question would be as "presentable" as others
in the area.
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ordinance which is reasonably related to promoting a traditional
police power objective will not be invalidated by the fact that
aesthetic considerations were a significant motivating factor.19
Since the trial court had found the billboards not injurious to
the public health, safety, or morals, 20 the appellate court de-
clared that the decisive issue was whether the ordinance pro-
moted the general welfare. After the customary judicial defer-
ence to legislative choice, the court framed the police-power test
as "whether plaintiff has established that the village council was
arbitrary and unreasonable in its legislative determination that
the . . . [restriction] promotes the general welfare. '2 1 As a
conjunctive statement between its exposition of the test and the
holding, the court declared that the "mere fact" that a zoning
restriction is aesthetically motivated will not invalidate an
"otherwise valid" ordinance.22 In determining whether the
necessary promotion of the public welfare was present, the court
relied upon the trial record showing that exclusively residential
zoning improves property values with a subsequent increase in
a municipality's tax base.23
Although prior courts have consistently upheld attempts to
develop exclusively residential districts, they have long failed
to acknowledge the validity of aesthetic motives in zoning.2 4 The
19. The trial court made no finding of fact on the motivations of
the village council in enacting the ordinance. The village only claimed
that the ordinance would in fact promote the general welfare. It ap-
pears that adherence to this strategy will be sufficient even though
aesthetics might be the sole motivating factor.
20. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka,
M inn. __, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968). The court said that the trial court
found, "apparently on the basis of the uncontradicted and unchallenged
testimony of an expert witness testifying on behalf of plaintiff," that
the billboards did not create a safety or traffic hazard. Id. at 209-10.
The village had conceded that the billboards did not adversely affect
public health or morals.
21. Id. at 210.
22. Id. at 212. The court also said that the "considerations of taste
and beauty more likely reflect a community-wide opinion of what is
necessary to advance and stabilize neighborhood values rather than the
purely subjective opinions of members of the council," and that there-
fore aesthetics "were not the sole basis" of the council's decision. Id.
at 212-13.
23. Id. at 212. The court footnoted a finding of the trial court
that Minnetonka's further development and growth points toward resi-
dential development almost exclusively." Id. at 210.
24. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
According to traditional doctrine the community may not
use the police power to accomplish primarily aesthetic objec-
tives, but planners and lawyers have long had serious doubts
whether in fact this doctrine describes what courts have done
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instant court's declaration that the "mere fact" that an ordinance
is aesthetically motivated will not be an invalidating factor 25
was, therefore, a significant change in judicial posture. The
court failed, however, to draw upon any of the explanatory
tenets of aesthetically minded courts or writers.2 6 Instead, it
merely concluded that "[o]bviously, aesthetics play a signifi-
cant part in residential zoning. 27
An alternative rationale for validating an aesthetically moti-
vated ordinance is that of a Hawaii court which "accept[ed]
beauty as a proper community objective, attainable through the
use of the police power" without requiring that a need be shown
in economics, health, safety, or morals.28 This holding, deeming
the promotion of beauty a valid goal of the police power, differs
from the Naegele rule, which seems to require improvement in
community economic indices such as increased or stabilized prop-
erty values. The difference in these approaches, as a practical
matter, will seldom produce a difference in the outcome. Rare
will be the case in which the requisite economic advances do not
accompany aesthetic regulations. The community consensus on
aesthetics which supposedly provides the mandate for legislative
action behind zoning restrictions is the same as that which sub-
sequently manifests itself by a marketplace preference for a more
sightly habitat. It therefore follows 29 that where zoning can be
in the past in approving ordinances ....
Where courts have allowed community officials to prohibit
what are in reality aesthetically objectionable land uses, their
language indicates that they have closed their eyes to the real
underlying facts. Yet what courts say and what courts do
are two different things, and it is not proper to conclude from
their language that courts do not know what is going on.
Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 218, 223 (1955).
25. See note 22 supra, and accompanying text.
26. "It is within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (discussing the power of eminent domain).
See Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 158, 196 N.W. 451, 455 (1923); THE
SENSE OF BEAUTY, Intro. (1896) in I THE Woaxs OF GEORGE SANTAYANA 5
(1936).
27. - Minn. at , 162 N.W.2d at 212.
28. State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 429 P.2d 825, 827 (Hawaii 1967).
It is noted that the Hawaii Constitution art. VIII, § 5, provides that
natural beauty and sightliness may be preserved and to that end pri-
vate property may be subjected to reasonable regulations. Cases in
other jurisdictions, however, approach or match the unqualified position
of Diamond Motors. See Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d
748 (1967); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
29. A case where economic benefits do not accompany an aes-
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aesthetically justified, so also can it be justified economically.80
Perhaps influencing the court's decision to base validity on
an objectively measured community exigency such as economics
are the inherent difficulties in a test as subjective as aesthetics.
It was noted that some courts have invalidated aesthetically
motivated ordinances because they refuse to be placed in the
role of a "super art critic."31  The instant court avoided this
problem by adopting a test which provides a more workable
basis for determining the question of unreasonableness and
arbitrariness. If an ordinance is indeed motivated by commu-
nity aesthetic beliefs, this will be reflected by subsequent eco-
nomic advances. If, however, no economic improvement results,
it might be assumed that motivations other than genuine aes-
thetic desires, such as legislative caprice, engendered the ordi-
nance's enactment.
A somewhat puzzling assertion of the court is its statement
3 2
that the aesthetic motivation behind residential zoning ordinances
is more likely a reflection of public desire for the improvement
in neighborhood property values than a subjective decision of
the village council. First, as previously observed, it might be
questioned seriously whether economic motivations create a con-
sensus on the question of what is aesthetic or whether aesthetic
sensibilities produce economic demands. Second, the statement
imports to the council the motivation of advancing the com-
munity economy. Since "promotion" of general welfare con-
notes a result, and not a motivation,33 the statement is indeed a
theticaly based ordinance, however, might be hypothesized: A munici-
pality bans billboards along a scenic drive on the edge of the city
where the property is farmland. If anything, it would seem that the
property would decrease rather than increase in value as a result.
30. Although the instant court belatedly admitted the significant
role which aesthetics plays in zoning, see note 27 supra, and accom-
panying quote, the analytical framework which the court constructed
appears to necessitate still another admission. Instead of implicitly pro-
claiming that sightliness and economics are separate and distinct, the
court might have professed a causal connection between the two. If it
is taken that beauty creates economic demands measurable by eco-
nomic indices, then beauty is the direct result of the zoning restriction
while economic advances are the indirect result. See Bettman,
Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HAIRV. L. REv. 834, 840 (1924); Note,
The Administration of Zoning Flexibility Devices: An Explanation for
Recent Judicial Frustration, 49 AM . L. REv. 973, 979 (1965).
31. See Trust Co. v. Chicago, 408 IlM. 91, 96 N.E.2d 499 (1951);
Stoner McCray System v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d
843 (1956); Hitchman v. Township of Oakland, 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d
306 (1951).
32. See note 22 supra.
33. An illustration of the distinction between effect and motivation
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curious one. The court found that the general welfare was not
only objectively promoted by the ordinance but also, and appar-
ently unnecessarily, that the motivation itself was to advance
economic factors.
The instant case has resolved the question of whether an
aesthetically based ordinance can be constitutional. Two points,
both stemming from the fact that the instant restriction excluded
a commercial use from a residential district,34 can be advanced
which might delimit a broad interpretation of the court's hold-
ing. First, the court stressed the fact that the defendant village
was developing an exclusively residential area.35 Exclusivity,
therefore, may be a condition necessary to the reasonable-
ness requirement of a restriction.36 Second, a future ordinance
might seek to restrict a residential use in a residential district,
such as requiring conformity to a stipulated architectural de-
sign.37 The instant court, in considering whether the ordinance
was reasonably related to promoting a police power objective,
stressed the fact that municipalities may exclude all nonresi-
dential uses from residential neighborhoods.3 8 It is apparent,
is found in Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659
(1962), where the court said that although the council was motivated
by the desire to protect present business from competition, the effect
did not promote health, safety, morals, or general welfare. The court
quoted the trial court's statement that it is "not the motive that makes
it invalid but the effect fortified by the fact that no justifiable reason
within permissible legal limits has been shown by the evidence." Id.
at 568, 118 N.W.2d at 669.
34. A zoning plan including such a restriction is common. See,
e.g., Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954);
State ex rel. Civiello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923);
Connor v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957).
35. - Minn. at .., , , 162 N.W.2d at 209, 212, 213.
36. Another potential distinguishing factor can be found in the
court's statement that the village zoning plan was "comprehensive." Id.
at 208, 213. However, the court will presumably continue to use the
test of the instant case which is based upon a determination of whether
a village council acts reasonably in exercising its legislative prerogative.
The issues of "exclusiveness" and "comprehensiveness" would then be
considered in the determination of the reasonableness of the village
action. The fact that aesthetics were a major motivation in the adop-
tion should not influence the decision.
37. See People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.
2d 734 (1963), where an ordinance prohibited the hanging of clothes-
lines in front and side yards in residential districts. An ordinance
might also restrict commercial uses in commercial districts. There is
Minnesota precedent, however, validating certain types of such restric-
tions. See Oscar P. Gustafson Co. v. Minneapolis, 231 Minn. 271,
42 N.W.2d 809 (1950) (prohibition of overhanging signs in commercial
district); State v. Miller, 206 Minn. 345, 288 N.W. 713 (1939) (prohibition
of bag cleaning industry in light industrial zone).
38. - Minn. at , 162 N.W.2d at 211.
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therefore, that the validity of restricting residential uses in a
residential district is yet to be decided.
A question which will be of future significance is whether
the municipality or the user has the burden of proving that a
restriction promotes, or fails to promote, the general welfare or
some other police power objective. Although the court inti-
mated 0 that this burden is on the user, it did not rule on this
issue.40 This point will be of increasing importance as the nature
of the restrictions becomes more aesthetically subtle, thereby
making proof of a relationship between the restriction and the
general welfare more difficult.41
The second issue to which the court addressed itself is signifi-
cant in determining whether a municipality can successfully
develop districts exclusive of nonconforming uses. While the
establishment of new nonconforming uses may be prohibited,
42
zoning power has traditionally been paralyzed when attempting
to interfere with property interests of lawful uses already in
existence.43  While the pre-existing nonconforming use could
be removed through the use of eminent domain,44 a newly con-
ceived legislative device for taking without payment is the re-
39. See note 21 supra, and accompanying quote. The court also
quoted with approval a statement in Kiges v. St. Paul, 240 Minn.
522, 530, 62 N.W.2d 363, 369 (1953), that a police power ordinance "can-
not be successfully attacked . . . unless there is affirmative proof that
the restriction is clearly . . . unreasonable and without any substan-
tial relation" to a police power objective. - Minn. at , 162 N.W.2d
at 209.
40. The burden of proof must fall either on the municipality to
show that the restriction promotes the general welfare or upon the user
to show that it does not. The opinion does not explicitly provide the
answer and a deduction is impeded by its statement that "clear evi-
dence" in the record shows that exclusively residential zoning enhances
the economic welfare. - Minn. at , 162 N.W.2d at 212. If the plain-
tiff-user had the burden of establishing that the absence of billboards
does not improve economic welfare, and failed in this proof, then the
court's statement appears to be unnecessary.
41. Proving that an ordinance promotes the general welfare may
be more difficult where the restriction involves a residential use in a
residential area or where it involves a traditionally unobjectionable
commercial use in a commercial area. See note 15 supra, and accom-
panying text. Proving that an ordinance fails to promote the general
welfare may be equally difficult in the various situations.
Difficulty of proof illustrates a weakness of the test which requires
advancement of the general welfare or other traditional objectives.
In fact, this drawback may be greater than the "super art critic" argu-
ment attributed as a fault of the test accepting aesthetics as a valid
objective.
42. State ex rel. Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 204 N.W. 569
(1925).
43. See Hawkins v. Talbot, 248 Minn. 549, 80 N.W.2d 863 (1957).
44. See note 10 supra, and accompanying text.
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quirement of removal after an amortization period.45 In a first
impression consideration of the device, the court upheld the
validity of requiring removal after amortizing the life of a use.
The court said that the traditional rule does not require that a
pre-existing use be allowed to expand or be rebuilt after de-
struction and that the theory underlying the amortization de-
vice is that the length of the amortization period approximates
the life of a use "so that the owner is not deprived of his property
until the end of its useful life. '46
The court then turned to consideration of two questions
which will remain relevant despite the validity of the amorti-
zation device: whether the ordinance was unconstitutional on
its face, and whether it was unconstitutional as applied. The
court held the provision not unconstitutional on its face because
the three year period was found to be reasonable.47 The court
held the provision not unconstitutional as applied because, in
disputing the validity of the ordinance itself, the plaintiff intro-
duced evidence insufficient to show a taking of a valuable prop-
erty interest without just compensation. Nevertheless, the court
considered the plaintiff's claims and indicated several avenues
available for attacking the application of an amortization ordi-
nance.
First, reimbursement for removal expenses was considered
but denied to the instant plaintiff because the lessee in a lease-
hold condemnation is not entitled to compensation for the cost
of removing personal property.48 It appears open to question,
however, whether a user who owns the property would be en-
titled to compensation for removal after the amortization period.49
45. See, e.g., Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212
Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957); Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d
442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
46. - Minn. at , 162 N.W.2d at 213. The court also said that
the interim monopoly position enjoyed by the property owner is a source
of supplemental compensation.
47. The court said that the plaintiff "cannot successfully challenge
this ordinance as unconstitutional on its face unless it would be un-
constitutional as applied to the property interests of every billboard
owner." Id. at , 162 N.W.2d at 213. The court found that the three
year period was reasonable because the value of the plaintiffs property
interest was either extinguished within the period, or, if not, the value
of freedom from new competition during the period equalled the value
of property interest unextinguished at the end of the period.
48. State v. Pahl, 257 Minn. 177, 100 N.W.2d 724 (1960).
49. See Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d
34 (1954), where payment for the cost of removing a plumbing business
was not allowed. In Gage, the cost of removal amounted to less than
one per cent of the gross revenue of the five year amortization period.
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Second, the court acknowledged some support for the conten-
tion that a user claiming a vested right to continue the conduct
of a lawful business does have a compensable property right.
The plaintiff must establish the value of such a right, however,
and here he failed to do so. Third, the court said that a user
can recover for the loss of property interests in the leases them-
selves in an amount equal to the fair rental value less the rent
payable for the remainder of the term. Because of failure to
introduce evidence, the court denied the plaintiff's claim to com-
pensation for its leases, which varied in length from one month
to 10 years.50 The court also noted that to determine whether
an owner must ultimately be compensated for loss of a lease-
hold interest, it is necessary to consider the termination pro-
visions in a lease. If, upon condemnation, a lease either termi-
nates by its provisions,51 or is terminable at the option of the
lessor,52 the lessee is not entitled to compensation. All leases at
issue, however, vested the power of termination in the hands of
the lessee and the court stated that such leases are therefore of
equal or perhaps increased value when it is initially established
that a taking has occurred. Since the plaintiff failed to show a
loss in the leases themselves, his power to terminate was of no
import.
The instant case was the first in Minnesota which questioned
the validity of a zoning ordinance based primarily on aesthetics.
The court accepted the propriety of an aesthetically motivated
ordinance, but found it necessary to ground its validity upon
considerations capable of objective measurement. Although such
a test measures an indirect effect of the restriction, its implemen-
tation is more feasible. The court also upheld the validity of
requiring removal of nonconforming uses after the expiration
of an amortization period, while indicating that a user can seek
Removal cost of the billboards in the instant case, however, was
shown by the record to be about $2,000 each. Since this would be a far
greater proportion of gross revenues than involved in Gage, Letter from
Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. to Mnux. L. REV., Jan. 17, 1969, on file
in Minnesota Law Library, it might be argued that the three year
amortization period was unreasonable.
50. If a lessee-user can show that he is entitled to compensation
for loss of a property interest in the leases themselves, it would be ad-
vantageous to him for the leases to be of lengthy duration, for, as the
court intimated, the compensation for short leases would be negligible.
- Minn. at , 162 N.W.2d at 214.
51. Korengold v. Minneapolis, 254 Minn. 358, 95 N.W.2d 112 (1959).
52. In re Improvement of Third Street, St. Paul, 178 Minn. 552,
228 N.W. 162 (1929).
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